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Abstract 
The successive conflicts in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards represented 
one of the most significant challenges for the European Union in the immediate post- 
Cold War context . This experience also coincided with the most intense period of 
development of the EU's formal external competences. The aims of this thesis are to 
establish what actions the EU took in relation to four conflicts that broke out in the 
fori-ner Yugoslavia; to determine the extent to which the nature of this involvement 
changed over time; and to examine how the identified patterns of activity might be 
best characterised. The objective of this characterisation of the EU's involvement in 
the fonner Yugoslavia is to consider how it has progressed, as distinct from other 
international actors, including its own member states. Four periods are considered 
corresponding with the conflicts in Slovenia/Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and the FYR of Macedonia. The extent to which the EU's policy towards the former 
Yugoslavia is evidence of an emerging European Foreign Policy is then considered, 
through a discussion of the extent to which key features associated with the notion of 
'foreign policy' are identifiable in this particular case. In conclusion it is argued that 
by 2001 the EU had developed what can be characterised as a limited and context- 
specific, but nevertheless distinctive, foreign policy . 
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1. Introduction 
The complex, violent and not yet fully resolved break-up of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represented probably the most dramatic and 
contentious challenge of the 1990's in Europe. Steeped in a history of conflict and 
international - or more specifically - European, interference, the unravelling of the 
federation in such a violent and divisive manner was however,, not inevitable. 
Yugoslavia's violent demise occurred due to its timing, both in terms of what was 
happening internally and the changes that were taking place in the international 
system overall. It occurred due to a broad range of inter-linked factors ranging from 
post-Tito political uncertainty, the weakness of civil society, the cynical manipulation 
of pre-existing ethnic tensions for political gain, to the loosening of the uncomfortable 
but relatively more predictable Cold War international order. The end of the Cold War 
presented a range of challenges, of which (in the initial stages)Yugoslavia was just 
one, and considerably less urgent than others. In addition to the range of ethnic 
tensions exacerbated by disputes over the future division and control over the region 
was the fact that the Yugoslav construct managed to contain, relatively successfully, a 
series of threats to overall regional stability. One of the main challenges posed by the 
vacuum left by the federation's demise has been to find a way to secure the region in 
the long-term, while at the same time acknowledging that Yugoslavia will never again 
exist as a single entity. 
The international response to the crises in Yugoslavia is an integral and 
inextricable part of the narrative of more than a decade of conflict. No account is 
complete without a consideration of the constant part played by a wide range of 
international actors throughout. They not only responded to events but also were 
active participants in them, often making both direct and indirect contributions to 
shaping them. This has been a feature of centuries of Balkan history, but was 
particularly the case from the beginning of the 1990's as an almost bewildering array 
of different types of actors at first stood on the side lines, unsure of their particular 
role and when it was either desirable or appropriate to get involved, and then, as the 
situation continued to deteriorate, scrambled to act in a highly incoherent, overlapping 
and chaotic manner. The then European Community(EQ, however, had no such 
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hesitations - rhetorically anyway. Seeing the Yugoslav situation very much in the 
same light as the range of post-Cold War challenges it was attempting to address, it 
moved quickly to assume a leadership position in the international response to the 
impending break-up of the federation. It quickly slipped from this central position and 
thereafter was a sometimes easily overlooked participant in the broader international 
response. However, there is something very particular about how the overall 
European Union (EU) approach to the region has developed that eventually saw it 
arriving at a position where it was pursuing not only a policy suited to its own 
particular competences but one that was also useful and appropriate for the region. In 
the absence of any other guiding framework within which to pursue the longer-term 
stabilisation of the region, by the end of the 1990's the EU was the only international 
actor in a position to be able to offer such a longer-term framework that might help 
contain the plethora of ethnic and geopolitical tensions that remained unresolved. 
However, despite the high-profile beginning of the EU's involvement in the 
successive conflicts in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, little effort has been made 
to consider both the nature of the EU's specific involvement and how it has changed 
overtime with any sense of perspective. The sheer complexity of the Yugoslav crisis 
and the range of participation in it has meant that a clear sense of the EU's overall 
role can tend to get lost. This is because the focus is not on the EU as an actor 
specifically, the time-frame considered is too narrow or the focus is on what went 
wrong in terms of the failures of the EU's own institutional procedures 
The starting point of this thesis is that there is a valuable 'story' to be told 
about the nature of the EU's own specific involvement in the former Yugoslavia over 
time and through the successive conflicts. In other words, it attempts to address the 
fact that what is missing is a sense of an overall perspective of what the EU has done 
over time and how it has or has not changed. What this involves is a certain re- 
focusing and synthesising of several over-lapping narratives, including that of the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, the overall international response and the process of EU 
political integration. The story can be told from the perspective of each of the actors 
involved in order to establish the nature of the involvement, how it changed and its 
relationship to the particular context. However, the EU's connection to the region and 
the way it very slowly began to 'find its feet' is of particular interest as in many ways 
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it served as the test ground of what was possible in practice, as distinct from 
aspiration. 
To that end the focus here will be on the substance of what the EU did or what 
was done in the name of the EU in relation to the four primary conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia over a twelve-year time frame. The purpose of this is threefold: first, to 
establish what it was that the EU specifically did in relation to each conflict; second, 
to establish the extent and ways in which the nature of its involvement has changed 
over time; and third, how the identified patterns of activity can be characterised. A 
clear sense of when it was the EU that was acting will be achieved by restricting the 
focus to the actions of the EU's institutions. At the same time, these actions will be 
placed in context with those of the other actors involved in order to highlight what 
exactly was specific and distinct about the EU's response. The EU's actions will also 
be located within the context of the development of the EU's external competence and 
how it can best be characterised in this regard. The purpose is to establish the extent 
and nature of the any change in the nature of the EU-Ievel policy towards the region 
over time. 
Therefore, there are overall two broader contextual narratives that must be 
considered while isolating, analysing and locating the EU's response. The first of 
these is that of the development of what will be described as European Foreign 
Policy. Chapter Two establishes what is understood by the notion of the EU's external 
activity, both in formal and practical terms. It is argued that a broad range of activity 
needs to be considered, beyond the confines of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) in order to really capture the full range of what the EU has done in the 
fon-ner Yugoslavia. Through an exploratory discussion of some of the key issues and 
relevant approaches, it then outlines ways in which the idea of the development and 
change in the nature of activity can be accessed in conceptual tenns and establishes 
the premise that, despite not exhibiting certain key features of statehood, there are 
ways in which certain patterns in the EU's external activity can be characterised as a 
developing and specific kind of foreign policy. 
The second of these broader contextual narratives will be considered in 
Chapter Three, which will provide a broad overview of the context of the break-up of 
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the former Yugoslavia, and the nature of the roles of other actors involved. It will 
assess existing treatments of the EU's involvement in this regard. Much has been 
written on the former Yugoslavia and the international response in general, as well as 
many useful analyses of the EUS own involvement. However, there is a need for not 
just a specific focus on the substance of the EU's own response, but also a focus on it 
over time in order to fully get a sense of perspective on what has actually happened 
and what it means. 
Chapter Four will then link these two narratives and set out how the EU's 
involvement in four phases of conflict will be dealt with, focussing on an account of 
the substance of the EU's response to the crises, followed by an analysis of the types 
of action taken. Building on the discussions in the previous chapters, development 
will be measured in terms of the extent to which the discussed patterns of activity 
exhibit less reactive and more strategic features, the extent to which there is better 
linkage between the goal pursed and the actually available capabilities and finally any 
change in the nature of the function or role performed by the EU in this particular 
context. 
Chapters Five to Eight will then deal specifically with the EU's involvement 
in four conflicts which followed the onset of the break-up of the Yugoslav federation 
from 1991. First the initial reaction to the crisis in Slovenia and Croatia will be 
considered as a starting point. This much criticised and analysed period will here be 
discussed with a focus on what the EU did do in broad terms, and will serve as a unit 
against which subsequent developments can be compared in order to establish the 
extent of development, as will each of the subsequent chapters as they build upon 
each other. Second, the complex and contentious Bosnian conflict will be considered. 
Most accounts dealing with the EU and the international reaction to former 
Yugoslavia centre on a consensus of a failure in Bosnia. Here, however5 it will be 
considered as evidence of the beginning of a development of a more appropriate 
response that feeds through into the third conflict in Kosovo. In this period, what will 
be identified as the particular EU response is ftirther consolidated through to the 
response to the final phase of conflict in Macedonia The phases of activity outlined 
will be informed by the two primary contextual narratives with the EU"s position 
being the central focus. It has been elaborated upon and given more focus through a 
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more detailed focus on a broad range of EU statements and documents in order to 
isolate the EU's particular actions ftom the international reaction as a whole. 
With the development of the EU's external competence in fonnal terms and 
the need on the part of the EU to respond to situations as they arose, it will be shown 
that it was often the case that the policy pursued lagged-behind what it appeared the 
EU could or should have been able or willing to do. This often led to an uneasy mix 
of old and new instruments and approaches being used. Overall, however it will be 
shown that the EU focused more and more on the tasks to which it was best suited 
throughout the period under examination, despite some ill-advised forays into more 
ambitious and high-profile endeavours. 
The concluding chapter will bring together the analyses of these patterns 
through the four conflicts and review the overall response of the EU towards the 
former Yugoslavia over twelve years and how it has changed. This will then be 
discussed more precisely in ten-ns of the ways in which it has changed and specifically 
in terms of displaying what were earlier established as key features that allow the 
characterisation of the EU's external policy as a sui generis European Foreign Policy 
(EFP). 
Note on place names and ethnic groupings: 
Throughout this text when referring to the entirety of what was once known as 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia it will specified that it is either the 
fon-ner Yugoslavia or the Yugoslav federation that is being discussed. Elsewhere, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) refers to what was left of the federation after 
the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia - in other 
words it refers to the overall entity centred on Belgrade that is today known as Serbia 
and Montenegro. Kosovo is referred to as Kosovo (rather than Kosova) throughout 
because it has become the default name for the region used by the international media 
and international community and does not presuppose the relative legitimacy of it 
over any other names for the region. Likewise what is officially known as the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYROM is more often refereed to as the FYR of 
Macedonia or just Macedonia in the text. 
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Describing the former Yugoslavia's dispersed ethnic composition can be 
equally contentious and loaded and as at some stage in this thesis most of the ma'or J 
groups will be referred to it is necessary to clarify how they can be differentiated. For 
Croatia, the Croatian majorities are simply referred to as Croats and the significant 
ethnic Serb minority as the Croatian Serbs. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three main 
groupings are labelled the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. The Serbs 
refers to those from the Republic of Serbia. In Kosovo and Macedonia the Albanian 
minorities are referred to as ethnic Albanians,, though it will be made clear where it is 
specifically the ethic Albanian population of either region that is being referred to. 
The majority population in Macedonia is referred to as ethnic Macedonian. 
Note on referencing: 
Throughout Chapters Five to Eight all EPC/CFSP documents cited are 
referenced using their reference number in the European Foreign Policy Bulletin e. g. 
26 th March 91/093 Statement by an informal Ministerial Meeting concerning 
Yugoslavia. 
The number following the date of the documents issue is the reference number in the 
European Foreign Policy Bulletin, with the year of issue coming first. The European 
Foreign Policy Bulletin brings together documents issued by the European Union in 
the area of foreign policy since 1985. It is accessible at 
http: //www. ILie. it/EFPB/welcome. htnil 
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2. The EU and European Foreign Policy 
2.1 Introduction : From External Relations to Foreign Policy 
By the beginning of the period under examination, the EU member states had 
been engaged in increasing levels of external or foreign policy co-operation for over 
thirty years. What is notable is that while the member states have consistently proved 
themselves reluctant to engage in any wholesale surrender of their sovereignty in 
foreign policy, security or defence matters, increasing levels of consultation and co- 
operation have become discernible. This is evident from the earliest foundation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the failed attempts to create a European 
Defence Community in the early 1950s. To a great extent, the evolution of the acquis 
politique was largely propelled by the more rapid development of the acquis 
communitaire and its resulting co-operative procedures and processes, creating a de 
facto need to provide some kind of political counterbalance to the strong collective 
economic presence of the EC in the international economy. The notion of political co- 
operation became unavoidable but the form it would take was never predeten-nined or 
designed. 
Tracing the development of the forinal competences of political cooperation 
gives some indication of direction and collective intention. Separated from practice 
this does not do justice to the range and dynamic of the EU's external actions, 
relations and roles and their development and consolidation over time. An analytical 
framework is required that accommodates both the formal development of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) and the fact that the broader range of EU external activity 
needs to be accounted for in order to arrive at a more rounded understanding of what 
it is that the EU actually does in international relations. The first step in 
accomplishing this is to establish what exactly is meant by EU activity in terms of 
what it encompasses. Once the extent and range of activity has been defined, it can 
then be better characterised and both a working definition and method of analysing 
the notion of change can be proffered. This chapter will first deal with the notion of an 
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EU external policy overall and discuss what it incorporates in forinal legal terms, and 
also what it can be seen to do in practice. Having established the basic assumptions 
associated with the notion of EU external activity, how this activity can be 
characterised in terms of a sui generis foreign policy will be discussed. 
2.2 The European Union's External Policy 
2.2.1 From EPC to ESDP: Formal Development 
The pre-1987 system of European Political Co-operation' as first outlined in 
the 1970 Davignon (or Luxembourg) Report entailed an informal and non-binding 
undertaking by the member states to consult with each other on important foreign 
policy matters, to exchange any relevant information and to make some attempt to 
hannonise and co-ordinate their views and approaches to international affairs. This 
consultation did not involve the EC institutions with the exception of the 
Commission, which was to be consulted on any matters relevant to it or its 
competences. It was an entirely intergovernmental process with all views or positions 
taken arrived at by consensus. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the discussion and 
gradual development and consolidation of these procedures continued in a succession 
of reports and summit meetings. The 1973 Copenhagen Report made more explicit the 
undertaking to agree a common approach and deal with issues collectively. In the 
same year the Document on European Identity outlined the key elements of a 
'European' identity in the world, namely representative democracy, rule of law, social 
justice, economic progress and respect for human rights. Thus articulated, these were 
some of the values that would underpin the EU's external approach through into the 
new millennium. 
The culmination of these proposals and discussions was Title III of the 1987 
Single European Act (SEA). For the first time political co-operation was a significant 
component of an EC treaty, codified and given a legal framework and foundation. 
That said, the distinction maintained between EPC and the European Community 
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(EC) reaffirmed EPC's intergovernmental character. Under the SEA the 'High 
Contracting Parties', as opposed to the 'member states' who signed up to the EC 
Treaty amendments, were committed to consult with each other on foreign policy 
issues and problems of common relevance. Again, any common approach or 
viewpoint was to be arrived at by consensus. Also while the main actors in EPC were 
still to be the member states as represented by their foreign ministers under the 
leadership of the rotating EPC Presidency, the Commission was to be fully associated 
and equally charged with ensuring the 'consistency' of EC and EPC policy. The 
European Parliament also was given the right to be both consulted and informed of 
EPC matters. 
The decision to launch a parallel Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on 
Political Union in the Summer of 1990 to complement the IGC on European 
Monetary Union (EMIJ) was again reflective of the consistent need to reinforce the 
mechanisms for political co-operation alongside the more intense economic 
cooperation and its associated integrative processes. The result was Title V of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the launching of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSp)2 under which the EU and its member states would seek to 
4 assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation 
of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence' (Article 2, TEU). The 
objectives of the CFSP were 
To strengthen the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the 
Union 
" To strengthen the security of the Union and its member states in all ways 
" To preserve peace and strengthen international security 
" To promote international co-operation 
" To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms 
1 For more detailed accounts of the development of political cooperation see (Nuttall 1992), (Rummel 
et al 1992), (SrrUth H. 2002), (White 2001) or (Whitman 1998). 
2 For more detailed accounts on the development and operation of the CFSP see (Nuttall 2000), 
(Regelsberger et al 1997), (Holland 1997) or (Cameron 1999) 
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The CFSP was the second of three pillars (with the European Communities and 
Justice and Home Affairs) that comprised the new European Union, all linked by the 
single institutional framework. The Commission was again fully associated but now 
had the power to itself generate policy proposals. Importantly also, the European 
Parliament was to be consulted on all matters and could expect to have all questions 
submitted answered by the Presidency. The commitment to consult and co-operate 
was stronger under the CFSP than EPC and the member states also undertook to avoid 
actions or statements that might impair the effectiveness of the Union in international 
relations. Notable also was the explicit introduction of defence and security matters to 
the CFSP agenda and linkage to the Western European Union (WEU). However, it 
was also made explicit that any EU-based arrangement would not impinge on existing 
arrangements or obligations, namely the NATO commitments of some member states. 
The mechanisms for co-operation were further formalised in the form of two 
new mechanisms - common positions and joint actions. Once agreed (by consensus) 
member states undertook to ensure that national positions did not contradict the 
common position. In a similar vein, following the agreement on a joint action (by 
consensus in the Council following the recommendation of the European Council that 
a matter should be the subject of ajoint action), the member states undertook to 
conform and co-operate with the implementation of the joint action. The arrangements 
for the financing of the CFSP involved both the Community and the member states, 
with administrative expenditure to come from the EC budget and operational 
expenditure directly from the member states. The pillarisation of the EU under the 
TEU, however confinned the ultimately non-binding ties of even this more elaborate 
and enhanced form of political co-operation, keeping the CFSP at a safe remove from 
the provisions of the EC Treaties and most importantly the European Court of Justice. 
The CFSP was further elaborated upon and amended in the Amsterdam 
Treaty. The most notable innovations were the creation of the Policy Planning and 
Early Warning Unit, the creation of the office of the High Representative (HR) for the 
CFSP and reform of the troika mechanism 3 and the clarification and amendment of 
'This is whereby the current Presidency is now supported by the HR and the External Affairs 
Commissioner rather than the outgoing and mconung Presidencies, though there is recourse for the 
participation of the incorning Presidency also. 
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existing CFSP instruments. Joint actions would address specific operational matters 
and common position would define the EU's general approach to an issue or region. A 
new instrument was introduced in the form of the common strategy which was 
intended to give more coherence and direction to EU policy. Common strategies 
would be adopted by the European Council. Reforms to CFSP decision-making rules 
were also introduced to help prevent the frequent logjams created by the absolute 
requirement for consensus to be reached on all matters. Once a particular course of 
action had been decided upon by consensus, it could now be implemented by 
qualified majority voting. However, member states could still veto (the so-called 
'emergency brake') any measure should they have sufficient and explained need to do 
so The notion of constructive abstention was introduced to allow a member state 
abstain from vetoing in such a manner that it need not support an action or position 
but would refrain from impeding the will of the majority if it was not in violation of 
any crucial national interests. Importantly, the European Council was also given the 
power to discuss and implement common defence polices, though not to the detriment 
of NATO commitments. The EU and WEU structures were further integrated and the 
Petersberg Tasks 4 were formally incorporated into the CFSP with the WEU as the 
actor charged with their fulfilment if so instructed. 
Following the St Malo Declaration at the end of 1998 in which the UK and 
France made a joint call for the EU to develop a capacity for autonomous 
international action backed by credible military forces within the context of the 
Atlantic Alliance, further moves were made towards the development of the common 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Cologne European Council 
meeting of June 1999 declared the intention of giving the EU the necessary means and 
capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding the ESDP in the context of the 
Petersberg Tasks including the aforementioned capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so, 
in order to respond to international crises 5. This entailed the effective winding up of 
theWEU and the incorporation of its remaining defence-related responsibilities into 
4 The Petersberg tasks entail humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 
3 rd June 1999 99/098 Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the common European 
policy on security and defence / Conclusions of the Cologne European Council 
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the EU, without prejudice to NATO commitments or to the status of neutral or non- 
WEU member states. 
The ESDP has three components: dealing with military crisis-management; 
civilian (non-military) crisis-management (pertaining to the Petersberg Tasks); and 
conflict prevention. The 'headline goal' for the military component was agreed at the 
December 1999 Helsinki European Council : 'co-operating voluntarily in EU-Ied 
operations, member states must be able by 2003 to deploy within 60 days and sustain 
for at least one year militaryforces of up to 50-60,000 persons capable of thefull 
range of Petersberg Tasks'. This autonomous, EU-led military force was designed to 
act 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged'and 'will avoid unnecessary duplication 
and does not imply the creation of a European army 6. This was reinforced by 
institutional reforms under the Nice Treaty with the creation of the Political and 
Security Committee to replace the Political Committee and the creation of a Military 
Committee to advise the Political and Security Committee and the High 
Representative. . 
The civilian component of crisis management essentialy entails the provision 
of expertise, personnel and aid in four key areas : 
1. Police co-operation - provision of personnel for tasks ranging from restoring order 
in co-operation with a military force to the training of local police. 
2. Strengthening the rule of law - provision of personnel and expertise. 
3. Civilian administration - assistance with establishing or guaranteeing elections, 
taxation education, general utilities etc. 
4. Civil protection - assistance to humanitarian actors through emergency operations 
and the rapid despatch of assessment teams or experts and larger intervention 
teams 
The final component of the ESDP is conflict prevention and entails the commitment 
to make more systematic and co-ordinated use of the range of instruments available to 
' 11"' December 1991 99/253 Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council - Helsinki 
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the EU to identify and combat the causes of conflict, to improve the capacity to react 
to nascent conflicts and importantly, to promote international co-operation. 
Therefore, by the end of 2002 what exists in tenns of what is set out in the 
Treaties, and in tenns of the development of the outline of the ESDP, is a relatively 
comprehensive set of goals, instruments and procedures to enable the EU to 'act' 
internationally. However, it is more precisely the basis from which the Union can act 
or the framework within which it acts. It does not give an impression of what actually 
can and has been done in practice with these basic competences. It sets out the 
formalised procedures and structural divisions and responsibilities but not how they 
are used and what the resulting policy is. How the various procedures work and have 
been developed is significant in explaining how policy is made and why it takes one 
form rather than another, but there is still something quite interesting missing. As 
Karen Smith notes, procedural innovations such as the Joint Actions and Common 
Positions introduced first with the CFSP in the TEU, are not themselves instruments 
per se, but rather 'mechanisms for making decisions to use foreign policy instruments' 
(Smith K. E 1998; 68)). That is not to say that analysis in these terms is not highly 
significant and insightful, but rather that there is also a place for consideration of the 
content of the EU's external policy Yor this reason an appreciation of the formal basis 
for the EU's external policy needs to be balanced with an appreciation of what is 
actually done in practice. 
(ii) The EUs external activity 
A focus on the development of the Union's external competence in terms of 
the CFSP pillar and the formal link of the EC institutions to it, as outlined above, does 
not pay due regard to the variety of the EU's external policy and the range of actors 
involved in its various activities. However, there is an issue of complexity to be 
addressed in this regard. Just as it is not always sufficient to focus on the formal CFSP 
and its procedures in analysing the EU's external activity or role, it is equally difficult 
to simultaneously account for, describe and analyse adequately every aspect of the 
often overlapping array that combines to make up the whole. While what can be 
described as a consensus has emerged that analyses of EU external activity need to 
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acknowledge the broader nature of the EU's external PoliCY7 (White 2001), (Smith, M 
1998), (Whitman 1998), (Smith H 1995 & 2001), (Ginsberg 2001), it is also difficult 
here to operationalise a definition of 'European Foreign Policy' such as Hill's that 
defines it as 'the sum of what the EU and its member states do in international 
relations'(Hill 1998; 18). 'European Foreign Policy' thus defined incorporates a huge 
combination of often overlapping activities, including those emanating from all the 
EU institutions, be they strictly EC and/or CFSP, and 12 to 15 national external 
policies. 
The European Union engages in a broad enough range of activity in its own 
right to warrant a separate analysis, i. e. without incorporating the separate policies of 
the member states. The issue of how to account for the member states will be 
discussed in more detail below in terrns of their role as actors within European 
Foreign Policy. What will here be described as European Foreign Policy (EFP) is 
better described as the sum of what the EU institutions do in international relations, 
separate from the member states and the member states acting within other fora. The 
member states as actors within EFP will be included in the EU policy. In other words, 
it is the EU policy that is specifically being addressed. The understanding is that the 
EU 'acts' alongside a wide range of other actors with whom it overlaps, sometimes 
more comfortably than others, and that it is important to see both what the EU policy 
is in its own right and also how it sits alongside that of other relevant actors in the 
particular context under examination. The result might be a narrow focus but this 
prevents national foreign policy positions being confused with that of the Union as a 
whole. 
Leaving national positions aside, what remains is the still broad range of 
activity engaged in by the EU itself By this is implied the full range of actions taken 
within the context of the CFSP, the role of the EC institutions, especially the 
Commission in the implementation of CFSP and also the actions taken by the EC 
acting within its own remit and external competence, in particular as regards trade and 
financial and development assistance. An analysis of the range of activity engaged in 
7 Whitman notes that the EU as established under the TEU encompasses both the treaty-based external 
relations of the Community pillar and the CFSP pillar with both being 'explicitly directed towards the 
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adds more nuance and detail and can illustrate the extent to which formal 
competences are actually realisable, effective or appropriate. Alongside the formal 
development it is interesting to note the extent to which new procedures have actually 
been used or how alternative instruments have been seized upon and customised to 
make them more appropriate. Many of the formal developments outlined above are a 
response to practical experience and the codification and consolidation of instruments 
developed on a more ad hoc basis, for example the civilian crisis-management 
procedures of the ESDP. Many are also a response to the ways the EU has been found 
lacking in practice - not simply in terms of filling out its competencies to act like a 
state, but more to fulfil what it increasing perceived of as its role in particular 
circumstances. Looking at the range of activity and issues requiring attention just 
underlines the fact that it would be quite mistaken to focus just on the 
intergovernmental CFSP in trying to capture the range of activity and policy 
development. The question then remains of how this activity and its development over 
time can be characterised in order to move beyond a simple catalogue and pen-nit a 
more systematic analysis. 
2.2.2 The European Union and Conceptions of Foreign Policy 
(i) Definitions offoreign policy 
As traditionally conceived, foreign policy is primarily concerned with security 
issues and the pursuit of power in the international system. However, the expanding 
nature of the security concerns facing states and other actors in the post-Cold War 
contemporary international system is such that it is now necessary to be far more 
inclusive as to what can be described as foreign policy concerns. Likewise, the 
distinction between domestic and foreign policy is increasingly blurred, with domestic 
policies often having a wider external impact in an interdependent world than would 
previously have been possible and vice versa. White defines foreign policy as 'that 
area ofgovernmental activity which is concerned with relationships between the state 
outside of the Union accompanied by the commitment to a single institu. i nal framework' (Whi 11 tio itman 
1998; 4) 
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and other actors, particularly other states, in the international system'(White 1989; 
1). It is fon-nulated within the state but is directed at, and must be implemented in, the 
environment external to the state (White 1989; 1-5). Wallace cites four ways in which 
foreign policy can be characterised; 
9A stable set of attitudes towards the international environment 
" An implicit or explicit plan about a state's relationship with the outside world 
"A conscious image of what is or ought to be a state's place in the world 
" General guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decisions on 
specific issues (Wallace 1974; 14). 
Foreign policy entails some kind of a guiding framework or plan; it is a deliberate 
course of action and it is implemented beyond a state's borders. Here, however, it is 
easy to fall into the trap of describing what is essentially a rather ideal type of foreign 
policy. The policy-making process and often the policy itself is far more diffuse and 
changeable to be described in such absolute terms. The notion of policy itself is not 
always the 'explicit plan of action tailored to serve specific purposes' that it often 
purports to be and is seen to be but might also be described as 'a series of habitual 
responses to events' (White 1989; 6) combined with attempts at management and 
redirection in pursuit of perceived interests. 
As Clarke notes, in hindsight policies can be made to appear more deliberate 
and consistent than they were at the time (Clark 1989; 28). It is also difficult, even 
undesirable, to set out what might be described as a definite deliberate and 
consciously formed and pursued policy in any sense. It is equally difficult to escape 
from the fact that foreign policy as a concept is intrinsically linked to notions of the 
deliberate and the strategic. As Webber & Smith note, foreign policy constitutes an 
attempt to design, manage and control foreign relations and cannot be detached from 
notions of strategy (Webber & Smith 2001; 2-3). Foreign policy, therefore, can be 
said to contain elements of the reactive and elements of the purposive or strategic, 
with the strategic giving some indication of general policy orientation and objectives. 
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The problem is how to characterise and analyse the external policy of a sui 
generis international entity such as the EU while doing justice to its uniqueness and 
also to the fact that it neither emerged from nor exists in a vacuum. There is nothing 
exactly like the EU's foreign policy in the international system but it is not enough to 
simply state that it is sui generis. It is inevitable that EU policy will contain echoes of 
the state-system from which it emerged and in which it operates but at the same time 
the extent to which it will resemble state-type foreign policy must not be 
overestimated. What we require is an intellectual framework that does not rely on 
traditional conceptions of the state (Allen 1978; 156). Foreign policy behaviour needs 
to be studied for what it is (Allen 1978; 138) rather than what it should be or fails to 
be. 
When European Foreign Policy is considered in terins of a 'capabilities- 
expectations gap' (Hill 1993), mistaken expectations can be the result of expectations 
of state-like behaviour from the EU when it lacks the capabilities to act as such. It can 
also be the result of an under-estimation of what it is that the EU is capable of in 
international affairs and an over-estimation of the ability of any actor to fon-nulate, 
pursue and achieve predetermined objectives in an autonomous manner. So how can 
a state centric view be avoided? At best, we can avoid any presupposition that the EU 
is developing something analogous to an orthodox foreign policy but at the same time 
acknowledge that it does have an external policy that at certain times and in relation to 
certain issues exhibits certain features that can best be characterised loosely as foreign 
policy. It is possible to concentrate on what the EU lacks, namely key attributes of 
statehood such as sovereignty, legitimacy, a clear conception of 'European' interests 
and identity, and a definite 'governing intelligence' that directs policy. Hill cites the 
EC/EU's shortcomings as lacking attributes of statehood and the crucial dimensions in 
foreign policy of supranationality and a defence policy, as well as the clear location of 
the governing intelligence implied in the term foreign policy (Hill 1992; 109-113). 
Peterson cites three defects in the CFSP : lack of identity, lack of identifiable 
European interests and weak institutions. He argues that the lack of a common 
identity or common interests are far more essential problems than weak institutions 
(Peterson 1998; 3-4). Hazel Smith on the other hand cites the six objections most 
commonly raised to the idea of an EU foreign policy (lack sovereignty, subordination 
to the member states, lack of centralised focus and single executive, lack of military 
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capacity, capabilities expectations- gap and ineffectiveness) and successfully refutes 
each by demonstrating that none actually prevent the EU from having a foreign policy 
(Smith H 2001; 1-8) 
However, when it is acknowledged that states themselves face challenges to 
their sovereignty and autonomous policy-making capacity in an interdependent world 
and that the boundaries between what once would have been considered 'high' and 
8 'low' political concerns are increasingly blurred , it 
becomes clear that traditional 
conceptions of what constitutes foreign policy and the type of actor that can have one 
cannot be considered cast in stone. As Winn&Lord argue 
,... what matters is not that the EUS efforts should be identical with the 
external activities of other political systems - or that they should be invariant 
over time - but that they should satisfy a minimum definition of foreign 
policy'such as thefollowing: purposive and sustained efforts to influence the 
international environment undertaken by a body that acts on beha4f of a 
public, as opposed to purely private interests' (2001; 16-17). 
EFP and state-type foreign policy are similar enough to permit a limited forrn of 
comparative analysis, yet different enough to confirm sui generis nature of EFP. 
The EU does not have a single over-arching foreign policy such as that 
non-nally associated with states (Ginsberg 2001: 9) but it does engage in what 
Ginsberg describes as foreign policy activity (1989; 4). Joint foreign policy activity is 
a process 'integrating the policies and actions of the member states towards the 
outside world'but ajointforeign policy, on the other hand, is 'a composition of 
mutually relatedjoint actions that setforth a unifiedposition intended to serve 
predetermined objectives' (Ginsberg 1989; 4). What we are looking at is not the 
development of a single policy per se, but rather sets of common policies 
representative of when interests do converge over a specific issue combined with the 
competence and will to act in order to achieve them. As outlined above, the extent to 
8High political concerns are usually associated with security, diplomacy or war, as opposed the 
relatively less sensitive 'low' political issues associated with economic policy (Smith K. E 1999; 3), 
(White 2001-, 48). 
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which the EU's external activity can be described as a foreign policy cannot be 
established by analysis of the EU's formal competences alone or even through an 
analysis of policy emanating solely from the CFSP pillar. A more holistic and open 
approach is required. An analysis of the actual external activity itself will be more 
indicative of what the EU has done and can do in international affairs. While no 
attempt should be made to argue that the resulting policy entirely resembles what 
states have done and can do nor should it this does not lead us to a dead-end. As long 
as it is acknowledged that there are certain features of foreign policy as a concept that 
cannot be ignored when analysing foreign policy, many of the other more state-centric 
features do not prohibit the characterisation of elements of the EU's external activity 
as a type of foreign policy. 
(ii) The 'actor'issue 
The first question that arises when considering the EU's external activity in ternis 
of 'foreign policy' is whether it should simply be assumed that only a sovereign state 
acting on behalf of a discernible national interest can possess what can be described as 
a foreign policy in the first place? Hazel Smith has noted that, despite lacking in 
forinal legitimacy and sovereignty, the EU still acts in some instances as if it did have 
them, and external third parties treat the EU as if it did have them (Smith. H 2002; 1). 
The second question involves how exactly to characterise the peculiar nature of the 
EU in international relations, both in ten-ns of its collective 'actorness' and the range 
of actors that combine to make the variable 'whole'. Again, the nature of the EU's 
(actorriess' is evidenced by what it can and has done in practice. It also requires a 
more 'holistic' approach to the sources of activity than a narrow focus on the 
intergovernmental CFSP. 
The effective 'actorness' of the EU can be seen to arise from the combination of 
all its constituent parts. However, it also depends on the issue in question and the 
balance of competence and the will and opportunity to use it in relation to a particular 
issue. As well as examining everything that combines to influence a particular 
position or action, an equally important task is an analysis of what actually emerges at 
the end of that process. This is indicative of what EU-level policy actually is rather 
than what it could be, should be or fails to be. When we begin to disaggregate the EU- 
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as-actor we are confronted not only with the member states and the EU's constituent 
parts and agencies with their varying competences and legitimacy, but also the fact 
that the EU functions alongside and also in co-operation with a variety of other actors 
in the international system, in addition to and overlapping with its own member states. 
The potential for confusion is high, hence an initial focus on the substance of policy 
itself will allow for a clearer identification of who or what was acting in a particular 
instance and the collective non-unitary EU policy complete with its contradictions and 
inconsistencies. 
Related to the issue of the state as the sole type of foreign policy actor is the 
issue of the state as the primary foreign policy actor within the EU. The 
intergoverninental nature of the CFSP leads to the temptation of focusing on the 
member states as the primary source of EU-level foreign policy activity. The member 
states are the most significant among a range of factors that influence EU policy. 
However, the primary interest and focus here is on the collective policy rather than a 
detailed examination of what goes into making it. As Whitman & Manners note the 
member states 'conduct all but the most limitedforeign policy objectives inside an EU 
context' (2000; 243). The process is marked by the coexistence of attempts at 
collective action on the one hand and the persistence of national foreign policies on 
the other (Hill & Wallace 1996; 1). The European foreign policy option is an 
important addition to, but not a replacement for a national foreign policy competence 
based on a national determination of interest (Allen 1996; 289). However as Hill notes 
the CFSP 'is sufficiently elastic to incorporate rather than deny separate national 
policies and to work alongside other intergovernmental organisations like the WEU, 
NATO or the OSCE'(Hill 1998a; 49). 
National foreign polices are themselves transformed by the changed 
international context and for the member states EU membership represents 'not so 
inuch an opportunity or a constriction, but merely anotherforumfor itsforeign 
poliq, ' (Whitman & Manners 2000; 264). Given the range of participation in 
contemporary international politics, what is under examination here are the instances 
when the EU is the forum of choice for the member states as represented by the extent 
to which and ways in which they actually manage to act collectively, the instances and 
issues where the collective relationship is the more important for the member states 
26 
(Smith K 1999; 5). What we are looking at is not the development of a single policy 
that represents the congruence of all the interests of the EU's membership, but rather 
common policies representative of when the interests of the member states do 
converge over a specific issue combined with the competence and will to act in order 
to achieve them. This will be reflected in the extent to which the member states 
operate within the EU. 
As outlined above, the range of EU institutions from the European Council to 
the Parliament have some part to play, not only in the formal CFSP but also and 
especially in the broader range of external activity. lt is they that will be considered 
the sources of EU-Ievel activity, activity that can be considered evidence of the 
emergence of a new type of foreign policy. What we are dealing with is not a single 
actor, but a multi-level system 9 of external relations which 'generates international 
relations - collectively, individually, economically, politically, rather than a clear-cut 
'European Foreign Policyas such'(Hill 1993; 322). As has already been discussed 
EU external activitiy has not only emanated from the CFSP pillar. Focus on the CFSP 
does no justice to the range of instruments used by the EU in its external relations nor 
the range of issues which require attention and a reaction on the part of the EU. First 
pillar or EC instruments give effect to second pillar policies; EC policies themselves 
have become 'politicised"o (Smith M 1998; 86) as overall, at all levels in the 
international system the distinction between political, security and economic issues 
has become increasingly blurred. Therefore there is a clear case for a high level of 
inclusiveness in the types of external activity to be considered and also the types of 
activity that might not be entirely hostile to the label 'foreign policy' . 
The other issue pertaining to the 'actor problem' is the 'actorness' of the 
collective. According to Bretherton & Volger an actor will 'have an impact, formulate 
purposes and make decisions and thus engage in someform ofpurposive action" 
(1999; 20). However, 'actorness' is not only determined by the EU's own capability 
9 White has described European Foreign Policy as 'an interacting foreign policy system' comprised of 
three 'subsystems that constitute and possible dominate it'; the EC as established by the Treaties of 
Rome and under the TEU; all first pillar activities; and the national or separate foreign policies of the 
member states (White 2001,24) The focus here is on EFP defined so as to include both the EC and 
CFSP i. e. the totality of the EU-level as distinct from separate member state foreign policies. 
'0 'Politicisation is defined by Smith as *The addition or accretion of political meanings, understandings 
and consequences to particular areas and instruments of policy' (Smith M 1998; 86) 
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or sense of purpose but also by pressures from the international arena at large. 'Actor- 
ness' depends on the extent of opportunity accorded by the external environment to 
the EU to act; the extent of internally determined capabilities and the strength of the 
EU's 'presence' in relation to the particular issue in question (Bretherton & Volger 
1999). Where the balance of influence lies is not always clear. The extent to which 
external activity is deliberate on the part of an actor or compelled by external factors 
is an issue of similar importance at state level in a world marked by interdependence 
and eroded sovereignty. At EU-level this issue is particularly pronounced. As 
mentioned above, external activity contains elements of both the reactive and the 
deliberate but for any kind of foreign policy what must exist is some degree of the 
strategic or purposive to give direction to policy. 
Bretherton & Volger describe the EU as an 'intermittent' actor (1999; 21) with the 
extent of 'actomess' determined by the extent of opportunity for the union to act in 
particular circumstances,, the extent of internally determined capabilities and the 
strength of the EU's presence in relation to the particular issue in question. The idea 
of presence has been defined as 'afeature or quality of arenas, of issue areas, and of 
networks of activity, operating to influence the actions and expectations of 
participants' can thus be described as a 'variable and multidimensional-presence 
playing an active role in some areas of international interaction and a less active one 
in others'(Allen & Smith 1998; 48) The EU's presence rests on a combination of 
factors: credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act and mobilise resources, and the 
place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations of policymakers (Allen & Smith 
1991; 97-98). The EU's ability to make its presence felt or to take responsibility for 
certain forms of international action (in other words to engage in purposive proactive 
as opposed to purely reactive policy) depends on the strength of presence in relation 
to the target of action and as much on institutional capacity and collective will as the 
opportunities provided by the wider international system (Allen & Smith 1998; 53- 
57). The presence of the EU also heightens expectations of what the EU can do or 
achieve and leads to increased pressure for it to deliver. Therefore, in any 
28 
consideration of the EU in international relations it is not sufficient to focus just on 
internal capability' 1 and also not just on external opportunities or constraints. 
(iii) Linking instruments and capabilities 
Karen E. Smith defines foreign policy instruments as 'those means used by 
policy-makers in their attempts to get other international actors to do what they 
would not do otherwise' (Smith KE 1998; 68). The EU has a broad range of 
instruments at its disposal through which it can bring significant influence to bear in 
international relations. This is especially so if the source of instruments is not 
confined to those ascribed to the CFSP, but also those resulting from the EC pillar, as 
mentioned above. Towards the end of the period under examination, these even 
include the previously taboo military instruments in theory. However, despite 
possessing instruments under each of the key headings of necessary foreign policy 
instruments - diplomatic, economic, military and propaganda (Smith KE 1998; 68)- 
the EU still does not function as a state-like international actor. This is because of the 
imbalance of the EU's relative strength in each of these categories, and also because 
of the goals instruments are mobilised in pursuit of In traditional terins, the recourse 
to the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy is related to the desire to 
maximise, or at least prevent the relative loss of, power and the preservation of 
national security vis-a-vis other actors (states) in the international system. To date, 
this has not been entirely relevant for the EU. However, over time the EU has 
acquired the competence to deploy the full range of foreign policy instruments, but in 
specific and restricted circumstances. What is highly relevant here is not simply the 
fact that the EU can deploy certain instruments but the extent to which it actually can 
agree to use them and does in fact use them in practice. 
What the EU can do in international relations is based on, but not synonymous 
with , its 
formal capabilities and the range of instruments available to it. There have 
been discrepancies when there has either been a lack of internal will or consensus in 
11 Sj ostedt cites serveral often quoted criteria for judging actor capability: a community of interests, a 
decision-making system, a system for crisis management, a system for the management of 
interdependence, a system of implementation, external communication channels and external 
representation, comiTiunity resources and a mobilisation system. However, this approach does not 
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deciding to mobilise available instruments or resources leading sometimes to a 'gap' 
between declared intention or expectations and what the European Union eventually 
can and does do. The gap between the capability to decide to act in a certain way and 
the ability to follow- through is as significant as the inability to act due to the lack of 
required instruments or resources. However limited or ineffective the actual EU 
policy might be said to be, the extent of the EU's ability to determine an appropriate 
course of action based on what can actually be achieved is a more realistic indicator of 
the extent of the 'maturity' of its foreign policy, than the extent to which it should or 
can achieve what an ideal state might aspire to. 
Therefore, how the European Union actually uses the range Of instruments 
available to it is highly significant. The actual instruments used and the way in which 
they are used is reflective of what the EU can decide to do collectively in relation to a 
specific issue. Whitman argues that what he describes as the EU's 'international 
identity' 12 is synonymous with those instruments that are available to the EU to give 
expression to policy (Whitman 1998; 2). The policies pursued by the EU through 
these instruments represent recourse to common instruments and identify the 
'Identity' 13 of the Union as distinct from that of the member states (Whitman 1998; 2) 
and other actors. Looking at the collective policy itself allows us to what is possible 
when the various factors influencing policy internally actually do converge. 
(iv) The context of European Foreign Policy 
In addition to internally deten-nined capabilities, the other issues of particular 
significance are the appropriateness of these capabilities and the extent to which the 
particular external circumstances with which the EU is attempting to deal condition 
what the EU can do. The levels of the reactive and the proactive in the EU's external 
policy are determined to a large extent by the interplay between the nature of 
capabilities and the coherence of their usage on the one hand, and the nature of the 
sufficiently account for the opportunities and constraints originating in the environment external to the 
actor. Cited in (Whitman 1998: 13). 
12 International identity is defined as the 'operations of the EU that are explicitly directed outwards 
from the Union' (Whitman, 1998,2) 
13 Whitman prefers to characterise the EU's external actions in terms of an external Identity rather than 
a 'foreign policy' in order to escape the restrictive and state-centric connotations of the terrn 'foreign 
policy. 
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particular constraints and opportunities afforded by the particular issue or situation 
with which the action or policy is attempting to address, on the other. Attempting to 
even access the ideas of the strategic and the reactive in external policy involves a 
consideration of the extent to which foreign policy is determined by the interplay of 
forces in the environment external to the state or a conscious effort on the part of 
policy-makers to design, control or manage international relations and affairs. 14 
External activity is a mixture of both the strategic and the reactive but foreign policy 
on the other hand must contain the strategic and the purposive or deliberate. The 
interplay of the internal and external environments is two-way so the actor in 
question' s strategic actions will at least in part be a response to external events and 
circumstances. The relationship is a dynamic one and also continuous (Gerner 1999; 
2 1) and some sense of perspective is required in order to capture it. One way of 
capturing this sense of perspective is through looking at the development of policy 
over time. 
In addition to the overall operational context of foreign policy (comprising 
both the internal and external environments), there is also the issue of the 
psychological environment or context. In other words, some account must be taken of 
the role of perceptions, cognitive processes, attitudes and belief systems (Gerner 
1991; 24) if we are not to assume an entirely monolithic and rational foreign policy 
actor. The notion of bounded rationality is of some use here in that it acknowledges 
the impossibility of fully rational decision-making but allows for a degree of 
rationality while allowing for the constraints 15 that lead to a tendency to "satisifice 
(Gerner 1991; 25), something that is simply inevitable in the pressured, uncertain and 
obfuscated environment in which foreign policy is both made and conducted. 
However, this is more what underlies policy and cannot be fully operationalised or 
analysed here. Here lies more of the value for the task in hand in looking at policy 
content or the actions of the relevant actor. What we are looking for is the extent to 
which there is some kind of self-knowledge or understanding on the part of the actor 
in question and the drawing of some distinction between elements of habit and past 
" For more on this issue see (Smith S 1986) 
15 These include placed by time, resources, lack of perfect knowledge, the tendency to take short-cuts 
and to simplify issues and problems until they can be processed and understood based on past 
experience and the means available in which to attempt an approach or a solution (Gernerl. 991; 25) 
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practice in determining the way forward and a clear attempt to direct policy in a 
particular direction. 
Helpful here is the concept of roles in international relations that allows us to 
characterise activity in such a manner as to be able to identify patterns more 
effectively. Roles occur at the point of convergence between structure and agency 
(Light 1994) (Walker 1987) and are representative of both the will, intent and 
capability of an actor and also the extent to which the external environment acts as a 
constraint or enablement in this regard, as well as the dynamic and mutually (and 
variably) influential relationship between the two overlaping environments (internal 
and external). Roles can be as performed by an actor and therefore reflective of the 
extent of capabilities. They can also be as externally prescribed or internally devised 
and therefore more reflective of internally or externally held and maybe not always 
entirely realistic or accurate expectations of what the actor's function is in 
international relations (Rosenau 1987; 5 1). Rosenau defines roles as 'sets of formal 
and infon-nal expectations experienced and held by their occupants' (1987; 5 1). Holsti 
draws a distinction between national role conceptions (self-defined), role prescriptions 
(externally-determined) and role perforinance (actual attitudes, decisions and actions) 
(19 8 7; 5- 8). An actor's own self-understanding of its role accompanied by clear 
attempts to fulfil that role will be indicative of the extent to which policy can be 
considered purposive or strategic. The gap between role performance and role 
falfilment can be narrowed by a more precise linkage of goals and capabilities. 
The roles or functions which the EU fulfils will also be significant in trying to 
identify patterns in the EUs external activity. If we do not presume that an 'actor can 
and should find for itself something approximating to a part played on a stage, namely 
a distinctive, high-profile and coherent identity' (Hill 1993; 307) and that in 
considering the functions perforined there is 'no implication either of clearly 
demarcated tasks agreed by the rest of the international community, or of a 
mechanistic system where each unit repetitively perforins tasks ' (Hill 1993; 3 10), we 
can identify patterns in external actions that indicate the role or function which the EU 
has performed. A sense of the purposive can be accessed in attempts to direct policy 
and the type of roles the non-unitary EU consciously aspires to perform. The actual 
role performed is evident from what is actually acted upon. Criticism of the EU as an 
32 
international actor often emerges from the gap between prescribed roles and the EU's 
ability to fulfil them, although it is also the case that over-ambition in the EU's own 
self-prescribed roles and its inability to then follow through effectively leads to as 
much criticism. As stated above, the gap between role performance and role 
falfilment can be narrowed by better linkage between goals and capabilities, which in 
turn involves a degree of purpose and management. 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
There are certain inescapable facts that must be considered in an examination 
of any kind of foreign policy. Firstly, it obviously must be both externally directed 
and implemented. It also must entail some element of the strategic or purposive. 
However, these are not themselves absolutes and foreign policy will inevitably 
contain a mixture of the reactive and the deliberate as it does not exist in a vacuum but 
rather an increasingly interdependent world. The question is just how strategic can a 
certain course of action be said to be. When it comes to an analysis of EU's activity 
these concerns are still relevant and of use despite their state-centric connotations. 
Elements of the EU's external activity can be considered a sui generis foreign policy 
if combined with a qualified notion of purpose. What requires examination in this 
regard is the collective activity of the EU, regardless of source, while building in an 
acknowledgement of the non-unitary 'actorness' of the EU and the effect different 
sources has on the nature of activity. What we are looking for is the extent and nature 
of change over time. Rather than assuming any linear movement towards state or 
ideal-type foreign policy, it is more helpful to consider the extent to which activity 
can be described as reactive or deliberate, the extent of linkage between expressed 
goals and actual capabilities reflective of the degree of self-understanding on the part 
of the EU as to what it can and wants to do in international relations, and finally the 
roles that the EU can be seen to be performing and their connection to the previous 
two questions of strategy and self-understanding. The development of the EU's 
external competence is one of the contexts within which the EU operated in the 
former Yugoslavia. The other is the broader context of the conflicts themselves and 
the overall international response. This will be outlined in the next chapter before 
moving on to consider how the notion of change or development in the EU's activity 
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in the foriner Yugoslavia will be discussed based on the conceptions of foreign policy 
outlined here. 
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3. The Former Yugoslavia 
3.1 Introduction 
'Consistently and conspicuously absentftom Western reflections on the 
Balkans since the latter ha4f of the 19 th century has been any consideration of 
the impact of the West itseýf on the region. The great powers, or 'the 
international community' as they are now known, have always been 
'dragged'into Balkan conflicts as apparently unwilling partners to local 
disputes whose nature has eluded them. The Balkans were thought to be 
impervious to the civilising processes which the European empires claimed to 
have introduced elsewhere in the world. Yet when the great powers extracted 
themselvesfrom some Balkan entanglement, they rarely investigated the 
consequences of their intervention. (Glen-ny 1999; xxv) 
As was noted in the introduction to this thesis, the EUwas not 'dragged' into 
involvement in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s. Its involvement also 
continued beyond the initial reaction which it both led and dominated. The reasons for 
this are manifold , including the 
fact that western Europe, including the EU had had 
some level of involvement in the region for a long time. The focus in most analyses of 
the conflicts and the international response to them have tended to sideline or criticise 
the EU's involvementl or to focus on the role and impact on policy-making 
procedures and processes. Less emphasis has been placed on what it was that the EU 
specifically did in relation to the region overall and the particular nature and 
appropriateness of this overall response. The EU had a direct and unique part to play, 
which developed over the course of ten years and fitted quite well into both the 
historical and more recent contexts. 
When the build-up to war in Yugoslavia was already underway in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the attention of the EU, the United States(US) and other 
important international actors was on dealing with the changed circumstances that 
followed the collapse of communism in the 1980s, and on tensions in the Middle East. 
The challenge of German reunification, the rapidly proceeding pace of European 
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integration, the 1990 Gulf War and a concern to stabilise the unsteady former 
Communist block, all overshadowed the Yugoslav crisis at the outset. Yugoslavia was 
but one of the plethora of concerns thrown up in the wake of the Cold War. However 
it was to become an issue that challenged some of the fundamental principles and 
expectations of the system of international order and governance and for most of the 
international actors involved was a severe learning experience. 
Despite the involvement of some of the most significant and powerful 
international actors ranging from the US to the United Nations (UN) and Russia, this 
I international community' failed to prevent or satisfactorily resolve a conflict in 
Europe. The carnage of Bosnia and the entry of the term 'ethnic cleansing' into 
common usage have left an indelible mark on all involved. For that reason, much of 
the treatments of this period entail an attempt to understand or come to terms with 
what happened and why the international reaction was so confused. The wars in 
Yugoslavia cannot be fully understood in snapshots or without a sense of perspective. 
They also cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the chaotic attempt to 
deal with them that became as much a part of the course of the conflicts as the internal 
Yugoslav factors that combined to cause and perpetuate them. The main challenge of 
studying this issue lies in the need to both accommodate and counteract its 
complexity. 
In order to appreciate the nature of the EU's involvement through the series of 
crises that followed the break-up of the Yugoslav federation, it must first be placed in 
its historical and more immediate context. This chapter will outline the background to 
the out-break of war in 199 1. First the background to the conflict will be outlined. 
This will be followed by a brief discussion of the nature of international involvement 
overall and the emphasis in the predominant literature on the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia overall. Finally, the involvement of the EU will be placed in context and 
the gaps in the existing treatments of the EU's involvement considered. 
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3.2 The Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia, in both its manifestations' 
6, 
was pieced together by the western 
powers in the aftermath of two world wars. In both wars, the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia and its constituent ethnic groups played a significant and strategic role for 
17 both sides . South Slavic unity was convenient for some, such as the Slovenes and 
Croats who viewed Yugoslavia as the lesser evil to complete absorption into, for 
example Italy, Austria or Hungary. During the Cold War, Yugoslav President Joseph 
Tito's break with Stalin made the federation a focus of western attention again, as it 
became a favourite among the west's communist enemies. 
By the time communism fell across Central and Eastern Europe, things both 
inside and outside Yugoslavia had changed somewhat. The experience of coexisting 
in a single state with an ever more nationalist Serbian republic, combined with their 
own increasing ambitions for independence, was beginning to wear down both 
Slovenia and Croatia's commitment to the federation. The autonomy the individual 
republics enjoyed since 1974 and the practice of economic self-management made 
them less and less dependent on the centrel 8. Beyond the federal borders the former 
belligerents of two world wars, whom almost all the republics had some fear or 
suspicion of, were now engaged in a process of peaceful integration, enjoying 
considerable economic and political power in a manner than now made them 
attractive rather than threatening'9. The then European Community was actively 
promoting closer ties and association with former communist states across the 
continent including Yugoslavia. While Serbia began to consider a recentralisation of 
the federation in such a manner as to maximise its dominance over the other republics, 
the more Central European oriented republics of Slovenia and Croatia began 
16 In the interwar and post World War 11 periods 
17 For interesting accounts of the history of the region some of the classic texts include (Jelavich & 
Jelavich 1977), (Jelavich 1983), (Singleton 1985), (Lampe 2000), (Banac 1984) and (Glenny 1999) 
18 Under the 1974 constitution all eight federal units enjoyed extensive autonomy from the centre in 
many respects, including the economy. Both Croatia and Slovenia were relatively successful in this 
regard which contributed to their potential viability as states independent of the centre. This autonomy 
was also accorded to the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina who enjoyed almost all 
of the same rights and status as the republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia) 
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immediately to play a game learnt over centuries of foreign involvement in the region 
- that of internati onali sing their plight and seeking powerful external allies. 
Though slightly unstable for years previously, the Yugoslav federation began 
to break up from 1987. The concerns over a threatened Serb dominated 
recentralisation of the country by the newly installed Milosevic regime in Belgrade, 
prompted the two most western-oriented and self-sufficient republics (Slovenia and 
Croatia) to cut their losses and try to break free and go it alone. The chain of events 
which triggered this crisis can be traced back over the longer-term history of the 
region, but more immediately from 1980. Tito's death in 1980 left Yugoslavia under 
the control of a collective presidency comprised of representatives from all the 
various federal units, including the autonomous provinces. Without the dictator's 
a process of psychological as well as actual decentralisation uni yi I 
continued into and throughout the 1980's. Economic crisis in the wake of failed self- 
management facilitated this, which led to a greater need to deal with the problem at 
republican level. The 1974 constitution had sought to achieve a greater level of 
devolution in government, while at the same time subduing nationalist sentiment. It 
failed in this regard and its main effect was to decrease the dependence of the 
federation's constituent units on the centre. The desire to loosen the central control 
only gained in momentum as the decade progressed and produced a set of nationalist 
ideologies and possible alternative governance structures that would eventually lead 
to the disintegration of the federation in 1991. 
Ironically, this process had particular resonance in Serbia, a republic that 
traditionally became unnerved at the prospect of the dilution of federal power in 
favour of the republics or autonomous provinces. The main reason for Serbia's 
resentment of the devolved system of governance introduced in 1974 was the 
reduction in influence the Serbian authorities now experienced over the significant 
number of ethnic Serbs living in Yugoslavia, but beyond the borders of Serbia proper 
(See Table 1). Serbia had already lost a significant amount of authority over its two 
autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) and their Serb populations under the 
1974 constitution. However, the erosion of total federal rule was considered positive 
19 To Slovenia and Croatia in particular but it would be too much of an oversimplifi ication to suggest 
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in that it offered a solution to the scattering of the Greater Serbian 20 nation throughout 
Yugoslavia; it offered the possibility of recentralising Yugoslavia along Greater 
Serbian lines. This seemingly contradictory process is best explained as 'a Serbian 
drive to rule the other South Slavic nations under the label of a federal' Yugoslavia' 
(Lukic 1994; 49). 
Table 1. Ethnic Serbs Outside Serbia Proper 
Yugoslav Republic/Province Percentage of Population 
Serbia (Proper) 85.4 
Kosovo 13.3 
Vojvodina 54.4 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 32.2 
Croatia 11.6 
Slovenia 2.2 
Macedonia 2.4 
Montenegro 3.3 
Source: (Woodward 1995; 34-35) 
This rise in Greater Serbian nationalism increased throughout the 1980s and in 
the end was harnessed and manipulated for the political ambitions of a cynical elite 
and set in motion the chain of events that led to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia. In 
September 1986 fragments of what came to be known as the 'Draft Memorandum' of 
the Serbian Academy of Sciences appeared in the mass circulation daily newspaper 
'Vercernje Vovosti'. The Memorandum was a total denunciation of the 1974 
constitution and called for the reversal of Kosovo's autonomous status and an end to 
the claimed persecution of Kosovo's Serb minority. Texts such as the Memorandum 
and earlier petitions had, to an extent, the effect of creating by reaction the symptoms 
which they claimed to diagnose (Thompson 1992; 13 1). Therefore when Serbian 
nationalists began to make allegations about the treatment of Serbs outside Serbia 
proper, their audience with no touchstone of personal experience against which to 
measure them, were roused into supporting this nationalist agenda (Thompson 1992; 
that this was equally the case for all regions of the former Yugoslavia. 
20 'Greater Serbian' nationalism refers to the belief that all Serbs scattered throughout the region should 
be united under a Serb-ruled state. 
39 
131-32). Serbia was ripe for action. Significantly also, in 1986 there was a change in 
Presidency of the Communist Party of Serbia. The final incendiary factor that would 
bring Serbia into direct confrontation with the federation now came to prominence in 
the forrn of Slobodan Milosevic. 
Slobodan Milosevic represented one of two options available to Serbia in the 
latter half of the decade. He represented the forces of chauvinistic nationalism and 
conservatism. The other, in the person of Serbian President Ivan Stambolic, was more 
liberal. At this stage it was not inevitable that extreme nationalism would be the 
political ideology to win out. It was Milosevic's cynical manipulation of the 
nationalism of the grass roots and elements of the Serbian intelligentsia 21 that secured 
his victory over public opinion. On the 24 1h April 1987, Milosevic was sent to Kosovo 
Po1je in northern Kosovo to meet with disgruntled Kosovar Serbs in place of 
Stambolic. This brought him into direct confrontation with the intensity of sentiment 
amongst Kosovo's Serbs and the wider sympathy and support for their situation. It 
was then that he realised that Kosovo could be the issue to mobilise the Serbian 
people as a whole behind him and propel him to power. For a man who expressed 
little interest in Kosovo before April 1987, he delivered explosive words to the 
crowds who gathered in Kosovo po1je and greeted him as the hero of their cause. As 
Stambolic later observed he 'he became aware that Kosovo was only the launch pad. 
The goal was Yugoslavia' (Silber & Little 1996; 47). By the end of 1987 Milosevic 
had been installed as the Serbian leader in place of Stambolic. His victory was secured 
on the promise of strong leadership at a time of mounting economic difficulties and 
social unrest. He was a Party leader who addressed Serbian grievances and reminded 
of its historic task to reclaim Kosovo (Vickers 1998; 230). As Pavlusko Imisirovic, a 
Serbian socialist democrat, observed: 
'With his chauvinist hullabaloo, Milosevic has succeeded in temporarily 
wearing down political mobilisation in Serbia, in confusing the masses, in 
exporting their dissatisfaction by turning existing social tensions against an 
imaginary outside enemy. Today his enemy is the Albanians, tomorrow it will 
21 Who had stunned many observers by converting from democratic and humanist socialism to racist 
nationalism (Denitch 1996,118) 
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be the Slovenes, the Croats, the Moslems, indeed anybody who resists him 
(Magas 1993; 235). 
With the intention to remove Kosovo's autonomy having already been 
22 
signalled as early as February 1987 , the necessary amendments to the Serbian 
constitution were endorsed by the Serbian and provincial assemblies on the 28 th 
March 1989. Under the amendments, Kosovo's status reverted to that which it had 
under the 1963 constitution when the region's autonomy was declared a republican 
prerogative and the limits of its autonomy were to be prescribed by the Belgrade 
assembly. Kosovo was now granted restricted territorial autonomy, will all statutes 
passed by the provincial assembly subject to the approval of the Serbian national 
assembly. 
Table 2. Population of Yugoslavia's Successor States 1991 (in thousands) 
FRY (Serbia & Montenegro Total 10,394 
inc. Kosovo and Vojvodina) 
Serb majority 62% 
Albanian minority 16% 
Croatia Total 4,760 
Croat majority 78% 
Serb minority 12% 
Bosnia-Herze2ovina Total 4,363 
Bosniaks (Muslims) 44% 
Serbs 31 % 
Croats 17% 
Macedonia Total 2,034 
Macedonian majority 65% 
Albanian minority 21% 
Slovenia Total 1,963 
Slovene majority 88% 
Source: (Lampe 2000; 368) 
22 In the text of the Proposal of the SFRY Presidium for Constitutional Changes, without a mention of 
the fact that Kosovo's constitutional status could not be reconsidered without a total reappraisal of the 
whole concept of Yugoslav federalism. Milosevic was aware that the Kosovo assembly would have to 
pass any constitutional amendments and therefore launched a purge of the Kosovar Communist Party in 
order to remove anyone who opposed him or his intentions. In November 1998 then, amendments were 
passed by the federal assemble clearing the path for a new Serbian constitution (Silber &Little 1996; 
64). 
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Already in September 1989 Slovenia had asserted the supremacy of republican 
over federal legislation through several constitutional amendments (Gow 1991; 296). 
On the 4 th October 1990, Slovenia and Croatia jointly proposed the restructuring of 
Yugoslavia along more confederal lines. This would involve a loose alliance of 
sovereign states, with a single market and common foreign and defence policy 
supplementary to republican foreign policy and defence forces, not unlike the EU 
itself It was clear that at this stage the federation still had a chance of survival if any 
common ground could be found between Serbia and its neighbours. Not surprisingly, 
Serbia rejected the confederal model, as it would result in its losing any control it had 
over regions across Yugoslavia that contained significant Serb minorities. 
In March 1990 multiparty elections were held in Slovenia, followed in July by 
the declaration of the supremacy of its own legislation and the announcement of 
Slovenia's intention to pursue its own foreign and defence policies. The republics 
local (federally controlled) Territorial Defence forces (TD) were brought under the 
Slovenian government's peacetime control. A referendum held on the 23 rd December 
1990 returned an overwhelming majority in favour of secession from the federation 
and independence, failing the successful conclusion of an agreement on Yugoslavia's 
future within six months. The previous day, Croatia's new government, elected in a 
free multiparty election held there in the Spring, had also declared the supremacy of 
its legislation over the federal constitution. A referendum held in Croatia in May 1991 
also returned an overwhelming majority in favour of independence. The Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) began to attempt to disarm the local TDs in Slovenian and 
Croatia and resistance to the Croatian government was already beginning to solidify 
in the Serb majority territory known as the Krajina. 
In the absence of any agreement on the constitutional future of Yugoslavia, 
Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on 25 th June 1991. Once members 
of the provisional Slovenian militia started taking control of posts on Yugoslavia's 
western international border, the JNA rushed to intervene and quickly attacked. There 
was now a war to contend with and the speed with which it flared up illustrates the 
extent of tensions on the ground. That war broke out should not have surprised 
anyone. In Croatia, Serbs in the Kra . ina and in eastern Slavonia had been i restless for 
years and active for at least two years. The Croatian government had not been in full 
42 
control of a significant area of the country for quite a while. In addition the 
supposedly neutral yet Serb dominated JNA was openly acting on behalf of Serb 
interests in all arenas. 
3.3 An International Crisis 
'Over two thirds of the more than 200,00 killed, were civilians or unarmed at 
the times of their death .... most were targeted simply because their ethnic 
identity made them seem a present orfuture danger to the other ethnic group. 
So were the smaller number of women raped and the much larger number of 
refugees - over 3 million if we include Kosovo in 1999 -... because of these 
events the very phrase 'ethnic cleansing has now passed into common English 
usage. Because of these events, unprecedented international intervention and 
media attention hasfollowed theformer Yugoslavia since 1992. Theflood tide 
of Western publications concentrates on the tragedy of the cleansed in the 
instances where western intervention has confronted the cleaners. Wefind less 
attention paid where there has been no intervention '(Lampe 2000; 365-7) 
Aside from the brutality of the Yugoslav wars themselves, much of the 
subsequent discussion and analysis has centred on the international reaction to and 
entanglement in them. The more high-profile representatives of various states and 
international organisations became more ubiquitous and visible than some of the main 
players in the region. They became actual participants in events and the reverberations 
and consequences of this involvement was to have far reaching effects and create a 
sense of frustration and crisis as the spiral of conflict persisted. It was not a simple 
case of an international reaction causing or even worsening the situation. Much of the 
subsequent analyses focus on what went wrong, what should have been done or was 
not done at all, blaming to varying degrees the Serbian leadership, a succession of 
mistaken moves (usually beginning with the recognition process launched by the 
European Union) or 'ancient' and intractable ethnic hatred. No one factor is entirely 
responsible on its own. It is all of them to varying degrees and it depends on the exact 
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region in question. As in all conflicts, there were broader contextual factors and more 
immediate triggers that often escalated swiftly due to already highly tense 
circumstances. In trying to account for an 'international' failure the temptation is to 
assume that the Yugoslav crisis sprang out of nowhere or that it was so historically 
entrenched as to be intractable. 
This tendency to need to 'make sense" of the international involvement 
dominates the literature on this subject. In virtually all accounts it is covered in at 
least in some depth. It is present even in those accounts that have as their main focus 
the internal and historical contexts of the conflicts themselves 23 - In addition, many 
accounts which discuss the region or parts of the region are based on a crucial sense 
of historical perspective in trying to account for what happened in the 1990s. Overall, 
however, the dominant emphases are on an EC failure in the initial phase, a general 
international failure in Bosnia and an attempt to come to terms with the implications 
of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. For the most part, not surprisingly 
considering its scale and complexity, most accounts are very Bosnia-based, as 
discussed below. 
As mentioned above many of the accounts are still very much centred within 
the years 1990-1996 and were written within and focus broadly on the unfolding of 
the crisis and international involvement in it. The EU features most prominently 
throughout in relation to the recognition process and its consequences. The unfolding 
conflict in this period and the inextricable part played by the international reaction has 
been covered by many authors. Through many accounts the international reaction is as 
central as the progress of the conflicts themselves (Cviic 1995) (Woodward 1995) 
(Bennett, 1995 ) (Glenny 1996) (Silber & Little 1996) (Kaldor, 2001). In addition, 
even accounts that covered a wider time-frame and provide a solid sense of both the 
internal and historical context devote significant time to the analysis of the 
international involvement (Ramet, 2002) (Thompson 1992), (Cohen 1995), (Lukic & 
23 Also, interestingly the literature on the subject itself became influential in the conflict. US President 
Bill Clinton's interest in the issue was stirred and indeed further informed by his reading of Robert 
Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts (Holbrooke 1998; 22). Kaplan's book, along with Rebecca West's 1940's 
travelogue Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, has done much to perpetuate the 'intractable ethnic hatreds' 
myth of the Yugoslav wars. Brendan Simms also remarks on a copy of West's book marked 
'UNPROFOR use only' in circulation at the UN headquarters in Sarajevo during the Bosnian conflict 
(Simms 2001,179) 
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Lynch 1996), (Almond 1994), (Meir, 1999), (Malcolm 1996), (Denitch 1996), 
(Udovicki&Ridgeway 1997). The literature on the conflict in Kosovo ranges from the 
more historically based texts (Malcolm, 1999) (Vickers, 1998) and those situating the 
contemporary conflict in context (Judah 2000) (Mertus 1999) to those focussing on 
the controversy surrounding the international response to the 1999 conflict (Ignatieff 
2001) (All 2000) (Bellamy 2001) (Chomsky, 1999). Considerably less has been 
written on the conflict in Macedonia (Clement 1997) (Pettifer 2001) (Ackermann 
2000), mainly due to its more recent nature but the less high-profile or contentious 
nature of the international involvement will probably mean that its does not ultimately 
receive the same amount of attention as earlier conflicts. The texts cited here are 
examples drawn from a wide literature on this issue. The point is that throughout the 
literature there has been a heavy focus on Bosnia and on the combination of internal 
and international factors in causing and deten-nining the course of the conflicts. With 
just a few exceptions (Ramet 2002), there has not been much of a sense of perspective 
on the reaction of development of the conflicts throughout the 1990s and beyond. 
More importantly in relation to this thesis, there has been little focus on EU's role in 
particular; this will be discussed in more detail below. 
The experience of this involvement, especially in Bosnia, has led to much 
discussion and reconsideration of the roles and relevance of the international actors 
themselves in international affairs, each in turn having to go through some kind of 
process of re-examination, or even crisis in some instances. The focus here is on the 
EU , 
but the EU acting alongside and often in cooperation with a range of other 
actors. The confusion and lack of coherence in the international reaction resulted not 
only from the fact that there simply was no integrated international response but also 
from the overlapping membership of international organisations and sometimes 
contradictory actions. The dominant actors and a very brief characterisation of their 
involvement is outlined below: 
(i) The United Nations 
The UN first became directly involved in late 1991 with the appointment of 
Cyrus Vance as Special Envoy. The ceasefire secured by Vance In Croatia by early 
1992 was secured by the deployment of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), an 
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originally 10,000 strong peace-keeping force that was also later extended to Bosnia. A 
UN Preventative Deployment (U-NPREDEP) was also positioned in Macedonia in 
1993. Along with the EU, the UN led the international diplomatic effort into 1994 in 
the context of the joint EC-UN International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
based in Geneva. Successive UN Security Council Resolutions also provided the 
legitimacy and framework for harsh sanctions regimes and an anus embargo in 
relation to both the Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts. The UN also took the leading role 
in post-war Bosnia and Kosovo, leading the interim administrations and 
reconstruction efforts. The UN High Commission for Refugees (LJNHCR) was also 
the primary aid agency working in the region and to the best of its ability and that 
permitted by circumstances, co-ordinated the international aid effort also. However, 
the inability of the UN in Bosnia to negotiate a settlement, the vulnerability and 
sometimes ineffectiveness of the peacekeeping force, allegations of assisting ethnic 
cleansings through assistance of refugees, and extremely ill-advised moves such as 
the creation of the doomed Safe Areas, along with other factors all combined to 
diminish the UN's position in this context (Biermann 1998), (Mayall 1996), (Rose 
1998). It has been most important in terms of providing a framework for the interim 
administration and reconstruction efforts and the provision and delivery of 
humanitarian aid. 
(ii) NA 24 
Between 1990-2002 it has been NATO that has put the real 'teeth' into the 
international response, first with air strikes in Bosnia, the deployment of the 
implementation and the stabilisation forces in the aftermath of the Dayton Accords 
(IFOR and SFOR), the deployment of the extraction force in Macedonia to provide 
back-up to the OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission, the air campaign against the 
FRY in 1999, the deployment of KFOR in the Kosovo conflicts aftermath and finally 
assisting with the stabilisation of Macedonia from 2001. Having gone through its own 
development and redefinition of purpose and raison d'itre after the Cold War, in 
Yugoslavia it has been the forum of choice for the kind of US-backed intervention 
24 For more on NATO's role in Kosovo see for example (Carpenter 2000) or (Daalder 2000) 
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which no other actor was capable of, even to the point of the launching of the 1999 
campaign in the absence of a UN-mandate. 
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(iii) United StateS 
At first reluctant to get involved under the Bush regime, the inability of the EU 
or the UN to resolve the situation on their own, and the less-isolationist position of the 
Clinton administration drew the US into the fray. From that point on it more or less 
dominated and managed to instil greater momentum into diplomatic efforts, combined 
with NATO action than had been possible previously. The US was responsible for the 
Dayton Accords which brought the Bosnian conflict to an end and along with the UK 
was the dominant force in the reaction to the Kosovo conflict in 1999. It also played 
an instrumental part in diplomatic efforts in Macedonia. 
(iv) Russia 
The Russian federation has played a key role in relation to both Bosnia and 
Kosovo, not simply as a pro-Serb power block but rather also as a sometimes useful 
counter-weight to US/NATO predominance. This was the case in Bosnia but was also 
very noticeable in Kosovo (Lynch 1999) with the central involvement of Russian 
representatives (at the level of the prime minister and President Yeltsin himself) in 
negotiating the terms to the cessation of the NATO campaign. The relatively uneasy 
participation in KFOR was also a significant break with the past 
(y) The Contact Group 
First formed in 1992 as a mechanism for co-ordination and consultation 
between a power-block of states and dominated by the US, the Contact Group led the 
diplomatic effort that eventually culminated in the signing of the Dayton Accords. It 
also played a crucial role in Kosovo and constituted the de facto alliance of the states 
behind the intervention. 
25 See (Holbrooke 1998) or (Peterson and Pollack 2003) 
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(vi) OSCE 
The CSCE/OSCE performed less high-profile but very important tasks 
throughout the period under examination. It worked closely with the EU's missions in 
monitoring cease-fires and borders, was involved in the monitoring of sensitive 
elections and referenda throughout the region, assisted with the reconstruction and 
reform efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and elsewhere, with its focus for the 
most part on assisting the development of democracy. Its most high-profile 
involvement was in the form of the Kosovo Verification Mission, deployed in late 
1998 to monitor compliance with the October 1998 Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement 
and had to removed in the run up to the NATO campaign which commenced at the 
end of March 1999. Its envoys were also present and involved in much of the 
diplomatic efforts, most notably in relation to Kosovo prior to and during the NATO 
campaign. The OSCE's involvement was both desirable and appropriate due to the 
broad base of its membership, especially in that it included Russia. 
(vii) The EU member states 
For the most part single member states were not usually involved on an 
entirely unilateral basis but more often within some kind of international organisation 
or forum and often not the EU. The main fora within which they operated were the 
UN (most notably in contribution of troops to UNPROFOR which influenced the 
approach to policy made at EU-Ievel and elsewhere) and the Contact Group and 
NATO. There was of course the high-profile and controversial German recognition of 
Croatian and Slovenian independence, Greek blockage of the recognition of 
Macedonia, and French, Gennan and British 26 diplomatic efforts, amongst others 
things. For the most part, individual member states operated within a broader 
umbrella (though sometimes very broad and very loose), be it the EU, NATO or the 
Contact Group depending on what end it actually wished to pursue. 
On the whole what is remarkable about the general international reaction is 
that with the exception maybe of the US and Russia, most other actions took place 
2617or a rather scathing assessment of the British policy towards Bosnia see (Simms 2001) 
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within the context of some kind of over-arching multi-lateral context. Even the US 
and Russia rarely acted entirely alone, and even where they did It was within the 
context of a diplomatic process already underway, building on a previous action or 
process or with at least lip-service paid to the loose collaborative framework of the 
Contact Group. This in itself was part of the problem. What occurred in the former 
Yugoslavia was a confusing profusion of actors each making some attempt to deal 
with the crisis, often overlapping with each other and duplicating actions in a rather 
haphazard manner. Policy adopted within the context of one organisation or 
framework contradicted that of another, or more often hindered the adoption of a 
better approach. One example of this was the reluctance of states contributing to the 
UNPROFOR peacekeeping force to countenance a badly needed intervention for fear 
of putting troops on the ground in danger. 
Where precisely the EU fits into this complex and inconsistent international 
response is difficult to establish. This is mainly because, apart from in the initial 
stages, it was not as high-profile as many of the other actors involved and from that 
point a sense of its particular role gets drowned out by the wider clamour. However, 
the case of the EU in the former Yugoslavia is particularly interesting for several 
reasons including the way it illustrates the extent to which the EU was the forum of 
choice through which to act for its member states in this context. In addition, it is also 
interesting as it shows how the Union operated in an increasingly multi-lateral manner 
in cooperation with other actors and the EU's involvement in the region is a good 
example of the sustained practice of European Foreign Policy in a manner that 
challenged the EU on all levels: diplomatic, economic, political and eventually 
military. 
3.4 The European Union 
Yugoslavia was the first communist country in Europe to establish relations 
with the EC in 1967. A trade agreement was negotiated and signed by 1970 and a 
fori-nal Yugoslav diplomatic mission was established in Brussels in 1973. Seven years 
later a wide economic cooperation agreement was signed. In 1989 the Yugoslav 
federation applied for formal association with the EC, despite the fact that the process 
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of the federation's dissolution had been underway since the Serbian re-annexation of 
its two autonomous provinces began in 1987. The federal prime Minister, Ante 
Markovic, introduced an ambitious programme of economic refom-i and free elections 
in early 1990 in support of his government's expressed hope of closer association with 
the EC (Pinder 1991; 75). May 1990 saw the extension of aid to Yugoslavia under the 
PHARE programme and the suggestion by the Commission that negotiations on an 
association accord might soon begin, though there was no clear indication of when 
that might exactly happen. 
There was no sense of urgency as regards Yugoslavia. Its economy was not in 
bad shape in comparison with other post-communist states. It appeared to be relatively 
stable on the surface and the federal government was making moves to make it more 
democratic and more market orientated (Pinder 1991; 73-75). However, the federal 
government was losing more and more power to the republics as 1990 progressed and 
was itself coming under increasing Serbian dominance. The initial EU response 
focused on attempting to encourage the federation as a whole to maintain its integrity, 
an approach that was not entirely invalid in that the existence of the federation had 
managed to keep in check several difficult problems, most notably that of multi-ethnic 
Bosnia that had no experience of independent state-hood, and the geopolitical 
flashpoint of Macedonia. However, Yugoslavia was already falling apart at this point 
in such a manner that non-committal promises of potential association and assistance 
with development and refon-n were never likely to stop its progress alone. 
The accumulation of circumstances made it inevitable that the EC would 
assume the leadership position in relation to the initial international response to the 
crisis. It came firstly out of the overall leadership position being assumed by the 
Community in the former communist East as a whole. It also came as a result of the 
point reached after decades of political cooperation which brought it to the point 
where is was in the process of negotiating on the creation of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. In addition, the whole post Cold War rhetoric talking of a 'return to 
Europe' positioned the EC as the most appropriate actor to respond. At this stage war 
was not inevitable, certainly not on the scale that it eventually occurred. As will be 
shown, the pace of events overtook the relevance of the approach based on the 'return 
to Europe' logic, but it was this approach that remained an integral component and 
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indeed became the guiding framework within which the EU's policy was to operate 
within with increasing self-awareness and coherence over the next ten years. It was 
the only component of the Union's overall policy, but it became its basis and the 
framework within which other actions were increasingly conducted. 
It is precisely the nature of the Union's overall approach, specifically, that has 
been neglected. There have been snapshots and 'stock-takes' along the way dealing 
with the context of EC involvement in Eastern Europe in general (Pinder 1991), the 
initial reaction (Salmon 1992) (Nuttall ) (Edwards 1992), the reaction through Bosnia 
(Edwards 1997) (Kintis 1997) (Cafruny 1998) and Kosovo (Duke, 1998) and little as 
yet dealing with Macedonia (Plana 2002). With few exceptions there has little sense 
of perspective on the overall response over the entire period involved. Most accounts 
such as those listed above dealing with the conflicts in general make some mention of 
the Union but mostly focus on a failure. Even where the EU's involvement is given 
good consideration there is not a focus on the EU's own policy in any kind of 
sustained manner or over a broader time-frame (Gow 1997) (Gnesotto 1994). Other 
more EU or EFP centred accounts focus on the effect that Union involvement had on 
political integration itself or the how the procedures and processes of the CFSP 
worked and changed (Winn & Lord 200 1) (White 200 1) or measuring the impact of 
EU actions on the conflict or the other actors involved (Ginsberg 2001). Most of the 
main texts dealing with EFP, from whatever perspective, make some mention of the 
experience of the former Yugoslavia. However, it has not been brought together to 
any significant extent in terms of the overall EU experience in the foriner Yugoslavia. 
An analysis of the EU's involvement, in line with the issues discussed in the previous 
chapter concerning EFP offers a crucial sense of perspective in order to establish both 
the nature of the EU's own particular involvement and the extent to and ways in 
which it has changed in practice over time. 
3.5 Conclusion 
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The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the broader international 
response to it constitutes the specific context within which the EU operated, together 
with that of the development of its own internal capabilities. However, despite a clear 
context for the involvement of the EU there is a significant gap in the literature 
dealing with the former Yugoslavia itself, the international reaction and the 
development of EFP. Therefore there is a need to gather together and piece together 
an account of the overall approach of the EU in the former Yugoslavia, in its own 
right. As discussed in the previous chapter, the EU engages in a broad range of 
external activity, beyond the boundaries of the fon-nal CFSP. The involvement in the 
former Yugoslavia is effectively EFP in motion and an analysis of it in terms of the 
substance of the policy pursued enables the identification of overall trends and 
patterns of activity. The following chapter will outline how exactly the accounts of 
EU involvement in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia will be approached in this 
regard. 
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4. European Foreign Policy and the Former Yugoslavia 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters considered the contexts of the notion of European 
Foreign Policy and how it has evolved and can be approached, and the operational 
context of the former Yugoslavia and the problems raised. The following four 
chapters are concerned with an overview of the substance of the EU's approach to the 
successive crises and an analysis of how it has or has not changed over time. The 
purpose is to provide a broad sense of perspective and not a hugely detailed tracking 
of every action and reaction. This chapter will briefly outline the approach that will be 
taken towards the accounts of the four conflicts in the former Yugoslavia that will 
follow. It will begin with a consideration of some of the conceptual issues considered 
in the previous chapter that will assist in the analysis of the EU's external activity. An 
outline of the phases of conflict in the former that will be covered will then be 
provided, along with a discussion of how the notion of development or change can be 
accessed. Finally, the three central questions that will be asked of each of the four 
case studies will be outlined. 
4.1.1 The European Union's Foreign Policy - Analysing Change 
Based on the discussion of the notion of foreign policy at both state and EU-Ievel 
in Chapter 2, four main conclusions can be drawn that will be central to the analysis 
of the EU and its 'foreign policy' in the former Yugoslavia. First, the notion of an EU 
foreign policy is not synonymous with state-type foreign policy nor has it or will it 
ever become anything analogous to it. There are, however, certain key characteristics 
of foreign policy that are relevant to the analysis of the EU-level policy, despite their 
state-centric origins. The policy is 
(a) be extemally directed; 
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(b) be implemented in the environment external to the actor in question; 
(c) entail a degree of the purposive or the strategic, or a guiding plan or 
framework; 
Second, the EU as an international actor is non-unitary and the extent of its potential 
impact or relevance varies according to the issue in question and its capability to 
respond. Third, foreign policy as a concept is broader and more diffuse than 
traditionally conceived and in the case of the EU it is not sufficient to just focus on 
second pillar CFSP-related activities. Fourth, an analysis of the substance of EU 
external activity permits a degree of liberation from state-centric inhibitions and 
allows an acknowledgement of the fact that the EU actually engages in extensive (if 
not comprehensive) levels of international action without prejudicing it with 
criticisms of failing to live up to internal and external expectations. 
Therefore, in order to restrict the scope of what will be examined in the case of 
the EU in the former Yugoslavia, the focus will be on the substance of the EU's 
actions and reactions in relation to the various wars and crises. In other words,, the 
output of the EU's single institutional framework in relation to the former Yugoslavia 
will be considered in order to construct a broad overview of the substance of EU 
policy. EU-level output and activity will not be taken here to involve the member 
states in their own right but merely the collective policy representative of the extent to 
which they have chosen to operate within the EU institutions. A sense of the EU's 
non-unitary nature will be maintained throughout. The relevant actions of the EU- 
level will be considered regardless of source. What this activity or patterns of activity 
amounts to will then be discussed, and also the extent and ways in which it has (or has 
not) changed over time. Building on the discussion in the previous chapter, the 
chronological accounts provided on the EU's activity in the former Yugoslavia will 
centre on the following issues. Conclusions will then be drawn on the extent and 
nature of any change based on the three central questions outlined below. 
(i) Substance vs. procedure 
The central focus here will be on the substance of the EU's policy in the 
former Yugoslavia rather than on policy-making procedures or processes. This is in 
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order to better isolate what it is that the EU actually did do in the former Yugoslavia 
and to better penult a characterisation of the resulting policy and its progress over 
time in terms of what it actually is and has done and could do, rather than how it was 
made or why it was not otherwise. That is not to say that a more behaviourist focus 
has no relevance but rather that in this particular instance the key questions of what 
the EU did in the former Yugoslavia, how the actual policy pursued can be 
characterised and how the nature of how it has changed can be captured is best 
accessed through an analysis of the range of actions actually engaged in. A sense of 
the dynamic of the process of policy-making and implementation is maintained as the 
development (or lack of) of policy is discussed and there is no deliberate attempt to 
'black-box' the various factors influencing the resulting policy. However, the focus is 
very much on the 'output' end of the policy process. 
(ii) Reactive or Strategic 
As noted in the previous chapter, external relations will contain elements of 
both the reactive and the deliberate. What distinguishes foreign policy from the mass 
of external actions and relations is a sense of a deliberate attempt to manage, in other 
words a sense of purpose or of the strategic. Both the notion of purpose and of the 
strategic must however be heavily qualified. Purpose implies the ability to identify 
and the ability actively to work towards preferred courses of action that would benefit 
a definable set of interests. Strategy goes further to imply the existence of an actual 
plan designed to serve specific objectives. 
However, with foreign policy the notion of strategy is problematic. It is not 
simply a matter of setting up and applying a policy in a vacuum. Both the making and 
implementation of it will be subject to the influence of various internal and external 
factors that will effect both the fonn of policy and the extent to which it can be 
implemented in the external environment. Therefore initial 'purposes' or 'strategies' 
will change and be reconsidered and are therefore always to a degree reactive. The 
extent and direction of change will then itself be conditioned by past actions and 
policies and also by what is going on in the international system at the precise 
moment in question. However, in the case of the EU, what can be identified is the 
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extent to which some attempt to design, direct or proactively manage Is inherent in its 
external relations. To a degree, this will be apparent in the expressed intentions. 
However, this is not enough, as the degree to which intentions are followed up with 
action, and importantly the necessary and appropriate type of action, is extremely 
significant. Aspirations to the strategic are not always realisable and do not constitute 
the policy actually pursued. The rationale for considering the extent to which the 
actual policy pursued can be described as reactive or strategic is to locate it better in 
terms of conceptions of foreign policy, without any presumption of the EU becoming 
more state-like. 
(iii) Capabilities and instruments 
An analysis of policy substance and the degree to which it exhibits features 
that might be associated with 'foreign policy' is not in and of itself sufficient for any 
kind of rounded analysis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is not sufficient to 
merely focus on formal competences in looking at the EU's external activity, but 
neither is it desirable to completely ignore them. In examining the policy actually 
pursued, a clearer picture emerges of what instruments can and have been used and 
to what effect. This must then be considered in the context of the range of instruments 
actually available to the EU to give effect to its declared intentions or purpose.. The 
extent to which a sense of purpose can be pursued will depend on the existence of and 
ability to mobilise the relevant and appropriate instruments in order to bring about the 
desired results. What will be examined is what the EU was actually capable of doing 
as a collective and the way the available instruments have been used as distinct from, 
but still in the context of, the formal evolution and design of the CFSP. 
Context and roles 
Of equal importance is the extent to which the context within which the EU 
operates influences the ability to follow a particular course of action, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. Analysis of the EU's policy must to an extent be situated in 
context in order to consider it in terms of its appropriateness not only as regards the 
EU's intentions and capabilities, but also in terms of the nature of the particular issue 
being addressed. It has already been noted that rather than a single over-arching 
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foreign policy the EU has common policies that vary in their extent and nature 
depending on the issue in question. Therefore a sense of context and the role of other 
actors is important. The EU's interaction with other actors in the international system 
is significant, especially in the case of the former Yugoslavia. While the focus very 
much remains on the EU policy, this is still seen in its operational context in order to 
arrive at conclusions as to the relative importance of the EU's actions in this instance 
and also the roles or functions that the patterns of EU activity show it to be 
performing. 
4.1.2 Policy Activity - the Former Yugoslavia 
The phases of activity that will be covered correspond roughly to the four primary 
conflicts in the fori-ner Yugoslavia that occurred between 1991 and 2002. While a 
section will be devoted to each, these sections are not intended to comprise self- 
contained and all-encompassing narratives of the individual conflicts. The emphasis in 
the analysis is on the what the EU attempted or accomplished and to trace the 
development of types of activity through from one conflict to another. A certain 
density of detail has to be sacrificed in order to provide a sense of perspective and a 
'taking stock' of the evolution of policy substance over an expanded time-frame. 
What is offered is an overview that permits sufficient discussion of the main questions 
to be addressed. 
It must also be stressed that none of the periods outlined below is considered 
to be self-contained. There are significant degrees of overlap and this in itself will be 
significant in discussing policy development. The four periods are identified by the 
issue or region which was the more high-profile target of activity. For example, there 
is no suggestion that Croatia did not continue to be a matter of grave concern after 
1992. Equally, Bosnia continues to be problematic to this day. Unfortunately, a degree 
of over-simplification is inevitable. Also, while it is the contention here that there is a 
need to avoid normative analyses of the involvement in the foriner Yugoslavia, that is 
not to suggest that the EU does not deserve a great deal of the criticism levelled at it 
but rather to maintain more of a focus on the policy activity itself. 
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The purpose of considering these phases of activity is to ascertain the extent 
and nature of any change in the activity or patterns of activity. The question must then 
be asked how change will be characterised. Building on the discussion in the previous 
chapters this will centre on the central notion of purpose or strategy in foreign policy 
and the connected notions of the extent of linkage between goals and capabilities and 
the various 'functions' the EU served in this particular context. These issues will be 
addressed after an account of the activity in each period of time, with overall trends 
and conclusions being drawn in the concluding chapter, where the overall patterns of 
activity will be assessed in terms of the extent to which they are evidence of an 
emerging EU-level foreign policy. The underlying assumption is that the EU 
possesses a sui generis foreign policy despite the fact that it lacks the key attributes of 
statehood and is unlikely to seek to acquire them. The absence of statehood does not 
preclude the possibility of an EU-level foreign policy that is distinct and identifiable 
in its own right in international relations. What must be acknowledged is that this 
foreign policy can be more limited in its scope and objectives than more traditional 
conceptions of foreign policy and rather than a single over-arching EU-level foreign 
policy, there exist common policies that vary in their extent and potential according to 
the issue in question. 
The following four phases of activity will be outlined in the following chapters: 
(i) Sloven ialCroatia 
This roughly covers the period 1990 to the beginning of 1992. Rather than merely 
re-telling a well-told story it is being offered here as a starting point and is important 
as a comparison point for subsequent activity and policy. Also, a more nuanced view 
of the actual substance of the then EC's policy in this period often gets lost in the 
complexity of actors and events in the former Yugoslavia and the international 
community at large, as well as within the EU. More often cited as an example of an 
EC failure 
, it is argued 
here that while this may be true, the policy performed here 
contained the seeds of what was to remain the overall policy over the next ten years. 
This is often over-shadowed by the subsequent 'failure' in Bosnia. 
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(ii) Bosnia- Herzegovina 
This period has been well-covered and represented a profound challenge to all 
actors concerned. It is very often used as an example of the EU's failure to agree and 
act in line with a common foreign policy and also its inability to function as a 
coherent and effective international actor. As with the 1990-1992 period, it is also 
useful as a comparison point for subsequent activity. It is an excellent example of how 
the response devised to the situation was not directly in line with the plans for and 
actual codification of the EU's external competence. However, treatments of this 
period often focus on what the EU failed to do or achieve and not on the surprisingly 
wide-range of activities actually engaged in. These may not represent a single, 
comprehensive, broadly effective policy that addressed all facets of the conflict, but as 
disappointing as the EU's policy and ability to act may have been, it did still act and 
make attempts to manage things within the limitations of its capabilities. This section 
will begin in early 1992 and continue through to the implementation of the Dayton 
Accords and efforts to stabilise Bosnia up to the end of 1996. 
(iii) Kosovo 
After the perceived failure in Bosnia, the EU's involvement in Kosovo from 1998 
is often characterised by a decrease in expectations of what it could or should do, both 
internally and externally. However, as with the later years in Bosnia, it did still act 
and more importantly began to show signs of consolidating an understanding of the 
functions it was most suited to fulfilling, as detennined by actual capability and also 
the opportunity afforded by the lack of an equivalent actor in the international system 
to offer a suitably attractive framework within which to encourage post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilisation. This section will briefly consider the years leading up 
to the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo in 1998 and will focus on the reaction 
to events in 1999 and end with a consideration of the EU's involvement in post-war 
reconstruction and stabilisation. 
Macedonia 
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This section marks the culmination of the period under examination and thus the 
state of EFP here will be the real indicator of how it has or has not changed and the 
level and direction of momentum sustained. It may not mark a massive leap forward 
but it does stand in sufficient contrast to the early reaction of 1991, not necessarily 
just in the type of actions or the broad approach taken but in the sense that the EU did 
operate with a more clearer and defined (if limited) purpose, aided to an extent by a 
more realistic understanding of what it was most suited to working towards and 
achieving. It also showed more of the increasing ease with which the EU could work 
with other international actors, concentrating on its own appropriate tasks and also 
building on this by venturing into new areas such as the deployment of an 
autonomous peace-keeping force. This section will begin with the efforts made to help 
Macedonia maintain its own stability during the earlier conflicts and will go on to 
consider the reaction to the outbreak of hostilities in 2001 and conclude with the EU's 
role in the stabilisation process. This will deal with the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe and the Stabilisation and Association Process but will also look 
forward very briefly to the deployment of the EU force in Macedonia in 2003. 
4.2 Characterising Change 
Following the accounts of the EU's activity in these regions in terins of what the 
EU actually did, located in the context of what it could do as permitted by its own 
capabilities and external circumstances, conclusions will be drawn at the end of each 
phase based on the following questions: 
(V) Balance between the reactive and strategic 
Rather than consider the notions of the reactive and the strategic in absolute 
terms, what will be considered is the extent to which the EU simply responded to 
events and the demands of other actors or the extent to which there was some apparent 
degree of self-understanding and foresight on its part as to the most effective and 
appropriate course of action to adopt. Expressed intentions are one source for 
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identifying the strategic, but this alone is not sufficient and is in fact misleading. 
Considered in conjunction with the following two questions, perceivable alterations in 
the degree of deliberate purpose in the EU's actions will give some indication of not 
only change, but also its direction in terms of the EU's developing 'matunty' as a 
foreign policy actor. 
(vi) Goals-Ca abilities linkage p 
A reason why the strategic is not always realisable is that there is an 
inadequate degree of linkage between goals and capabilities. The degree of linkage 
will reflect the ability to actually pursue expressed goals. It is not a matter of 
developing the necessary capability to pursue goals constructed in isolation. The 
process is two-way, with goals being modified to bring them more into line with 
actual capabilities and also with certain development in capability occurring to serve 
more ambitious objectives. However, both the extent of possible goals and capabilities 
are constrained by the influence of both internal and external factors. The extent to 
which goals and capabilities are connected and balanced will be indicative of the 
capacity to act purposively in international relations. 
(vil) Nature of thefunctions/roles performed 
The patterns of EU activity can be characterised by the dominant functions 
being performed by the EU. The notion of a role or function is linked to both internal 
capability and external opportunity. An analysis of activity (as opposed to just 
declared intentions or goals in isolation) gives an impression of the actual roles 
performed, reflective of what the EU is capable of perfon-ning and is in a sense 
permitted' to perform. However, it is not enough to consider roles performed in 
isolation. The roles prescribed to the EU, both by itself and its member states and 
other actors in the international system are significant. Without some sense of purpose 
combined with a degree of linkage between goals and capabilities, the EU will fail to 
fulfil its prescribed role so dissatisfaction and a capabilities-expectations gap emerges. 
The gap will narrow over time not simply just when the EU rises to the occasion and 
develops the capability to fulfil roles prescribed to it, but when the performed and 
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prescribed roles are more balanced. More realistic expectations will be associated 
with a clearer sense of purpose and more effective linkage between goals and 
capabilities. The role performed may then be more limited but It is more realistic. 
4.3 Conclusion 
What follows is an account of what the EU did in the former Yugoslavia between 
1990 and 2002. Each phase of activity will be outlined in chronological order and will 
consist of an account of the substance of the EU's policy and will be discussed in 
terms of its reactive or strategic nature and the nature of utilised capabilities as well as 
their operational context. Finally conclusions will be drawn as to the extent of overall 
change or development in the nature of the policy pursued through a consideration of 
the balance between the more reactive and strategic aspects of the policy, the extent of 
linkage between goals and actual capabilities and the nature of the functions or roles 
performed by the EU in this particular context. The conclusions that can be drawn 
from each stage will then be brought together in the concluding chapter in which 
overall patterns of change will be traced and characterised along the same lines as the 
individual phases, before a consideration of how they might be characterised in terms 
of a developing EFP. 
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5. Slovenia and Croatia 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the ties that held the already unstable Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia together began to unravel by the early 1990s, it was one of a 
range of new and challenging issues to be confronted in the rapidly changing post- 
Cold War international system. Everyone, including the then EC and its member 
states, was still struggling to process and comprehend the changes and define and 
assert their own particular position within the new order. At the same time, new issues 
and new types of conflict required new and hastily devised approaches. For the EU 
the most pressing concerns were the need to absorb the reality and potential of the 
newly reunified Germany and to address the issue of how to deal with the many 
potentially unstable and under-developed foriner communist states on its Eastern 
borders. The EU's overall initial response to the changes in the international system in 
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War set the tone for its reaction to the unfolding 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Underlying much of the response was the fear of a 
similar disintegration of the former Soviet Union as it moved unsteadily from its 
communist past. With the international agenda so heavily loaded, the EU attempted to 
address the issues ansing from the looming Yugoslav crisis and to stabilise the 
situation. It assumed for itself a leadership role for which it was not yet ready and 
whose character was not entirely appropriate to secure the short or medium-term 
placating of the situation. 
This period of activity highlights, in the first instance, what could be done within 
the limits of pre-TEU EPC .A 
broad range of available instruments were mobilised 
and there were several significant innovations. In addition, and in response to the 
transformed international context, the EC's own internal agenda was also heavily 
loaded during this short but intense period. While it attempted to prevent the 
unravelling of Yugoslavia, it also had the two simultaneous IGC's on EMU and 
Political Union to contend with, as well as the launch of its enlargement project to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE's). Therefore the highly declaratory 
and high-level diplomatic emphasis of EPC was conducted in relation to the former 
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Yugoslavia alongside more novel activities arising out of the often hastily devised 
approach to other changes in the EC's internal and external environments. However, 
the role assumed by the EC as the anchor for stabilisation through assisted economic 
and democratic reform in post-Cold War Europe is highly significant for the path that 
future involvement in the former Yugoslavia would follow. The initial reaction is 
interesting because, although it is much criticised and dismissed as an outright failure, 
it does contain the seeds of an approach that would build on in later years. 
5.2 The EU-s Initial Response 
(i) 1990 
At the beginning of 1990 Yugoslavia was still very much seen in the same 
light as the plethora of unstable states that emerged from the former Soviet block. The 
way to stability was perceived to be through political and economic reform in order to 
bring these countries into line with the western norms of democracy and market 
economics. The difference with Yugoslavia was of course that it was a complex 
multi-ethnic federation that struggled with considerable inter-ethnic and republican 
tensions since the death of Tito in the early 1980s 27 . Following the Serbian moves to 
re-centralise Serbia by imposing direct control over its two autonomous provinces, by 
1990 the already waning commitment of both Slovenia and Croatia to the federation 
quickly diminished. The autonomy the individual Yugoslav republics enjoyed since 
1974 28 and the practice of economic self-management had enabled both republics to 
become less and less dependent on the centre. Both were relatively prosperous and 
self-sufficient in their own right. The process of secession from the federation began 
in 1989, when Slovenia asserted the supremacy of republican over federal legislation 
through several constitutional amendments. This culminated in the referendum held 
on the 23 rd December 1990 which returned an overwhelming majority in favour of 
secession from the federation and independence failing the successful conclusion of 
an agreement on Yugoslavia's future within six months. Despite suggestions for 
27 There were of course tensions prior to the death of Tito and before the creation of Yugoslavia after 
the second world war but Communist Yugoslavia did remain intact and relatively stable and functional, 
both economically and politically. 
2' Under the 1974 federal constitution Yugoslavia was comprised of 8 federal units, the six republics of 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia, Macedonia and Serbia and the two autonomous 
provinces within Serbia (Kosova and Voj*vodina) which enjoyed equal federal status. All units enjoyed 
considerable local autonomy. 
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possible restructuring of Yugoslavia 29 little progress was made. On the 22 nd December 
,, 
Croatia's new government (also elected in the Spring's multi-party elections) also 
declared the supremacy of its legislation over the federal constitution. 
Despite this extremely complex and precarious political situation the EC's 
reaction was in line with the policies it adopted in dealing with other post-Communist 
states through central and eastern Europe. What was highly significant in this case 
was that there already existed a long-standing relationship between the EC and 
Yugoslavia to build upon. Yugoslavia was the first communist country in Europe to 
establish relations with the EEC in 1967. A trade agreement was negotiated and 
signed by 1970 and a formal Yugoslav diplomatic mission was established in Brussels 
in 1973. In 1989, the Yugoslav federation applied for formal association with the EC, 
despite the fact that the process of the federation's dissolution had been underway 
since the Serbian reannexation of Kosova and Vojvodina began in 1987. At this point 
it was neither clear nor wholly inevitable that that would happen. Meetings between 
the Yugoslav federal foreign minister Budimer Loncar and the Commission (Matutes 
and Delors - separately) took place in April 1989, dealing mainly with the issue of 
economic reform (General Report 1989; Point 807). The following November at a 
meeting of the EEC-Yugoslavia Co-operation Council it was agreed that the EC was 
prepared to examine additional measures required to support reform and strengthen 
co-operation pending the conclusion of negotiations with the IMF on the 
improvement of Yugoslavia's economic and financial situation. It was also agreed to 
anticipate the negotiation of a new (third) financial protocol, extend technical 
assistance to sectors of the Yugoslav economy and examine the possibility of 
involvement in existing EC programmes (General Report 1989; Point 808) 
The federal Prime Minster, Ante Markovic introduced an ambitious 
programme of economic reform and ftee elections in early 1990 in support of his 
government's expressed hope of closer association with the EC (Pinder, 1991: 75). 
This was accompanied by a request for a review of EC-Yugoslav relations in light of 
29 By early October 1990 Slovenia and Croatia had jointly proposed the restructuring of Yugoslavia's 
along more confederal lines, involving a loose alliance of sovereign states, with a single market and a 
common foreign and defence policy supplementary to republican policy. This model was rejected by 
Serbia as it would result in losing any control it had over regions across Yugoslavia that contained 
significant Serb minorities. 
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developments within the federation and in Europe more generally. Meetings with the 
Commission followed (Markovic to Brussels and Matutues to Belgrade) in April. The 
April Dublin Special European Council agreed that action within the framework of 
the G24 (PHARE 30) should be extended to Yugoslavia (amongst otherS3 1) and that the 
32 EC would work for this at the upcoming G24 ministerial meeting in July . This was 
agreed and confirmed by the Council in September and negotiations proceeded with a 
view to concluding the third financial protocol. 
Therefore , in the context of this pre-existing relationship it made sense that it 
would form the basis for continued relations after the end of the Cold War and that 
these relations would involve the Commission and would centre on the prospect of 
financial support to aid the reform of the Yugoslav economy and political system. 
There was as yet no sense of crisis regarding Yugoslavia. It was cast very much in the 
same tenns as the range of recently post-Communist countries in Europe and the same 
guiding principles of supporting reform through the conditional provision of aid were 
applied. There was as yet little distinction between the Yugoslav case and that of the 
others. However, this very early approach displays what was within the EC's 
capability and it was also not entirely inappropriate either. Closer association was the 
will of the federal leadership and efforts at reform were made. War at this stage was 
not inevitable, though it is extremely difficult to say whether or not the federation as a 
whole in the form in which it then existed could have survived given events that had 
already occurred. What was interesting was that this approach remained central to the 
EC's response 1991, when the political situation began to deteriorate dramatically. 
(ii) 1991 
By early 1991 it had become apparent that the deteriorating situation required 
more urgent attention. Conducted very much in the context of support for the 
democratisation and economic reform of all of Europe's former Communist states, the 
EC approach to Yugoslavia into 1991 was aimed to preserve the status quo and to 
30 PHARE (Poland Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy) was set up M 1989 to 
support the extensive reforms necessary in order to ensure the stable economic and political transition 
of post-communist countries. It included emergency aid as well as support for modemisation and 
restructuring and was the main channel for the EU's financial and technical support to what ultimately 
was 14 CEECs. 
31 The GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania 
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encourage stabilisation through reform. As early as February representations were 
made to both the federal and republican authorities urging a democratic and peaceful 
settlement to growing tensions and confirming the EC's commitment to the unity and 
integrity of the federation within a fully democratic framework 33 . In addition to this 
support for the integrity of the federation, it was also emphasised in March that 
reform-based political dialogue would enable the full development of the co-operation 
which already existed between the EC and the federal authoritieS34. 
With the Second Financial protocol due to expire in June, the Third Financial 
Protocol was proposed on the 3 rd April. In May Commission President Jacques Delors 
and EC President Jacques Santer (Luxembourg) travelled to Belgrade to communicate 
the EC's commitment to the preservation of the federation and to the territorial 
integrity and international borders of Yugoslavia. In return, Delors promised to 
request additional aid from the EC in support of the federal reform effort and a 
peaceful dialogue on a constitutional solution to the disagreements among the 
republics (Woodward 1995; 220). The same month a referendum was held in Croatia 
that returned an overwhelming majority in favour of independence. The JNA began to 
disarm the local Territorial Defence forces in Slovenia and Croatia and resistance to 
the Croatian government was already beginning to solidify in the Serb majority 
territory known as the Krajina. 
The EC -through a combination of both EPC and EC procedures and 
competences, continued to respond to events as they began to escalate in the same 
vein as before -increasing the emphasis on the need for dialogue to resolve tensions 
to its conditions for the provision of EC financial aid. The context of the pre-existing 
relationship the leadership role adopted by the EC in relation to the efforts to stabilise 
the rest of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) , led the EC 
into adopting a leadership 
role in relation to Yugoslavia in the months that now followed, even as events 
overtook the relevance of the EC's role in this regard. Influenced also by the 
coterminous negotiations on the formulation of a CFSP in the IGC on Political Union, 
there was an over-inflated expectation in all quarters (Nuttall 2000) as to what it was 
32 2 81h April 90/185 Conclusions of the Special Meeting of the European Council in Dublin 
33 13 th March 91/083 Answer to oral question in the EP - Question No H-255/91 by Mr Blot 
concerning threats to the Croatians and Slovenes from the Yugoslav army 
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that the EC could actually do at this stage of European integration. No one was 
prepared for what was to come next in Yugoslavia and the EC was not alone in, for 
the most part, merely reacting to the tidal wave of events over the rest of the year. 
In the absence of any agreement on the constitutional future of Yugoslavia, 
Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on the 25 th June. Once members of 
the provisional Slovenian militia started taking control of posts on Yugoslavia's 
western international border, the JNA rushed to intervene and quickly attacked. There 
was now a war to contend with and the speed with which it flared up illustrates the 
extent of tensions on the ground. The immediate response to the outbreak of hostilities 
was one of alarm. The Luxembourg European Council, meeting the weekend after 
war broke out, responded quickly to the changed circumstances in Yugoslavia. The 
Troika of foreign ministers 35 was despatched to Belgrade to try to secure a cease-fire, 
anned with a threat to suspend all EC aid should the warring parties not agree. A 
cease-fire was agreed and the Troika returned to report to the Council before it broke 
up the next day. However, nothing had been done to resolve the issues underlying the 
conflict and the cease-fire did not hold. On 3 oth June the Troika returned with a 
proposal for the restructuring of the federation and agreed another cease-fire (which 
also did not hold). On the 3d July a joint EC-EU declaration condemned the 
continuing use of force and calling for an immediate halt to the violence, a return to 
barracks of all military forces and an immediate cease-fire and stated that the US and 
the EC would work together through the CSCE and with others in the international 
community to seek to defuse the situation 36 . That it was the EC that took the 
diplomatic initiative makes sense in light of the overall context and the nature of the 
pre-existing relationship. The response was immediate, though conducted in a highly 
reactive manner and with little sense of constructive purpose other than to urge a 
cease-fire. It quickly became apparent that simple demands of this kind were not 
enough, even when supported by more concrete proposals for a way forward when the 
Troika returned for the second time. Additional measures were required. 
3' 26hMarch 91/093 Statement by an informal Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia 
Comprised of the foreign ministers of the previous(Italian), current (Luxembourg) and inconuing 
(Netherlands) Presidencies 
363 rd July 91/202 Joint statement on the situation in Yugoslavia 
68 
The willingness to organise a group of international observers to monitor a 
cease-fire was announced. On the 5 th Of jUly it was announced that such a mission 
would be organised to help stabilise a cease-fire and to monitor the implementation of 
an agreement. It was also announced that an embargo on armaments and military 
equipment was to be imposed on the whole of Yugoslavia by the Community and an 
urgent appeal was made to other countries to follow this example. In addition to 
diplomatic condemnation and persuasion, more direct sanction came in the form of 
the withdrawal of the aid promised to the federation in support of the reform effort. 
The second and incoming third financial protocols were to be suspended with the 
hope expressed that a normalisation of the situation in Yugoslavia would permit their 
reintroduction as soon as possible so as to contribute to the indispensable economic 
recovery of the country37. Though the scope of measures and the nature of the issues 
that needed addressing would widen in later years, the EC's activity centres on these 
key types of diplomatic intervention and negotiation, sanctions and civilian cease-fire 
monitoring. 
At the invitation of the federal government, the EC Troika (with Portugal now 
replacing Italy) met with representatives of all concerned parties to the conflict on 
Tito's formal holiday island of Brioni on the 7 th July. At Brioni it was agreed that a 
peaceful settlement had to based on the acknowledgement certain key principles 
which included 
that it was up to the peoples of Yugoslavia to decide their future 
that there was an urgent need for negotiation in order to reconcile the 
rights of self-deten-nination and the need to preserve the integrity of the 
Yugoslav state in accordance with international law in a manner that 
avoids further conflict 
38 
37 5 th July 91/203 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia 
38 Negotiation and consensus between the parties was seen as the way to proceed peaceftilly given the 
inherent ambiguity of the situation according to international law i. e. the tension between the right of 
self-deternimation and the right to the preservation of the integrity of the state. Speaking in the EP, 
Hans van den Broek representing the Dutch Presidency acknowledged that 'both rights are legitimate 
and important for the future of Europe as well as individual states' and while 'international law does 
not always provide clear solutions to such complex problems as we now face within Yugoslavia's 
ftontiers' the view adopted at EC-level at this stage was that unilateral imposition of one group's right 
to self-determination was not acceptable in the Yugoslav case as it could not lead to a lasting and 
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* that the federal authorities needs to exercise its full capacity, notably with 
regard to the JNA 
e that all parties should refrain from any unilateral action, including 
secession or the use of violence 
39 
The basis of the agreement was a cease-fire. This was to be monitored by an unarmed 
mission of observers under the auspices of the (then) CSCE but directed, funded and 
largely comprised of EC representatives. Its purpose was to help stabilise the cease- 
fire and to monitor the implementation of the remaining elements of the agreement40. 
They were to monitor and assess the various elements and procedures involved in the 
cease-fire and to report any incidents or infringements commitment by any side, be 
they republican, federal or otherwise 41 . Eventually labelled the European Community 
Monitoring Mission (ECMM) it was comprised largely of civilian and military 
personnel from the member states and the Commission (Edwards 1991; 168). It was 
introduced in Slovenia on the 15 th July and was extended to Croatia the following 
September. Though relatively ineffective in preventing fighting, it did provide an 
invaluable source of information and its very presence did deter various smaller, more 
local incidents from escalating. It also represented a significant innovation for the EC 
and that even within the limits of capabilities, something approaching the appropriate 
and necessary could be organised. 
Also at Brioni, Slovenia and Croatia agreed to postpone the implementation of 
their independence declarations for three months to allow negotiations on 
Yugoslavia's future to be held. These negotiations were to take place no later than I't 
August and the EC agreed to assist and facilitate the negotiating proceSS42 The JNA 
was to return to barracks in Slovenia and Serbia was to allow the Croatian candidate 
for the rotating chairmanship of the collective Yugoslav Presidency (Stipe Mesic) to 
take his seat after blocking the appointment earlier in the year. As a result, Mesic was 
appointed. The JNA did return to barracks in Slovenia and the war there effectively 
ended. 
peaceful solution and would lead to a de facto violation of state integrity. See 9hJuly 91/207 Statement 
in the EP concerning the situation in Yugoslavia 
39 Author's interpretation of 7"' July 91/204 Joint Declaration of the Brioni meeting on the Yugoslav 
crisis 
40 7 th July 91/204 Joint Declaration of the Brion, meeting on the Yugoslav crisis 
" 9"' July 91/207 Statement in the EP concerning the situation in Yugoslavia 
42 7"' July 91/204 Joint Declaration of the Brioni meeting on the Yugoslav crisis 
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However, Slovenia was to prove the easiest of Yugoslavia's problems to 
solve. Its ethnic homogeneity, relative prosperity and its non-strategic place In the 
Serbian authorities Greater Serbian agenda meant that it was easier for it to be 
abandoned and be allowed to separate from Yugoslavia. By July 1991, the Serbian 
government was keen to divert attention and resources to far more contentious 
territories in Croatia. They were therefore almost willing to use the Brioni Agreement 
as an excuse to abandon attempts to recapture Slovenia. The EC's policy towards 
Yugoslavia had itself changed implicitly in the Briom Agreement also. Preservation 
of the federation was not stressed as strongly as it had been before and it could be 
interpreted that some form of political entity agreed by all parties would suffice. The 
three month moratorium on Croatian and Slovenian independence implied that in the 
absence of an agreement that they could proceed, causing the break-up of the 
federation. Showing some flexibility in the approach drew the EC further into the 
mire of leading and overseeing the fractious negotiations on how exactly Yugoslavia 
would be dissolved, but without the ability to prevent the escalation of all-out war 
other than the threat and imposition of sanctions. In the highly-charged and tense 
situation within Yugoslavia this was not the way to persuade bellicose militias within 
the republics to desist. 
A low-intensity war continued in Croatia throughout the Summer, 
concentrated in eastern Slavonia around Vukovar, and in the Krajina region along 
Croatia's border with Bosnia. Despite threats that without full compliance with the 
Brioni Agreement the EC would not continue its efforts and assistance in dealing with 
the criSIS43 , the 1 
s'August deadline for the commencement of talks came and went 
with little having been accomplished. On the 6 th August the EC foreign ministers 
expressed readiness to convene a peace conference should the federal authorities be 
unable (or unwilling) to do so. The basis of the negotiations carried out in such a 
conference would be based on two key principles: 
that any change of internal and international borders by force is not 
acceptable 
43 Such as in I Oth July 91/209 Statement by the 82 nd EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia 
which stated 'Full compliance is essential for the European Community and its Member States to 
continue their current efforts of assistance in overcoming the Yugoslav crisis' 
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* any solution should guarantee the rights of minorities in all the republics 
In addition, the Commission was invited to examine whether it would be feasible to 
apply economic sanctions selectively and consequently allow the EC to punish those 
who violated cease-fires and did not abide by the above principles, while at the same 
time moving to actively improve economic and financial relations with those who 
did 44 . In short, use of economic sanctions and incentives to differentiate between the 
conflicting parities parties and create more of an incentive to co-operate with 
diplomatic efforts. On August 27 th JNA activity in Croatia in support of the Serbs was 
condemned and it was stated that the EC or its member states would never accept a 
fait accompli and that a forcible change of borders would not be recognised. A cease- 
fire was also called for. It was to be agreed by I" September and would be monitored 
by ECMM. It was hoped that this would allow the EC to convene a peace conference 
and establish an arbitration procedure to work out some kind of a solution for the 
region's future. In the absence of a cease-fire by I" September the EC would consider 
additional measures including 'international action', 45 though what exactly was 
meant by this rather vague statement was not elaborated upon. 
However, that did not prove necessary as by the 2 nd September the required 
cease-fire had been agreed and the next day it was announced that an EC sponsored 
peace conference would be convened, supplemented by an arbitration procedure. It 
was to be located in The Hague under the auspices of the Dutch Presidency and under 
the Chairmanship of Lord Peter Carrington, former British Foreign Secretary and 
NATO Secretary General and the vice- chairmanship of a Dutch and Spanish 
representative. Alongside the main negotiations, three working groups dealt with 
human and minority rights issues, the details of Yugoslavia's institutional and 
constitutional future and economic co-operation. Negotiations were conducted on the 
basis of three basic principles 
1. That there would be no unilateral or forcible changes of border 
2. That the rights of all ethnic groups and minorities be respected 
3. That full respect be accorded to all legitimate interests and aspirations 
At the same time as announcing the convening of the conference the EC foreign 
ministers also reiterated their hope that the suspended financial protocols could be put 
44 6 th August 91/243 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia 
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into effect as soon as possible, as soon as a nonnalisation of the situation would 
permit it46 . The maintenance of Yugoslavia in its present form was no longer stressed. 
It was now acknowledged that 'New political arrangements will have to replace the 
present constitutional structure of Yugoslavia. To deten-nine these arrangements 
peacefully and by common consent, taking into account the interests of all inhabitants 
7 
of Yugoslavia, is the purpose of this conference4 . Later, it was also reiterated that 
any outcome that was the result of negotiations conducted in good faith would be 
accepted 48 . This was a mammoth task to take on. In short, the EC-sponsored 
conference was to oversee the negotiations that would define the future political form 
of Yugoslavia, supported only by a small group of ceasefire monitors and the recourse 
to utilisation of economic 'carrots and sticks' to encourage cooperation and 
compliance. 
The conference opened on the 7 th September, amidst some of the worst 
fighting to occur in Croatia. The brutality surrounding the fall of Vukovar and the 
entry of 'ethnic cleansing' into the conflict, and the destruction of the historic city of 
Dubrovnik are only two examples of the kinds of events that provided the back-drop 
to negotiations. Cease-fires came and went with a total of fourteen having been 
negotiated and broken by the conference's conclusion (Edwards 1992) One of the 
reasons why cease-fires did not hold was that the negotiating parties did not have total 
control of the militias on the ground. It is worth noting that while a war proceeded 
between the Croatians and the Croatian Serbs (though actively supported by Serbia 
and the JNA), the EC was negotiating with the federal and republican representatives. 
Despite the emphasis in statements of principle underlying negotiation of the rights of 
ethnic minorities, not enough attention was paid to the problem of Yugoslavia's 
nationalities scattered beyond the borders of their ethnic 'homelands', which was the 
very problem that made the Yugoslav crisis so intractable. In this atmosphere it was 
difficult for ECMM to perform its task and by mid-September the WEU's response to 
the request that it explore ways in which ECMM activities could be supported (i. e. in 
45 27hAugust 91/252 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia 
40 3 rd September 91/254 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning 
Yugoslavia 
47 Hans Van den Broek speaking at the opening of the Conference on Yugoslavia at The Hague 7 th 
September 91/258 Statement at the Conference on Yugoslavia 
48 1 9th September 91/282 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning 
Yugoslavia 
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a peace-keeping/reinforced cease-fire monitoring role) was welcomed if not 
49 
ultimately acted upon 
On the 3d of October Serbia and Montenegro announced their intention to 
assume control of the collective Yugoslav presidency and certain tasks within the 
competence of the federal parliament. This and great concern for the increasingly 
indiscriminate use of force by the JNA and others in Croatia, injected new momentum 
into EC efforts to find a way to resolve the crisis peacefully. A more forceful 
approach was required, with a clearer sense of what the warring parties had to gain or 
lose by their decision whether or not to co-operate with The Hague conference. On 
the 6 Ih October, the Council confirmed that those republics seeking independence 
would gain it, but within the context of an overall and negotiated settlement and 
subject to certain criteria. A deadline was set for midnight the next day for the 
implementation of a truce agreed at The Hague. Failing that, restrictive measures 
would be introduced against those who did not co-operate. The EC-Yugoslavia Co- 
operation and Trade Agreement would be terminated and would be renewed only with 
those making a constructive contribution to the peace process. A truce was agreed 
this time and the penalties averted. On 25 th September UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 713 imposed an anns embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia and 
invited the Secretary General to offer his assistance to the peace effort. Now, just over 
a week later the Council invited the UN to step up its engagement with the crisis and 
asked that the Secretary General consider sending a special envoy to Yugoslavia 
without delay 50 . The pace and scope of events 
had overtaken the ability of the EC to 
deal with on its own - even in terms of intense diplomacy. The potential 
independence of the former Yugoslav republics was now clearly on the agenda, an 
acknowledgement of a status quo where two republics had only suspended their own 
independence declarations, and not one where there was a viable entity that could be 
preserved in any form much resembling the present one. 
49 See 19"' September 91/282 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning 
Yugoslavia. The WEU replied with four options ranging from basic logistical support to ECMM to a 
full-scale peacekeeping operation. No agreement to adopt any option was achieved. The WEU was put 
at Carrington's disposal, who was to consult the Council Presidency in the event of his securing a 
durable cease-fire (Nuttall 2000). As we later see, the UN Secretary General's envoy Cyr-us Vance 
succeeded in negotiating the most secure cease-fire to date, as he arrived pre-armed with the likely 
prospect of the deployment of a large UN peacekeeping force in its aftermath. 
506 th October 91/296 Statement by an informal meeting of Ministers of foreign Affairs concerning 
Yugoslavia 
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Table 3: EC Assistance to Croatia 1991-1997 (EUR millions) 
1991 1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
PHARF/OBNOVA 
1 0.10 0.30 11.70 10.30 
ECHO 
204.80 1 38.40 121.15 1 14.50 
Media 
0.09 0.31 0.72 1.67 
Democrac and Human Rights 
I 1 0.70 2.20 
Total EC Assistance 
- ý 2-04.99 1 39.01 1 34.27 F28.67 
Source European Commission DG External Relations" 
On the issue of recognising the independence of the Yugoslav republics, it 
must be noted that in the course of the Hague conference this was seen as a possibility 
only within the framework of an overall settlement for the whole of Yugoslavia and 
arrived at by negotiation and consensus. This was the basis of the plan for 
Yugoslavia's political future presented by Lord Carrington on the 18'hOctober. The 
plan allowed for a loose association of sovereign states, with a common economic 
policy, common institutions and decision-making bodies and a level of foreign policy 
co-operation. The republics would be sovereign and independent with a personality in 
international law for those who want this. This independence had to recognised within 
a general arrangement and within existing frontiers unless a different arrangement 
concerning frontiers is decided by peaceful meanS52 . The plan was accepted 
by each 
of the Yugoslav republics except Serbia. On the 28 th of October it was made clear that 
should Serbia persist in refusing to support the plan the Hague conference would 
continue with the remaining five republics and would actively consider any desire for 
5 'See European Commission , DG 
External Relation at 
hl! p: //www. europe-eu-int/comm/extemal relations/see/croatia/index. htm 
52 23 rd October 91/320 Statement in the European Parliament concerning the situation in Yugoslavia. 
On this occasion the Dutch EPC President in Office, Dankert, went on to state 'What the 
Community 
wants is a settlement of the Yugoslav question that entails the establishment of sovereign and 
independent republics with a personality in international law. There is no 
doubt that these republics 
will then be recognised. We have said that we would like to see this 
happening in the context of a free 
association of these republics. 
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independence as the end result of a process of negotiation. In addition, restrictive 
measures would be taken against non-co-operative parties (by implication Serbia in 
this instance)53 . These restrictive measures came on the 8'hof November in the form 
of economic sanctions and an invitation to the UN Security Council to consider the 
imposition of an oil embargo on Yugoslavia. These sanctions entailed 
1. Immediate suspension of the application of the trade and co-operation agreement 
with Yugoslavia and a decision to then terminate it; 
2. Restoration of quantitative limits for textiles; 
3. Removal of Yugoslavia from the list of beneficiaries of the General System of 
Preferences; 
4. Formal suspension of benefits under the PHARE programme and Yugoslavia was 
not to be invited to take part in the next G24 ministerial meeting on 11 th 
November; 
Positive compensatory measures would then subsequently be applied for parties who 
do co-operate 54. It was decided to extend these benefits to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Macedonia on the 2 nd December. In short, the basis for contractual 
links between the FRY and the EC were revoked and only re-established with those 
individual republics deemed sufficiently cooperative. This re-positioned the EC as 
benefactor and anchor to individual and, as yet, undefined parts rather than the whole. 
However, despite the peace plan and the introduction of sanctions, the EC's 
solitary efforts to deal with the crisis were coming to an end. By November the UN's 
new Special Representative, Cyrus Vance, was conducting negotiations of his own in 
an attempt to secure first a cease-fire that would create better conditions for the 
negotiation of a durable settlement. Both the Croatian and 'Yugoslav' (Serbian and 
Montenegrin) presidencies expressed a willingness for a UN peace- keeping force to 
be deployed in Croatia and on that basis Vance succeeded in securing a cease-fire by 
January 1992, to be backed up by the deployment of 10,000 UN peace-keepers 
(UNPROFOR) on the ground in Croatia, substantially more than the couple of 
hundred unarmed monitors the EC could offer in its own right. Not that ECMM was 
to be entirely displaced by the deployment of UNPROFOR. Rather ECMM was seen 
53 28 Ih October 91/328 (Press) Statement concerning the situation in Yugoslavia 
ý4 8 th November 91/349 Declaration by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting on Yugoslavia 
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as still having value in playing a complementary role 55 and in fact from this point 
onwards the EU's role in Yugoslavia was at best complementary to the activities of 
other international actors rather than leadership. 
The lead-up to the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is the subject of some 
controversy 56 . 
Eventual recognition was II all the EC's dealings with the implicit in I 
fori-ner Yugoslavia since the Brioni Agreement, but it was not guaranteed and it 
remained conditional on a commitment to the peace-process. In this way, some 
diplomatic leverage was maintained. On the 16 th December the EC agreed to 
recognise the independence of those republics satisfying certain criteria. The 
ad . udication was to be carried out by the Badinter Commission established to provide J 
legal advice to the Hague Conference. The republics had to apply for recognition by 
the 23 rd of December and the conditions of recognition were to include: 
" guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities; 
" respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful 
means and by common agreement; 
" the continuation of efforts to secure a durable overall settlement; 
the republic had no territorial claims against a neighbouring EC state and it would 
not use a name that implied such claims; 57 
When the Badinter Commission returned its verdict, Slovenia was deemed to have 
satisfied all conditions but Croatia was judged not to have made sufficient guarantees 
for the protection of its significant majority population in its constitution. However, 
20'hNovember 91/373 Statement in the European Parliament concerning Yugoslavia 
56 For various reasons Germany had been calling for the recognition of both republics since 
midsummer and by Autumn pressure was beginning to mount. By the end of November, the German 
Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had prornIsed both the Bundestag and President Tudjman of Croatia that he 
would grant recognition by Christmas. The ensuing chaos was not as a result of a rush of concerns for 
the Yugoslav peace process but rather for the upcoming Maastricht European Council and the 
maintenance of consensus among the member states at all costs. The implications of Germany breaking 
ranks and recognising Croatia unilaterally was not something the other member states wanted to 
confront coming up to such an important European Council meeting. There have been many allegations 
made of deals having been done to bring Germany into line, but as Simon Nutall argues, it is most 
likely that the only deal done was to keep the recognition issue off the Maastricht agenda in exchange 
for conditional recognition After the EC had announced its intention to recognise those republics which 
the Badinter Commission judged to have qualified, Germany proceeded to recognise Croatia's 
rd Ih 
independence on 23 December but delayed establishing diplomatic relations until the 15 January, the 
date the EU had said it would recognise successful applicants. See (Nuttall 2000) or (Crawford 1992) 
57 16 th December 91/465 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial meeting concerning 
Yugoslavia and also (Weller 1992; 587-589) 
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following Germany's decision to proceed with unilateral recognition, both Croatia 
and Slovenia were recognised by the EC on the 15 th January. 
This marked the end of the first phase of the EC's involvement in Yugoslavia, 
and also the first phase of the international reaction in general. From here on the 
EC/EU was to be one of several players on an international level, and in most respects 
not the dominant or significant one. However, even at this early stage the EC had 
begun to position itself as a potential anchor and support for democratic and economic 
reform, the end result of which would be enhanced cooperation and relations with the 
EC itself This was the basis of diplomatic efforts and negotiations - and also the 
significant portion of the sanctions imposed. However, this all occurred in an almost 
entirely ad hoc and reactive way, building on the approach being employed towards 
post- Communist countries throughout Europe in this period. It represents what the 
EC was capable of but the absence of the 'god in the car' (Nuttall 1994; 13) giving 
any sense of guiding strategy or approach locked the EC into an approach of a 
particular character which prevailed in the coming years despite changes. 
5.3 Characterising the Initial Reaction 
(iii) The 'hour ofEurope 58 'and a particularly 'European 'response 
As argued throughout, the EC's initial approach and reaction to the increasing 
instability in the former Yugoslavia was remarkably similar and arose out of the 
approach being adopted towards the range of Central and Eastern Europe's recently 
post-communist states. In the case of Yugoslavia it built on an already well- 
established relationship and aimed to support economic and political reform through 
the provision of financial assistance and closer cooperation and association. Even as 
58 This refers to the Luxembourg Prime Minister's Jacques Poos widely quoted statement in relation to 
the EC in the initial stages of the conflict: 'This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the 
Americans ... If any problem can 
be solved by the Europeans, its the Yugoslav problem. This is a 
European country and it is not up to the Americans and not up to anybody else' (cited in White 200 1; 
108). Reference to this statement is almost compulsory in that in light of what happened next it was 
shown to be ridiculous. However, as will be shown through this thesis there was something in the 
sentiment, if not the vastly over-inflated ambition. Not quite the hour of Europe or anything the EU at 
any stage of its development could deal With alone, this was a European problem to which a particular 
and significant EU contribution could be made. 
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inter-republic and ethnic tensions increased within Yugoslavia, the emphasis was on 
support for the preservation of the status quo and the maintenance of both 
Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and its political structure. The instruments used to 
give effect to this policy were the promise of further financial and practical assistance 
for reforrn and the prospect of closer association in the future - and also the threat to 
and the actual withdrawal of these forms of assistance. In efflea, therefore, while the 
high-level diplomacy of the Troika and the establishment of the Hague Conference 
under Lord Carrington were the more visible and high profile of political efforts to 
facilitate the peaceful settlement of the escalating crisis, the instruments drawn upon 
to actually attempt to persuade compliance were more novel and also EC specific. 
They also drew heavily on Community resources and instruments to give effect to 
EPC policy. 
The centrality of sanctions to EC policy highlights the inevitable significance 
of the Commission's role in implementing policy. The types of sanctions imposed are 
also in and of themselves significant. The EC took the lead in imposing an arms 
embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia. All other sanctions imposed involved the 
withdrawal of benefits extended to Yugoslavia related to the general process of 
reforin and increased cooperation. The policy of differentiating between the republics 
is also interesting. Following November 199 I's comprehensive sanctions against the 
whole of Yugoslavia, the next month measures were introduced to compensate 
'cooperative' republics for the same sanctions. The notion of selective sanctions were 
here a reflection of the particular circumstances of Yugoslavia but the multi-lateral 
and 'collective' character of their content as well as their imposition is significant. 
They represent not simply EU-level consensus to apply sanctions but also to draw on 
collective resources, instruments and pre-existing policies in determining what 
sanctions to apply. These are not the kind of sanctions any single or smaller sub- 
grouping of member states could apply unilaterally. They rely too heavily on the EC's 
collective economic weight or 'presence' (Allen & Smith 1990)and also on a degree 
to the dynamic and pull of its integrative processes, both economic and political. This 
is not to imply that the sanctions were entirely effective but their form is significant in 
this context. The EC, dealing with a 'European' issue on its fabled 'backyard', 
adopted an approach that was a particularly 'European' one. This may only be 
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apparent in retrospect and in the content rather than the actual ultimate effect of 
policy. 
Notable also is the emphasis throughout on the efforts to secure a negotiated 
settlement on the need for an agreement to be arrived at by consensus and for no 
change or action designed to bring about change to existing political structures or 
territorial boundaries should be effected without mutual consent. When it became 
clear that Yugoslavia was very unlikely to survive in its present form some effort was 
made to manage this through a shift in negotiating strategy towards the idea of heavily 
conditional independence for republics within a newly defined over-arching structure 
that maintained Yugoslavia's internal (unless agreed otherwise by mutual consent) 
and international borders. That no settlement or even durable cease-fire came out of 
the proceedings of the Hague Conference is reflective of very significant deficiencies 
in the approach taken, but equally of the complexity of the Yugoslav issue itself It is 
also reflective of the fact that no single actor, be it state or non-state, was in a position 
to merely step in and deploy all the necessary means to defuse tension and resolve the 
conflict. Over-inflated expectations, created mainly from within the EU led to harsh 
criticism. What this period represents is a starting point - but not a clear-cut starting 
line. Already built into this initial approach are the pre-existing arrangements with 
Yugoslavia, the effect of the immediate post Cold-War context and the concern for 
the democratisation, stabilisation and economic reform of the former Communist 
block and the effect of the concurrent IGC's on EMU and Political Union that led to 
both over-statements of ambition and intention and less flexibility for the 
development of more comprehensive ad hoc approaches 59 . The concern here 
is to 
characterise what the EC actually did and to trace the nature in any change in the 
nature of EC/EU policy from this point forwards. 
ReactivelStrategic 
59 See (Nuttall 2000). Nuttall argues that the member states would not agree to anything in practice that 
they would not agree to in principle in the coterminous IGC. However, the ongoing negotiations on the 
form the new CFSP would take and monetary Union led to increased bravado as to what could actually 
be achieved at Union level. As such, it was not even simply a straightforward case of a wide 
capabilities-expectations gap but a gap between over-inflated expectations based on capabilities not 
even yet agreed. 
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In ten-ns of where the balance lies in this initial period between the reactive 
and the more strategic or purposive type of policy, it must be acknowledged that the 
approach was largely ad hoc and reactive, lacking a clear direction or coherent 
purpose. The initial framework out of which the EC responded and subsequently 
acted was, as noted above, the wider association and cooperation process with former- 
Communist Europe in general. The emphasis was on encouraging democratisation 
and market reform, using the prospect of building on the existing relationship and the 
developing closer ties to encourage the stabilisation of the political situation. This 
cannot be fully described as a strategy, more a guiding framework and while it was 
misapplied to a certain extent in this context it was not wholly inappropriate. No over- 
arching, custormsed approach was devised to deal with this particular situation that 
might have been more appropriate. Other actions, more clearly within the remit of 
EPC (high-level diplomacy, the Troika's efforts and the Hague Conference) were 
largely ad hoc and it is difficult to decide at times what was purely ad hoc and 
reactive and what was indicative of a healthy degree of flexibility and a willingness to 
deal with changing circumstances and issues as they arose. While sticking to its key 
negotiating principles, the basis of peace negotiations shifted from preservation of the 
federation to conditional and consensual dismemberment. In addition to the difficulty 
of distinguishing between the ad hoc and flexibility, is the difficulty of establishing 
the extent to which changes in approach were actually just the recognition of certain 
fait accompli in the making. The likely conclusion is that the policy pursued was a 
mixture of the ad hoc, natural readjustments, acceptance of likely fait accompli in the 
making that the EC did not have the capacity to prevent and some degree of deliberate 
effort to manage and direct the course of events. There were no clear guiding 
principles or no over-arching goals other than to contain the conflict and to facilitate 
negotiations towards a settlement. 
(V) GoalslCapabilities linkage 
The degree of clear linkage between goals and capabilities in this period was 
highly inadequate and is the main reason why the EC's reaction and approach has 
been perceived as such a dismal failure. This was set up as an issue the EC could deal 
with -a European issue that 'Europe' was most suited to 
dealing with. That view was 
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not entirely mistaken. There was and is much in the fact that the EC/EU does have a 
distinct and appropriate part to play. The mistake was in the over-inflated nature of 
the goals and therefore expectations set and the inability of the EC to achieve them. 
As stated above, there were no clear goals set other than to stabilise the situation and 
to facilitate the negotiation of cease-fires and a settlement. However, the intention to 
lead and to go it alone could not be matched by a capacity to deal with every aspect of 
the situation. This particular issue required a more comprehensive approach than the 
EC was capable of at this point in time and this had a great deal to do with the 
complexity of the Yugoslav question itself. It was not a case of being the wrong actor 
to deal with situation. It was more a case of it being the wrong actor to attempt to deal 
with it alone. Constrained by the informal consultation procedures and declaratory 
diplomacy of EPC, the range of instruments used by the EC in this initial period 
represent the most that could be deployed. In addition to the usage of high-level 
diplomacy that involved the Presidency, the Troika and even the Commission, this 
period also saw the novel deployment of the civilian monitors of the ECMM, the arrns 
embargo and economic sanctions and the enticement of the potential of closer 
cooperation and association in the future. By the autumn of 1991, the increased 
involvement of the UN was not only being encouraged but was being explicitly 
requested. By early 1992 Cyrus Vance had secured a cease-fire and the subsequent 
deployment of UNPROFOR in Croatia highlighted the fact that the EC's lack of a 
military capacity did hinder its effectiveness in securing a durable cease-fire. 
Functions performed 
Considered in context, the roles or functions performed by the EC and its agents and 
representatives in this period can be characterised under the following main headings: 
(a) Mediator andfacilitator of negotiations: 
In this first phase of the conflict, the European Community led and dominated 
the diplomatic effort. As has already been outlined, initial diplomatic intervention was 
staged by the Presidency and the Commission, followed then by the Troika and finally 
under the auspices of an EC-sponsored peace conference in the Hague. In this 
endeavour, the EC took on the mammoth task of overseeing discussions on the future 
form of Yugoslavia, first insisting on maintaining the status quo, then negotiating on 
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the basis of some kind of modified over-arching structure and finally setting in motion 
what was supposed to be the orderly and conditional dismemberment of the federation 
in the fonn of the recognition process. No other actor stepped forward to assume this 
role to this extent in this period. This effort is notable also in that represented some 
kind of attempt to address the fact that some order or framework was required in order 
to prevent chaos in the former Yugoslavia. It is unfortunate that subsequent moves 
such as the launching of the recognition process did seem to actually make things 
worse. The quick success of the UN envoy in securing both a cease-fire and a 
semblance of order with the back-up of UNPROFOR shows that this targeted and 
short-term focus back-up with more than sanctions and promises of aid and 
cooperation was also necessary. It was not a case of an either/or - both approaches 
were relevant. There was a need for more of a sense of how to deal with the situation 
in the medium to long-term and also to do what was necessary in order to actually 
help stop fighting immediately. As discussed above, there was little coherence or clear 
framework to the EC's approach. In the immediate context ad hoc and over-ambitious 
attempts to facilitate the negotiation of a complex settlement were less relevant than 
the need to find a way to stop the fighting and escalation of conflict. 
("' Civilian ceasefire monitor: 0) 
ECMM is interesting in that represented a pre-CFSP deployment of a civilian 
EC force outside of the Community and a constant physical Community presence in 
the midst of the conflict area. ECMM conducted its activities under the auspices of 
the CSCE but was nonetheless 'EC' and did make a contribution in terins of diffusing 
some more minor small-scale incidents. ECMM was to remain a constant feature over 
the next ten years. 
(c) Potential anchorfor democratisation and reform: 
This was at federal level prior to the outbreak of hostilities in June 199 1, with 
promises of assistance and potential closer cooperation being offered as an incentive 
to both reforin and to support the federal authorities in their efforts to maintain the 
integrity of the federation. This logic remained after June and was reiterated 
throughout negotiations, not least in The Hague conference. It formed the basis of the 
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EC's approach of encouraging cooperation with efforts to establish peace by offering 
incentives and imposing sanctions - as elaborated below. This was not a function any 
other actor or state could perform alone. 
(d) Imposition of sanctions1provision of incentives 
During this period the EC was the vehicle for the system of multi-lateral economic 
incentives and sanctions that drew on the EC's magnetism as a focus for the reform 
effort to encourage negotiation and more peaceful means for resolving the crisis. The 
sanctions in this period continued the logic of the provision of aid for reform and 
development under programmes such as PHARE, in that they were explicitly linked 
to the transition process. When aid was withdrawn, it was on the basis that it would 
only be restored to cooperative republics. This also implied the establishment of 
relations with individual republics in the aften-nath of Yugoslavia. This gave the issue 
of sanctions/incentives an added element that could not be provided by any actor 
other than the EC at this time. That is not to over-estimate its impact. As argued 
above , it was more relevant to address the 
issue of the escalating conflict itself at this 
stage. 
These are the functions that the EC was capable of performing and are not 
insignificant and do represent more than any one state could perform in isolation. 
However, in addition to these actual functions, in this period the EC was also 
temporarily assuming the role as the primary actor for dealing with European crises 
and both self-prescribed and also by other actors, such as the United States and the 
UN. The leadership role assumed was determined by the EC's role in relation to post- 
communist CEE in general and the supposition that it was the actor most suitable to 
dealing with such a 'European' problem. It also arises from the transitional internal 
circumstances as the EC moved towards EU and EPC to CFSP. They reflect the 
extent of capabilities at the time in question and the fact that more is expected is 
reflective in part of the lack of a coherent and clearly defined purpose other than the 
overly ambitious goal of assuming the leadership position in dealing with the crisis. 
When considering the extent to which the functions of the EC/EU change over time 
the development in capabilities linked to a sense of purpose should imply some 
reorientation and change in the basic substance of the policy. Even with that taken 
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into consideration, it will also be interesting to note the extent to which later policy is 
very much built on the foundation of this initial reaction. 
5.4 Conclusion - EFP on the Verge of CFSP 
This phase of activity represents the starting point against which subsequent 
phases can be compared in order to draw some conclusions as to how the overall 
approach can be said to have changed or developed over time. During this short 
period the EC took on responsibility for a task that was not fully thought-out and for 
which it was not equipped to deal with alone. However, it still drew heavily on what 
were particularly EC instruments and drew on the EC's own magnetism and presence 
in order to attempt to deal with the problem. This in and of itself is highly significant. 
Although pursued in an ad hoc manner, with insufficient linkage between goals and 
the capabilities to fulfil them - the actual functions performed by the EC were of such 
a nature that could not be performed to the same extent on another level. Hence, the 
policy performed is indicative of what the EC could do in relation to this particular 
issue at this particular point of time and the extent to which later years show how 
these functions are built on and added to is indicative of the particular sets of roles the 
EC/EU has to play in certain circumstances. 
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6. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
6.1 Introduction 
Between 1992 and 1996 the European Community underwent significant 
changes in terms of its competences as an actor in international affairs, not least in 
becoming the new European Union. The signing of the Treaty on European Union and 
the launch of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy suggested a new era of 
greater cooperation and ambitious and effective joint approaches and actions to 
international affairs. However, this was also the period when the Union was forced to 
climb down from the dizzy heights of over-inflated ambition in attempts to deal with 
the further deterioration of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. No attempt or claim 
was made concerning the Union's ability to deal with the crisis in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina alone. What was pursued was still a relatively extensive policy, 
conducted in conjunction with and alongside other international actors. However, 
simply because it was not dominant does not mean that the Union did not play a 
significant role in this period. 
There was no specific approach devised for the Bosnian conflict in particular. 
As the situation there began to markedly deteriorate in 1992, the EC's activity was 
more or less a continuation of the approach towards the first phase of the conflict. 
Over the following years, the UN, NATO, the Contact Group and the United States all 
became involved in the muddled efforts to deal with this crisis. As the EC became EU 
in 1993, the focus of its activity did not expand from anything attempted previously 
but instead focused on acting as a mediator, providing aid for humanitarian purposes 
and supporting the actions and measures of other actors. This is despite the 
availability of new instruments and procedures designed to expand the scope of the 
EU's presence in international affairs. If anything, what can be seen is the usage of the 
new instruments in similar kinds of activities. However, towards the latter stages of 
the conflict, more of a sense of a distinct EU approach can be discerned that built on 
what it had been capable of attempting and what it was most suited to achieving. This, 
for the most part, centred on a EU contribution to post-war reconstruction and 
stabilisation efforts. 
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6.2 The ECIEU in Bosnia 1992-1996 
(i) 1992: 
As 1992 began and the pace of what was to shortly become all-out war in 
Bosnia gained momentum, the EC was still preoccupied with ongoing concerns in and 
pertaining more specifically to its experience of trying to maintain order and secure 
peace in Croatia - namely its diplomatic endeavours bolstered by ECMM, continued 
support for the sanctions introduced the previous year and the promise of concrete 
reward (in the fon-n of aid, increased co-operation and preferences) in exchange for a 
negotiated solution to the conflict. From the outset there was no specific or 
custornised approach to the Bosnian conflict. In fact, the initial approach led directly 
from what had been set in motion in the efforts to resolve the issue of Yugoslavia's 
future status and composition arising from the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of 
independence. Once this process had been concluded, the EC was no longer 
predominant in the international response and further action was taken either in 
conjunction with or in support of the initiative of other actors. 
Following on from the greater success of the TLN Secretary General's envoy 
Cyr-us Vance in securing a relatively solid cease-fire in Croatia, international and EC 
attention soon became increasingly diverted towards the more complex and 
intractable situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The early months of 1992 were 
dominated more generally by the efforts to implement and secure the cease-fire in 
Croatia with the ultimate deployment of the 10,000 strong UN Protection Force 
(tNPROFOR) as an interim arrangement to encourage the creation of a sufficiently 
stable condition so as to facilitate the negotiation of an overall settlement of the 
Yugoslav problem 60 . The 
UN-brokered cease-fire was welcomed by the EC, as was 
the deployment of UNPROFOR which was assisted by close co-operation between the 
military liaison officers despatched in advance of the deployment and the ECMM 
60 As according to UN Security Council Resolution 740 (1992) 
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officials already on the ground 61 . However, the overall settlement which the 
deployment of UNPROFOR anticipated and which Lord Carrington continued to 
pursue in the Hague Conference was to prove impossible for a further three years and 
even then managed to establish only an unsteady peace in the more westerly half of 
the former Yugoslavia. While the UN and the EC focused on the short-term 
stabilisation of the situation in Croatia, the implications for Bosnia of events in and 
concerning Croatia were many and significant.. 
Most significant in terms of the EC's action was the decision in December 
1991 to recognise the independence of any former Yugoslav Republic satisfying the 
stipulated criteria. The prospect of the recognition of Slovenian and more importantly, 
Croatian independence confirmed that Yugoslavia as it had existed since the Second 
World War was very unlikely to survive and the issue of independent statehood for 
Bosnia was forced onto the agenda for the first time. In December 1991 the Bosnian 
government applied alongside Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and KoSOV062 for 
recognition without any clear sense of how Bosnia's ethnic diversity would be 
managed or placated. The problematic nature of this application was further 
reinforced by the declaration of the Bosnian Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 
the 9th of January 1992 encompassing the earlier declared Serb Autonomous Areas 
and with its capital and seat of government in Pale. 
It was this uncertain and unpredictable atmosphere that surrounded the 
announcement on the 15 th of January that the EC had decided that both Slovenia and 
Croatia had sufficiently satisfied the Arbitration panel conditions for recognition as 
independent states. In the case of Bosnia, there were important matters that still had to 
be addressed 63 , namely the 
issue of demonstrating the desire for independence among 
the majority of those living within Bosnia regardless of ethnic origin. This was 
especially pertinent given the fact that it was clearly evident that the vast majority of 
61 Statements 10'h January92/007 Statement on Yugoslavia and 17'h February 92/067 Statement on 
Yugoslavia 
62 Kosova was deemed not eligible to apply as it did not enjoy full republican status under the 1974 
Yugoslav constitution. Kosova and Vojvodina were classed as 'Autonomous Provinces' though 
functioned as de facto republics. Only former Republics were eligible to apply. Kosova's status is 
further discussed in Chapter Seven. 
63 15"' January 92/009 Statement on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia 
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Bosnian Serbs had no desire to be 'stranded' and/or cut-off from the Serbian mainland 
in an independent Bosnian state where they would be outnumbered by Bosnian Croats 
and Muslims. What, therefore, was required of the Bosnian authorities, was that a 
referendum be held to verify that the will of the majority was in fact independence, a 
referendum that the EC was keen to assist in the form of the despatch of 
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representatives to monitor the poll, under the auspices of the CSCE . In the meantime 
attempts to reach some kind of negotiated settlement between the Bosnian Croat, 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim leaderships 65 were conducted in Lisbon in 
February led by EC Ambassador Jose Cuitleihro (representing the Portuguese 
Presidency). Agreement was reached on the recognition of the existing borders of the 
republic, along with some endorsement of the eventual fonnation of territorial units 
within Bosnia corresponding to ethnic/religious make-up of relevant areas (Silber & 
Little 199 219). However, the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, soon changed his 
mind and repudiated his surprising endorsement of ethnically based cantonisation. 
The required referendum on independence was held in Bosnia on the weekend 
of the 29th February/l't March, with the resulting build up of ethnic tension spilling 
over into violence with an attack on a Serb wedding party and the entrenchment of 
ethnically-defined positions in the previously cosmopolitan Bosnian capital, Sarajevo. 
The referendum was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs and was carried with the 
resounding support of the vast majority (Glenny 1999; 164) of Bosnian Croats and 
Muslims. Therefore this was technically a positive result, though was not reflective of 
the will of the majority in Bosnia. The EC responded to the violence in Sarajevo 
following the referendum with an expression of concern for the ongoing talks in the 
Hague conference on future constitutional arrangements for the region, as well as for 
the security and freedom of movement of international personnel on the ground 66 
This was followed on the I Oth of March by a joint EC-US declaration on the 
recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, agreeing to co-ordinate their 
approaches to completing the recognition process based on the key principles of both 
the UN peace-keeping plan and the Hague Conference, namely: no change in the 
64 17"' February 92/067 Statement on Yugoslavia 
65 Leaders of the three main and ethnically defined parties; Bosnian Muslims -Alij a Izetbegovic leader 
of the SDA or Party of Democratic Action; Bosnian Croats - Mate Boban leader of the Bosnian branch 
of the HDZ; Bosnian Serbs - Radovan Karadzic leader of the SDS or Serbian Democratic Party 
66 2nd March 92/076 Statement on recent violence in Sarajevo 
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borders of the Yugoslav republics by force or in the absence of mutual consent; and 
strong protection for human rights and the rights of all national and ethnic groups in 
all republics. Positive consideration would be given to all requests pending the 
resolution of outstanding questions and full co-operation with the diplomatic process 
that could provide for a more peaceful development of the republic within its existing 
borders 67 . However, without any appreciable understanding of how Bosnian 
independence could be managed given internal divisions and the lack of a 
comprehensive or overall settlement, it was announced on the 7 th April that the EC 
would recognise Bosnia as a sovereign and independent Republic. The US closely 
followed suit declaring its decision to also recognise Bosnia. The diplomatic initiative 
was still with the EC at this stage, as noted by the UN Security Council the same day 
when it urged all concerned to co-operate with EC efforts to bring about a cease-fire 
and a negotiated political solution 68 . 
Unlike Slovenia or even Croatia, what was being recognised in the case of 
Bosnia was by no means simply an unstable fledgling state but a region on the verge 
of chaos and the possibility of violence on a scale not seen on the European continent 
since the Second World War. The descent from instability to all-out war proceeded 
rapidly from early April when it became apparent that the EU, closely followed by the 
US, were intent on recognising an independent Bosnia in the mistaken belief that it 
would promote peace rather than remove its possibility. However, subsequent events 
and the EU's reaction to them indicate that an increasing chaotic and violent situation 
quickly followed the decision. On the same day as the EU recognised Bosnia, the 
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic proclaimed the independent 'Serbian Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Repulika Srpska), with its capital at Sarajevo also. On 
April 27 th the Yugoslav federation was reconstituted though now only was comprised 
of Serbia (including Kosova and Vojvodina) and Montenegro. This new Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was not internationally recognised as the successor 
state to the former Yugoslavia. The activities of Serb irregulars and the JNA in north- 
eastern Bosnia and in the Drina Valley in eastern Bosnia marked the entry of 
systematic ethnic cleansing in Bosnia as the Bosnian Serbs and their allies moved to 
quickly 'cleanse' their desired territory of Croats, and more often Muslims. In May all 
67 10"' March 92/080 US/EC Declaration on recognition of the Yugoslav Republics 
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pretence of JNA neutrality had been abandoned with the capture of Izetbegovic at 
Sarajevo airport. 
Within days of the April 7 th declaration on the recognition of Bosnia deep 
concern was being expressed at the deterioration of the situation. Statements were 
issued imploring the parties to desist and to make use of the peaceful diplomatic 
channels made available to them in the Hague Conference. It was reiterated that the 
territorial integrity of Bosnia was considered paramount (as was that of Yugoslavia a 
year earlier) and that no de facto situation created by violence would be recognised. 
Both the Serbian and Croatian governments were urged to use their undoubted 
influence over the combatants to demand restraint and a vehement protest was 
expressed to Belgrade over the activities of the JNA in Bosnia 69 .A certain shift 
occurred then in the second week of May when the EU began to directly attribute the 
greatest share of the blame for the consistent deterioration of the situation to the JNA. 
The complete withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia was demanded along with the 
reopening of Sarajevo airport and Belgrade was requested to respect the integrity of 
all borders of all republics and the rights of all minorities and national or ethnic 
groups. 
At this stage, with the consistent deterioration of the situation it was becoming 
very clear that the methods of conflict 'management' devised for Croatia could not be 
simply extended to deal with Bosnia. Despite the efforts of Lord Carrington and Jose 
Cutileio to negotiate a cease-fire and constitutional arrangement that would actually 
hold, statements of principle, condemnation and even censure were as frequent as 
every escalation of violence with no apparent change in either. Having set the 
recognition process in motion, it was difficult to then restrain despite the unforeseen 
consequences. Diplomatic recognition supported by the facilitation of negotiations 
failed to hold back the onset of conflict , just as 
it had failed to end it in Croatia. 
The only means by which the EC could encourage cooperation with more 
diplomatic processes was through the support for the introduction and implementation 
68 UN Security Council Resolution 749 (1992) 
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of sanctions. However, the types of sanctions imposed in 1991 were not entirely 
appropriate in this instance. One aspect of the EC/EU'S own particular approach 
within the overall sanctions regime was the beginning of a process of isolating the 
FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) internationally. In support of this the Member States 
began to recall their Ambassadors from Belgrade, the suspension of the Yugoslav 
delegation at the CSCE was demanded and it was announced that the increasing 
isolation of the Yugoslav delegation in other international fora would be pursued 70 
Economic sanctions were also threatened, but the harsh economic and political 
sanctions eventually imposed did not come directly from the EC/EU this time, but in 
the framework UNSCR 757 on the 3 oth of May that imposed comprehensive 
sanctions on the FRY. The sanctions included: 
* Ban on all trade with the FRY with the sole exception of goods destined for 
humanitarian purposes; 
* Ban on the transfer of funds or any other financial or economic resources to 
any persons or bodies in the FRY except payments exclusively for 
humanitarian purposes; 
Comprehensive flight ban; 
Reduction in the level of staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the 
FRY; 
Prevention of FRY representatives in sporting events; 
Suspension of scientific and technical co-operation and cultural exchanges and 
visits involving the FRY, 
71 
The Council was consistently supportive of UN measures and declared itself 
ready to assist in any manner it could 72 . In this instance broader based and harsher 
economic sanctions were required than those of the type imposed by the EC in 1991 
and therefore were best imposed in the context of a LJNSCR. Where the EU-level did 
have a part to play was in assisting the implementation of the sanctions, both within 
69 11 th April 92/1551 Statement on Bosnia, 16thApril 92/161 Statement on the activities of irregular 
forces and the JNA in Bosnia 4thMay 92/193 Statement on the death of Belgian ECMM monitor, 5h 
May 92/165 Statement on events in Sarajevo 70 11 thMay 92/167 Statement on Bosnia 
71 Source UN Security Council Resolution 757 (1992) 
72 15 th June 92/226 Statement on the situation in Yugoslavia 
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and beyond the EU itself The June Lisbon Council ConclusionS73 welcomed 
discussions within the WEU on the possible means of support that could be 
undertaken within the framework of the UN Security Council's many resolutions and 
later. To this end, decisions by the WEU and NATO to monitor the implementation of 
tN sanctions at sea were welcomed 74 . Later in the summer, as the diplomatic efforts 
to deal with the conflict were stepped up, as discussed below, new EC regulations 
were introduced to tighten the arrangements for transit traffic as outlined in UNSCR 
757 and introducing a dual licensing regime. An active role was also played in 
sanction monitoring missions in neighbouring countries. A joint EC/CSCE mission 
visited Romania, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia to identify the scope of the leakage 
problems and options for tightening controls. 
Throughout the summer of 1992 the conflict raged unabated. The refugee 
numbers soared. The existence of several 'detention' camps was revealed in July and 
by the end of the summer the Bosnian Serbs were in control of most of their desired 
territory, with the notable exception of the Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde and Sarajevo 
areas. Izetbegovic was calling for the anns embargo to be lifted and for NATO air 
strikes in support of the Bosnian Muslims in order to prevent them being completely 
overrun. The humanitarian situation was grave with the hundreds of thousands 
displaced or under siege throughout Bosnia. In the absence of any international 
support for direct armed intervention on the ground, the emphasis remained on finding 
a political solution to the crisis while continuing efforts to allocate and deliver aid to 
those who desperately needed it. For the time being, the EC remained central to these 
efforts. Further financial assistance would be provided for urgently required 
humanitarian aid, with the Commission being charged with co-ordinating the EC's aid 
effort with the G24 countries. An additional ECU 120 million in aid was made 
available in addition to bilateral member state aid" in July. 
Into the summer of 1992 new momentum was injected into the political 
process; however any lasting agreement remained elusive. By mid-July agreement had 
73 26 th 27di June 92/254 Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council/ Declaration on the former 
Yugoslavia 
74 
ibid. 
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been reached in London on certain measures, including the withdrawal of heavy 
weaponry ( to be supervised by UNPROFOR). Having stressed the complementanty 
of the activities of the EC and its appointed representatives and the representatives of 
other international bodies such as the UN (including co-operation between ECMM 
and UNPROFOR and the UNHCR as well as close diplomatic contact) and the CSCE 
and the ICRC, the EC now announced that it would actively favour close consultation 
between the EC conference, the CSCE and the UN with a view to broadening and 
intensifying present efforts to negotiate a settlement. 76 . In short, no attempt was to be 
made to either go it alone or to adopt a sole leadership position in attempting to 
address the Bosnian conflict. The EU's subsequent activity in Bosnia mainly 
concentrated on the diplomatic and humanitarian fronts. 
The culmination of this renewed momentum was the London Conference of 
26 th /27 th August, co-hosted by the UK EC Presidency and the UN Secretary General. 
Attended by representatives of all the parties to the conflict as well as a broad range of 
representatives from the international bodies and third countries, the aim of the 
meeting was threefold 
1. To ensure humanitarian help. 
2. To restore respect for human rights. 
3. To set in hand a process that will lead to a just, lasting and enduring peace. 
On humanitarian aid, the EC confirmed its full support to the IRC and the UNHCR 
who were co-ordinating the aid effort. As the co-ordinator of the EC's aid effort, the 
Commission was to liase with the UNHCR. In addition to the ECU 120 million 
granted in July, a further 120 million for the October-December period was to be 
agreed. Full support was also accorded to the expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate to 
include escorting relief convoys and also the creation of a no-fly zone. On human 
rights, the EC demanded that all detention camps be shut and that humanitarian 
agencies be given immediate and unimpeded access to them. Full support would also 
75 20"' July 92/294 Statement on Yugoslavia 
76 ibid. 
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be given to moves to create an international criminal court for the prosecution of war 
17 
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia . 
As regards the peace process, most notable was the launching of a new joint 
EC-UN peace conference to be based in Geneva under the chairmanship of Cyrus 
Vance (representing the UN) and David Owen (representation the EC, replacing Lord 
Carrington). Just as at the Hague Conference, any negotiated settlement was to be 
based on certain key principles, namely non-acceptance of the forcible changing of 
borders (including internal partition) and the protection of minority rights within fixed 
internationally recognised borders. 78 . The immediate focus of the conference 
(International Conference on the former Yugoslavia or ICFY) was to be Bosnia with 
the emphasis on establishing the basis for a sustainable cease-fire and restarting 
negotiations. The basis of subsequent EU-UN negotiations was also established and 
would be reiterated through the difficult years ahead. These included the need for a 
cessation of hostilities, the principle of a negotiated solution freely arrived at, the 
unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force or 'ethnic cleansing' and the 
right of refugees and others who have suffered losses to compensation 79 The London 
conference also confirmed the fact that sanctions and the international isolation of the 
FRY was the primary means by which to bring pressure to bear on uncooperative 
parties. In addition to stressing that existing penalties would be continued or even 
intensified, further measures were taken to ensure the effective implementation of 
existing sanctions, as already mentioned above. 
Following the London Conference and as the ICFY swung into action, little 
had changed on the ground in Bosnia. Winter was looming and along with it the 
possibility of a major humanitarian catastrophe. Meeting in October the European 
Council underlined the importance of providing winter shelters and zones of safety for 
refugees and of ensuring the safe delivery of relief supplies by taking steps to speed 
up EC assistance 80 . In addition an 
EC Task Force was despatched under the auspices 
of the new European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to provide back-up to 
77 The EU expressed support for an international crimmal court throughout. 
78 16"' September 92/319 Statement in the European Parliament 
79 UN Security Council Resolution 859 (1993) 
80 16 th October 92/354 Conclusions of the European Council / Statement by the European Council on 
the former Yugoslavia 
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relief workers on the ground, notably the UNECR 81. Support for UNSCR 787 which 
provided for the necessary measures including military to be taken to ensure the safe 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
Table 4: EC Assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1997 (EUR millions) 
199-1-1994 1 1995 1 1996 7 1997 
PHARF/OBNOVA 
0.21 0.65 229.77 1211.16 
ECHO 
495.26 145.03 142.45 105.00 
Specific Actions 
70.00 65.40 39.90 
Democracy and Human Rights 
10.70 1 4.80 F-4.80 
Total EC Assistance 
495.47 1216.38 442.42 360.86 
Source European Commission DG External Relations" 
Despite efforts in London and at the ICFY, no real will for peace had been 
demonstrated. Primary responsibility for the conflict and its brutality was deemed to 
lie with the Serbian leadership and the Bosnian Serbs, with their principal victims 
being the Bosnian Muslims. The Croatian authorities were also accused of carrying a 
share of the responsibility for attacks on Muslims. It was stressed that if there was a 
radical change of policy and genuine co-operation in the peace process, Serbia would 
be gradually readmitted to the international community. It was also stated that while 
the EC will continue to give priority to political means in order to resolve the crisis,, 
the gravity of the situation now meant that it had no choice but to promote and 
participate in further initiatives which the international community might be obliged 
to undertake 
83 
Overall, therefore, as Bosnia descended into all-out war in 1992 the EC 
slipped into a secondary role as regards the leadership of the international response. 
After the recognition process wound-down the EC's activities focused on mediation 
and negotiations in partnership with the United Nations, the provision of humanitarian 
81 General Report of the European Communities 1992 Point 737 
82 See http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/external - 
relations/see/bosnie_herze/index. htm 
83 11/12 Ih December 92/450 Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council/ Declaration on the 
former Yugoslavia 
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aid and support for sanctions and their implementation. As the CFSP was on the verge 
of coming 'online' in January 1993, it was already apparent that circumstances 
rendered the EC incapable of dealing with this situation alone. Co-operation with the 
UN in the attempts to secure a political settlement gave greater weight to the effort, 
backed up by the UN's recourse to at least deploy a minimal military peacekeeping 
force on the ground in Bosnia. This was itself not enough to stop the conflict. In 
addition, the EC's aid effort, led by the Commission was conducted in liaison with 
other international aid agencies, the most significant being the UNHCR. However, the 
problems with the delivery and allocation of aid in a conflict situation such as this 
were shared by all the agencies involved. The majority of the comprehensive 
sanctions imposed came from the UNSC, not the EC - though they were supported 
both at Community and member state level. In short, by the end of 1992, the EC did 
not even have the same basis for even a rhetorical positioning of itself as a distinct or 
highly significant player. What provided this in relation to Yugoslavia as a whole or 
Slovenia and Croatia, was not immediately relevant in the case of the Bosnian 
conflict. It was neither relevant nor appropriate to discuss association or reform issues 
when the basic structures of government and society were quickly disappearing. A 
more immediate and directly focused response was required, and not having any 
experience of such an approach to build on, this was not possible at this point in time. 
Other actors who were better positioned to perform the necessary tasks would assume 
responsibility for them while the EC/EU was confined to the activities it could and 
was required to perform. 
(ii) 1993 
As 1993 began, the EC had for the first time, in theory, the means to formulate 
and pursue a Common Foreign and Security Policy and greater expectations of a more 
concerted and effective approach. However, in practice the types of activities engaged 
in were little different that those conducted the previous year and the approach was as 
ad hoc and responsive. In 1993 also, the EU was further pushed to the sidelines of the 
overall international approach with the US and the Contact gToup, assuming the 
dominant position. Diplomatic efforts continued but the efforts of the EU and UN 
mediators floundered due to a combination of factors which included the absence of 
any effective means to compel a settlement other than sanctions and lack of support 
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for peace plans by other actors. Otherwise, again the provision of aid and support for 
the widening sanctions regime were really all of any consequence that was engaged 
in. 
The stated cornerstones of EC/EU policy towards Bosnia into 1993 were the 
attempts to establish the basis for a long-term solution to the problems and to reduce 
human suffering. The means by which these aims were pursued at the beginning of 
the year were the intense mediation between the warring parties in the ongoing ICFY 
and the provision of aid, bolstered by punitive economic and political sanctions. The 
intention was to first prevent the fighting from spreading, then to secure a basis for 
long-term peace and finally contribute towards the formation and recreation of a 
84 functioning society . The 
first relatively viable proposal for achieving this emerged 
from the ICFY in Geneva in the form of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The 
plan contained three elements plus an interim agreement: 
1. Constitutional principles for an independent Bosnia. 
2. A peace settlement with a comprehensive system for monitoring the cessation 
of hostilities, disbanding of military units, troop redeployment, border 
surveillance, rebuilding of infrastructures and the securing of lines of 
communication etc. 
3. A proposal for dividing Bosnia into ten cantons or provinces within its 
existing internationally recognised borders. 
The provinces would be ethically defined for the most part and would enjoy 
considerable local autonomy under a central authority. Three would be Serb 
controlled, three Muslim, two Croat, one jointly Muslim and Croat controlled and 
finally Sarajevo that would be shared by all three groups. Most subsequent discussion 
followed from the third strand of the plan but for the next few months, having arrived 
at this point with some difficulty, as far as the EU and its member states were 
concerned the VOPP was the only show in town. 
" 20"' January 93/006 Statement in the European Parliament on the situation in the former Yugoslav 
republics 
98 
Despite accusations that the plan rewarded ethnic cleansing and that it resorted 
to fragmentary ethnic division in order to secure peace, the VOPP was deemed not to 
undermine any of the EC/EU's key negotiating principles - namely non-acceptance of 
forcible changing of internationally recognised borders and respect for the rights of 
ethnic and religious minorities. The VOPP was the best attempt yet to devise a 
workable political settlement; however the forinulation of the plan was about as far as 
the EU and UN co-chairmen could take it. The only pressure that the EU could bring 
to bear on the warring factions was political and diplomatic, bolstered by sanctions. 
At EU-Ievel the view was that there was no indication that military means would 
necessarily gain anything and could in fact endanger the emergency aid programme 85. 
The Bosnian Croats and Muslims supported the VOPP, although significantly less 
enthusiastically by the Muslims who conceded only in the (correctly held) belief that 
they could rely on the Bosnian Serbs to reject it. Diplomatic pressure was put on the 
Bosnian Serbs to sign the plan with threats of stronger sanctions and further 
international isolation being inflicted on Serbia and Montenegro in the absence of 
agreement. This pressure did lead Milosevic to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to sign 
(though he by no means supported the arrangements) which led in turn to a certain 
split between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. Karadiz did eventually sign reluctantly 
but this required the confirmation and ratification of the unrecognised Bosnian Serb 
assembly in Pale which duly rejected it. By April the Bosnian Serbs had still not 
signed up to the VOPP. A new front opened up in the war when the simmering 
tensions between Muslims and Croats, who barely tolerated each other out of a 
common desire to fight back the encroaching Serbs, erupted into all out war. Bosnia 
now had a three-way conflict with the Muslims on the verge of being completely 
overrun, a prospect which instiled a new vigour into their resistance and only added to 
the viciousness of the war. However, the VOPP remained the sole option pursued by 
the EU with further commitment to the penalisation of the FRY by strengthening and 
better implementation and enforcement of these sanctionS86 
On 17 th April a reinforced and extremely harsh set of sanctions were imposed 
by the UN and whole heartedly welcomed by the EU as a positive step in the right 
85 10"' February 93/042 Statement in the European Parliament on the situation in the former Yugoslav 
republics 
86 5th April 93/143 Statement on the former Yugoslavia 
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direction against the Serb aggressor 87 . As well as giving its full backing to the VOPP, 
UNSCR 820 goes on to give the Bosnian Serbs 9 days to sign up to the peace plan and 
cease all military activity or else the following sanctions would be added to those 
already imposed on the FRY : 
Ban on all transit traffic through Serbia and Montenegro; 
Freeze of all Serbian financial assets abroad; 
Ban on all forms of service apart from telecommunications, mail and 
legal services; 
* Confiscation of all ships, aircraft and trucks abroad on suspicions of 
sanctions violations; 
* Prohibition of shipping movements along the Montenegrin coast; 
The centrality of sanctions and the UN mandate for any other form of action remained 
central to EU-Ievel policy. The view was that the sanctions policy could yield positive 
results and any military action would endanger the humanitarian relief efforts and 
ECMM and UNPROFOR personnel on the ground. Earlier in April the WEU decision 
to strengthen enforcement of the existing UN embargo on the Danube had been 
welcomed 88 and continued to be active in sanctions assistance missions (together with 
the CSCE) in advising the states neighbouring the FRY on tightening sanctions 
enforcement procedures in electing and curbing violations. 
At this stage, the US government began to become more and more involved. 
Not entirely supportive of the VOPP or willing either to commit troops to an 
interventionist ground force, they began to advocate a policy of 'lift and strike' 
involving lifting the arms embargo for the Bosnian Muslims, in effect levelling the 
playing field (as the Bosnian Serbs had access to JNA resources and assistance from 
Serbia and the Bosnian Croats likewise from Croatia) and the launching (NATO) air 
strikes at Bosnian Serbs targets. Despite efforts throughout May to make some 
progress on the implementation of the VOPP despite the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs 
to comply, including an agreement on 18 th May for the implementation process to 
89 - 
gradually begin in Muslim and Croat areas , it and EU efforts to reach a negotiated 
87 UN Security Council Resolution 821 (1993) and 21" April 93/153 Statement on Bosnia 
88 5'11 April 93/143 Statement on the former Yugoslavia 
89 26 th May 93/209 Statement in the European Parliament on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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solution would be increasingly sidelined from this point on. On 22nd May the Contact 
Group's9o Joint Action Plan outlined five points of priority for immediate 
international action that largely reiterated the central aspects of what had constituted 
EU policy to date including commitment to sanctions, humanitarian aid, pressure on 
Belgrade to close the border with Bosnia (hence support and supply routes to the 
Bosnian Serbs), support for the establishment and protection of the UN Safe Areas 91 
and the setting up of a war crimes tribunal 92 . 
Despite now certain duplication and the echoing of much coming from the EU 
in the statements of other actors (and vice versa) - it was the EU that became 
increasingly eclipsed. With the sheer extent of the task in hand, it simply could not 
perform the range of activities with sufficient force in order to effect real change. 
There was of course the lack of a military capability, but this was not the only 
restriction in the EU's ability to effect change. The lack of a military capability was 
combined with a lack of commitment to VOPP among other international actors - 
including the members of the Contact Group. An effort led by the major national state 
actors had in this instance more force, both due to the greater potential for the usage 
of more forcible means to compel a settlement (though this was no certain at this 
stage) and the fact that it represented the consensus of many of the most important and 
influential actors in the international system. 
Despite the gradual demise of the VOPP, EU-level commitment to the 
production of a negotiated settlement held and consensus in the Council held for 
continued support for the anns embargo. It was felt that lifting the embargo would 
lead to an escalation of the war, a worsening of the humanitarian situation and would 
necessitate the withdrawal of international personnel and troops on the ground (who 
were for the most part European) 93 . This view was 
bolstered by the UNSC, which on 
the 291h of June also rejected even the partial lifting of the embargo and reiterated the 
need for the greater emphasis to be on a negotiated settlement. With the VOPP 
90 Comprised of US, Russia, UK, Spain and France 
91 Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica LTN Security Council Resolution 824 (1993) 
92 26"' May 93/209 209 Statement in the European Parliament on the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina 
93 23 rd June 93/263 Answer to oral question No H-664/93 in the European Parliament 
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sidelined, a Serb-Croat proposal for a 'Union of three republics' 94 was adopted by the 
EC-UN co-chairmen as the basis for further negotiation. Welcoming developments, 
the Council also reaffirmed its commitment to making a contribution to the 
implementati 95 'on of any settlement and to post-war reconstruction of Bosnia 
Importantly, subject to the securing of a cease-fire and the signing of the new working 
plan 96 part of the provisions dealing with implementation involved the UN assuming 
responsibility for the civil administration and supervising the reconstruction of 
Sarajevo 97 and the EU taking responsibility in a similar manner for Mostar. The EU 
declared itself to be ready in principle to take over administrative functions for the 
Mostar district and to appoint a civil administrator for the town who would work 
together with the local authorities and the other international institutions involved in 
implementing the peace plan (UN, NATO f not at all certain at this stagel ICRC, 
UNHCR etc). The WEU was also invited to consider what support it could offer to the 
98 
operation regarding, amongst other things, the organisation of the local police force 
This represented an element of novelty in a policy mostly unchanged despite the 
trials, tribulations, failures and opposition faced. However, this was still far from 
implementation. Also on the diplomatic front, by the end of 1993 earlier working 
settlements based on the Serb-Croat 'Union of Three Republics/Owen-Stoltenburg' 
plans, were repackaged to form the basis of an EU Action plan intended to jumpstart 
the floundering negotiations and also assist the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. 
The most immediate concern was the need for urgent measures to be taken in 
advance of the winter months to ensure the necessary humanitarian aid was both 
allocated and delivered to those within Bosnia who required it most. The October 29th 
European Council Conclusions expressed gave anxiety at the deterioration of the 
humanitarians situation and condemned all acts of deliberate aggression perpetrated 
94 Comprised of Serb, Croat and Muslim majority republics within Bosnia's internationally recognised 
frontiers 
95 14 th Septemeber 93/359 Statement in the European Parliament on development in the former 
Yugoslavia 
960wen- S toltenberg Plan or the Geneva Agreements - seems to be some resistance apparent *in all 
statements to calling the plan OSP or to have it tabled as a replacement of the VOPP, clearly referred to 
as a Serbo-Croat plan supported and facilitated by negotiations in the ICFY but not yet an EU plan - 
eventually to be repackaged in December as the EU Action Plan. 
97 This was not supported by the Bosnian Serbs so did not take effect. 
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on aid-convoys 99 . While holding the parties to the conflict directly responsible for 
establishing the conditions essential for the continuation of aid, the European Council 
agreed to f urther support the convoying of humanitarian aid on the basis of several 
guidelines, which included: 
The identification and restoration of priority routes in particular Sarajevo; 
Obtaining the agreement of all parties to the preservation of humanitarian 
routes; 
The use of all appropriate means to support the convoying of humanitarian 
aid; 
Reinforcing UNPROFOR so that more troops are available to protect aid 
routes; 
On the basis of these guidelines, the European Council then invited the Council to 
adopt detailed provisions for joint action while maintaining close co-ordination with 
the LN. At the same Council meeting, the search for a negotiated and durable solution 
to the conflict in Yugoslavia and the contribution to the implementation of a peace 
plan and support for humanitarian action was designated one of the five priority areas 
for the new CFSP 100. The humanitarian aid issue was the subject of two joint actions 
by the end of the year. In total ECU 48.30 million was allocated to the region in a 
rather cumbersome and time-consuming process for what was essentially emergency 
aid. 101 
98 27 1h October 93/425 Answer to oral questions No. H-1068/93 and H-1034/93 in the European 
Parliament 
99 2 9th October 93/441 Conclusions of the European Council/Statement on the situation in former 
Yugoslavia and on the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
100 Along with the promotion of stability and peace in Europe, the Middle East, South Africa and 
Russia. 29"' October 93/440 Conclusions of the extraordinary Brussels European Council 
101 The first came on the 8thNovember that declared firstly the EU's willingness to increase both its 
financial contribution to the aid effort and to support its delivery through assisting in the identification, 
restoration and preservation of priority routes. This was to be done on the basis if consultation between 
the Presidency, the Commssion and the co-chairmen of the ICFY, the UNHCR and UNPROFOR. The 
necessary budgetary arrangements would follow the production of a report following these discussions, 
while at the same time the Presidency would approach third countries for additional contributions to 
bolster the effort, both for the aid and its secure delivery in the form of greater participation in 
UNPROFOR ( in conjunction with the LTNSG). Full commitment to UNPROFOR was expressed and to 
strengthened member state participation and contributions, particularly in the areas of logistical support 
and engineering. This was followed by the Joint Action of 20thDecember which outlined the promised 
budgetary arrangements with a total of ECU 48.30 million to be made available, half of which was to 
come from the EC budget. Implementation of the joint action was charged to the Commission within 
the limits of the ECU 24.15 nullion to be made available from Community resources. Decision on how 
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Therefore by the end of 1993, the EU's diplomatic efforts in conjunction with 
the UN had not produced holding results in the face of opposition on the ground, 
perhaps due to the lack of anything more than punitive sanctions to encourage 
compliance and the fact that other actors were assuming a more high-profile and 
forceful role. The support for sanctions and the maintenance of the arms embargo held 
as the collective position but that became increasingly irrelevant. The aid effort also 
was not massively increased in effectiveness by new procedures. The overlapping 
efforts of the range of actors now involved increasingly drowned out the EU, 
rendering it ever-more sidelined, though never absent or insignificant. Over the 
remaining years under examination, the EU does begin to focus more closely on what 
it in particular could do that a particular state might not. 
(iii) 1994 
In 1994 the US, the Contact Group, NATO and the UN were the predominant 
actors attempting to deal with the conflict in Bosnia. The EU was now on the 
sidelines, concentrating on humanitarian aid and a failing diplomatic process. The 
interesting case of the assumption of responsibility for Mostar was even facilitated by 
US, not EU diplomatic efforts. The pace of events presented a challenge to all 
concerned. However, they completely over-ran the competence of the ICFY to keep 
up and eventually the EU's efforts were eclipsed entirely. The EU Action Plan and 
the Owen- Stoltenberg plan went the way of all previous EU sponsored peace plans, 
as the warring parties struggled to agree on the detail of the plan when they could 
manage to come together to even negotiate at all as the situation deteriorated further. 
At the beginning of 1994 the horror of the siege of Sarajevo was to the fore of 
international concerns. The controversial market square bomb of February 5 th102 was 
the remaining 50% would be financed by the member states was deferred. See 8h November 93/529 
Joint Action and 2 Oth December 93/534 Joint Action. 
102 Considered controversial due to the disputed source of the bomb. It was claimed by some that the 
bomb was a Bosnian Muslim attempt to discredit the Bosnian Serbs further and attract international 
intervention. It is however, widely accepted that it was in fact Bosnian Serb forces that were at fault. 
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a turning point in the general international response. The NATO ultimatum of 9'h 
February succeeded in persuading those laying siege to Sarajevo to pull-back within 
the stipulated 10 day deadline rather than face air strikes on any troops or weaponry 
remaining within 20krn of Sarajevo and not under UN control. (Silber & Little 1996; 
315-8)In advance of this ultimatum the Council expressed its support for the use of 
all means necessary to end the siege of Sarajevo, including the use of airpower and 
saw this form of intervention as complementary to the implementation of the EU's 
own action plan' 03 . Despite the fact that the action plan and the ICFY were getting 
nowhere, the EU still clung to it in the absence of any consensus on a military 
solution. However it was clear and also acknowledged that there was little hope of 
the plan leading to any kind of settlement or even of talks resuming in Geneva in the 
104 near future 
The three-way partition option' 05 was eclipsed by US-sponsored moves to 
restore the Muslim-Croat alliance that had disintegrated in 1993. The alliance was 
officially restored on the 2 nd March in the form of the Washington Agreement which 
created the Muslim-Croat federation. The federation was very slow to be implemented 
but the Agreement's most significant immediate effect was the cessation of hostilities 
between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. The Washington Agreement was welcomed 
within the EU. More significant than the continued references to the EU Action Plan 
as the only viable way forward (which it clearly was not, in practice anyway), the 
decision to despatch a group of experts to Mostar was announced as a reaffin-nation of 
the Union's commitment to undertake the administration of the city and its district' 06 
The success of the first NATO ultimatum in Sarajevo had set a precedent 
which changed the character of international involvement in Bosnia. This was to 
become most apparent in April in the response to the continuous Bosnian Serb attacks 
on the UN-declared Safe Area of Gorazde which lead to two rounds of NATO 
103 7 Ih February 94/050 Statement on Sarajevo 
104 91h February 94/054 Statement in the European Parliament 'prospects for the talks to be resumed 
tomorrow in Geneva are not very optimistic and we have scant hope that a lasting solution to the crisis 
can be found on the basis of the action plan' 
105 Or it could also be interpreted as dressed-up two way Serb-Croat partition with enough minor 
concessions to the Bosnian Muslims to prevent their being totally subsumed within Greater Serbia or 
Croatia 
106 9th March 94/094 Statement in the European Parliament on Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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airstrikes on the 1 oth and 16 th April, followed by the taking hostage of some 150 UN 
personnel by General Mladic and his Bosnian Serb forces. This NATO action was 
fully supported at EU-level as an underpinning of the broader UN action that the 
NATO air strikes were designed to support (i. e. the prevention of further attack on a 
UN Safe Area enabling access for UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid) 107 . However, a 
certain reorientation of policy is more clearly evident fTom this point on. The 
implications of Gorazde raised many questions about the UN peace-keeping presence 
which the EU had placed great emphasis on over the previous years. Progress had not 
been made in the ICFY on the basis of the EU's own action plan. There was a need 
for reappraisal of how the Geneva negotiations should proceed. However, the 
diplomatic initiative was now coming from an international coalition that did not 
include the EU as an actor or even the UN in anything other than supporting capacity. 
Despite the similarity between the Contact Group plan and the EU's own plan 108 , the 
US dominated group and its propositions were dominant and was supported by the 
EU, with only the occasional reference to the EU's plan and the desired centrality 
ICFY recurring in statements for the rest of the year. 
In October the existing sanctions regime was adjusted to differentiate between 
the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs in order to compel a settlement. Two common 
positions on the I O'hOctober declared that in line with the relevant UNSCRs 
economic and financial relations with those parts of Bosnia under Bosnian Serb 
control were to be reduced and certain trade restrictions on the FRY were to be 
suspended'09. Despite US support for the lifting of the arms embargo and its eventual 
decision not to play an active part in enforcing it, the EU's position remained one of 
support for the embargo. The view was that a suspension of the embargo could only 
be contemplated if all other measures failed and that that point had not yet arrived. It 
could lead to an escalation of the war and consequently the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR and further endangenuent of the civilian population and any prospects 
for success the political process might have' 
10 
107 18th April 94/137 Statement on Bosnia 
108 Both envisioning a two-way split between Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims/Croats within Bosnia's 
internationally recognised borders 
109 10"' October 94/241 Comirion Position pursuant to LINSCR 942 and 943 of 23 rd September. 
110 16"' November 94/291 Statement in the European Parliament on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
106 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the EU activity at this point was the 
execution of the EU's earlier expressed willingness to take responsibility for the 
administration of Mostar, as part of the Washington Agreement. Hans Koshnick was 
appointed as the administrator of the city of behalf of and under the direction of the 
EU. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the EU, WEU, the 
Bosnian Government, the Muslim-Croat Federation, the local administrations of east 
and west Mostar and the Bosnian Croats on 5 th July set out the ainis, structures and 
modus operandi of the EU administration (EUAM). The general aims of the 
administration included the reconstruction of the basic structures necessary for the 
functioning of society, both infrastructural and political and it was clearly stated that 
none of these arrangements would prejudice any more permanent arrangements 
concerning the status of Mostar in any wider political settlement for Bosnia (Article 
1). The administration was to last for two years and would be conducted in close 
consultation and collaboration with the local par-ties (Article 9). Seven departments 
were established dealing with city administration, finance and taxes, reconstruction, 
economic and transport infrastructure, education and culture, public order, health and 
social services (Article 9). The area was to be fully demilitarised under the 
supervision of UNPROFOR before the operation commenced (Article 14). One of the 
important tasks involved the creation of a unified multi-ethnic police force for Mostar 
under the authority of the EU Administrator but was to be achieved involving the 
participation of a contingent of police provided by the WEU. This involved WEU 
police working alongside local police in Mostar (civilian and police component). The 
role of this police force was to train local police and to supervise them with a view to 
setting up mixed patrols to operate in both sectors of the city. The two years of 
EUAM in Mostar commenced on the 23 
d July. ill 
In conclusion, therefore, with the exception of Mostar in 1994 the EU was at 
its least visible in tenns of activity that in any stage of the Yugoslav conflict to date, 
II' On 31" October the Council approved the granting of ECU 80 mi'llion for the operation. Support for 
the town's adnimistration was subsequently confirmed by the Joint Action of 12'hDecember. The same 
day a separate Joint Action extended the financial arrangements of previous joint actions until 31" 
December 1995. However, under what can be described as the EUAM Joint Action the decision on the 
total budget to be made available to the administration until the end of 1995 was delayed and instead an 
additional ECU 20 rrullion was set for the interim all coming from the Community budget. The need 
for funds urgently to finance the interim period was the cited reason for what was evident operational 
expenses being financed as if it were administrative. See 12thDecember 93/329 Joint Action and 12'h 
December 94/330 Joint Action. 
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CFSP or no CFSP. The Mostar example is interesting in that it sets the EU up as an 
entity of the appropriate kind to oversee international administration and 
reconstruction - something its multi-lateral composition renders it suitable for. 
However, on the diplomatic front arduous effort produced little of actual consequence 
or of distinction from previous years, accompanied with the same emphasis on 
sanctions and support for the arms embargo. 
1995: 
Overall, the same can be said for 1995. However, by the end of the year a 
reinvigorated sense of purpose emerges on the part of the EU as it finds for itself a 
role in the context of the peace agreement that finally became more clearly visible on 
the horizon. The Mostar experiment proceeded into 1995 and with the rather slow and 
cumbersome arrangements for financing the operation, its limitations were apparent. 
The intention was not to make this kind of direct administration a general principle 
due mainly to the limitations on resources 112 . 
Diplomatic activity in the first half of 1995 was also limited, with the 
international effort now led and dominated by the Contact Group and the United 
States. Despite attempts to present the Contact Group as a new mechanism to provide 
for European representation within an apparatus that combined the other major 
players in the international system (Russia and the US) 113, there is no escaping the fact 
that the Contact Group was a state-led alliance that eclipsed communal EU-level 
efforts. A slight change in the sanctions regime was supported, with certain aspects of 
trade sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs being suspended in order to further 
encourage compliance with efforts to secure a settlement' 14 . Encouraged by the 
112 17'h January 95/02 1 Answer to oral question No H-768/94 in the European Parliament. The 
administration's budget was finally set by the Joint Action of the 6h February. The total budget for 
1995 was to be a maximum of ECU 80 million, all of which was to come from the EC budget. The 
Joint Action of the 4 th December again deferred the decision on the sum to be made available until July 
1996, stating only that it would come from the Community budget. See 6 1h February 95/052 Joint 
Action, 4 th December 95/367 Joint Action and 4th December 95/365 Joint Action on continued support 
for the EUAM 
113 One example of this is 17'h January 95/024 in the European Parliament P 'in order to negotiate with 
the various factions, therefore, we had to put in place a diplomatic apparatus providing representation 
for the EU' ( authors own emphasis) 
114 In line with UN Security Council Resolution 970, a Common Position was adopted on the 23 rd 
January extending the suspension of certain trade restrictions imposed on the FRY under UN Security 
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imposition from Belgrade of an embargo on the Bosnian Serbs, the EU now called 
for Serbian recognition of Bosnia and Croatian independence so that a political 
115 
settlement could be reached 
However, as the dramatic events of the summer of 1995 approached it was 
clear that none of these efforts were having much of an impact. Moves in early 
summer to merge the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic centred on Pale with the 
Croatian Serb territory known as the Krajina centred on Knin signalled the onset of a 
serious escalation of the conflict and a threat to the very territorial integrity of the 
former Yugoslav republics that the EU had stressed from the beginning. Declaring 
that such an action would be considered null and void, the EU called for all states that 
were part of the foriner Yugoslavia to accelerate the process of mutual recognition 116 
With UNPROFOR under serious pressure and increasing danger, France and UK 
announced their intention to create a Rapid Reaction Force under its dual command 
(i. e. not answerable in the first instance to the UN) as a supplement to UNPROFOR. 
This was welcomed at Union level but this welcome was accompanied by the request 
that any reinforcement of UNPROFOR be accompanied by renewed negotiations and 
a focus on the mutual recognition of all the states that had emerged from the former 
Yugoslavia' 17 Meeting just over a week before the serious onslaught on the UN Safe 
Area of Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serbs began, the Cannes European Council 
reiterated this support for reinforcing UNPROFOR. It also set out the Union's 
immediate objectives in Bosnia. These consisting of requesting Carl Bildt' 18 to 
urgently explore ways of reopening dialogue with all the parties in Bosnia on the basis 
of the Contact Groups' plan for Bosnia's future and the need to secure mutual 
recognition between the republics (especially recognition of Bosnia by the FRY)' 19. 
The events of July and August 1995 overtook these intentions as the combined forces 
Council Resolution 943. The suspension of trade restrictions was further extended on the 28"' of April 
under a Common Position pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 988 and again on the 12 th June 
and the 7 th July. See 23 rd January 95/028 Common Position, 28th April 95/132 Common Position, 12th 
June 95/169 Conu-non Position and 7th July 95/200 Joint Action. 
115 14 th February 95/065 
116 2 nd June 95/165 Statement on the merging of the self-proclaimed Serbia 'republics' of KrajMa and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
117 13 th June Statement in the European Parliament 
118 Appointed to succeed Lord Owen as the EU's representative to region and co-chairman of the ICFY 
with Stoltenberg. 
119 26/27"' June 95/191 Conclusions of the Cannes European Council/ Statement by the European 
Council on the former Yugoslavia 
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(diplomatic and military) of the Bosnian Muslims, Croatia the United States and 
NATO succeeded in bringing a significant turnaround in the conflict. 
Bosnian Serb forces began to shell the Muslim enclave and UN Safe Area of 
Srebrenica in the first week of July' 20 in response to minor Muslim incursions into 
neighbouring Serb villages. Protected only by a vulnerable group of Dutch 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers, the enclave was easily overrun. The UNPROFOR 
soldiers themselves came under attack both by locals who did not want them to leave 
and by advancing Bosnian Serbs forces who took some of them hostage. A Serb 
ultimatum of the 9th July for Srebrenica to be evacuated led to limited NATO air 
strikes on the I Ith July, by which time most of Srebrenica's population had already 
fled and several thousand had been killed. The security of UNPROFOR from this 
point could no longer be guaranteed and it clearly could have little success in 
preventing this kind of large-scale offensive. On July 14 th it was agreed that NATO 
air strikes would be used to protect remaining safe areas should it become necessary. 
On July I 9th the Safe Area of Bihac in Western Bosnia was attacked by a combined 
force of Bosnian Serbs and Serbs from the Krajina area of Croatia. On July 22 nd a 
large counter-offensive was launched by a combined force of Croatia and Bosnia's 
Muslims and Croats. By the second week of August Croatia had regained control of 
the Krajina region and Izetbegovic was able to assume control of Bihac. Talk of a 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR became more pronounced. On August 28 th another bomb 
hit Sarajevo's market square. The following day, having learned the harsh lesson of 
Srebrenica, all UN personnel withdrew from the remaining Safe Area of Gorazde. On 
August 31" two weeks of comprehensive NATO air strikes began and they did not 
stop until all parties had signed up to a preliminary settlement and the shelling of 
Sarajevo had stopped on the 14 th September. On the I oth October a sixty-day cease- 
fire commenced which facilitated negotiations that culminated in the signing of the 
Dayton Agreement in December. 
The EU's reaction to the summer's events was minimal, consisting mainly of 
the expression of concern for the deteriorating situation and condemnation or support 
for the various actions. The diplomatic effort was dominated by the United States. As 
120 For more on the events in Srebenica see (Rhode 1997). 
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the prospect of peace came in late September, despite lip service paid to the need for 
consultation between the international representatives, the EU's representative Carl 
Bildt was increasingly sidelined and excluded from crucial talks and decision-making. 
However, as the seeds of a peace agreement were sewn in Geneva and New York in 
the run-up to Dayton's proximity talks, the EU was already beginning to elaborate on 
the kind of role it could play in the future of Bosnia. 
This view echoed that of the initial reaction to the impending break-up of 
Yugoslavia, describing the EU as the anchor of peace and stability in Europe and the 
only guarantor of the long-term development and stability of the western continent. In 
this vein, already in September the Presidency and the Commission were in contact 
with the US concerning the means by which the reconstruction of Bosnia would be 
tackled post-peace agreement. The EU's future function would involve rebuilding 
Yugoslavia, both politically and economically. This view was confirmed by the 
Council, meeting at the end of October. While setting out eight priority goals for 
121 Bosnia , it went on to 
i confirm its willingness to contribute to the international effort aimed at 
reconstruction of the regions devastated by the war once peace is established. 
To that end the EU will co-ordinate its actions with other members of the 
international community in order to provide long-term assistance with the 
objectives of supporting economic development, reinforcement of civil society 
and reconciliation and regional economic co-operation. In the perspective of 
peace the EU is developing its long-term policy towards the region, to help 
build stability and prosperity 122 
This was supplemented by an undertaking to continue the provision of humanitarian 
123 
assistance for 'as long as the need exists' 
121 1) The continuing existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state in its internationally recognised 
borders consisting of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska; 2) 
Bosnia must be a multiethnic state, a democracy founded on respect for the human person and the rule 
of law; 3) Basic human rights and the rights of minorities as enshrined in international law have to be 
fully respected and recognised; 4) Full respect for the rights of refugees and displaced persons 
in 
particular the right of voluntary return; 5) A framework for early, free and fair elections in Bosnia; 6) 
Econormes based on market principles and regional co-operation; 7) Mutual recognition among all the 
states of the former Yugoslavia within their internationally recognised borders; 
8) The establishment of 
the a process to define anus control, disarmament and confidence-building measures; 
Source- 3 1" 
October 95/308 Council Conclusions on the former Yugoslavia 
122 
ibid. 123 
ibid. 
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On the II th December a Joint Action was adopted setting out the manner in 
which the EU would proceed with this intention to play a key and significant role in 
the implementation of the peace plan. The EU was willing to make a contribution both 
to the monitoring process involved in implementation of the agreement and also 
funding part of the expenditure necessary for the proper execution of the High 
representative appointed in London the previous week. ECU 10 million was allocated 
for this purpose for 1995. The EU would be represented by both the Presidency and 
the Commission in the deliberations on post-war reconstruction. 124 Meeting on 15 th 
/16th December, the Madrid European Council confirmed and reaffirmed all these 
statements and actions, repeating that the EU was ready to make a contribution to the 
implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement 125 . The 
former Swedish 
Prime Minister Carl Bildt was appointed to coordinate the EU's involvement from 
Sarajevo. 
Therefore, the EU concluded the year with the intention of participating in the 
post-war reconstruction and stabilisation of Bosnia in conjunction with the other 
relevant actors. This would be built upon in 1996, and indeed in following years. 
Rather than an actual action, per se, what this is indicative of is part of an evolving 
sense of what the EU's particular contribution to Yugoslavia within the confines and 
relevance of its capabilities could be. It involved concentrating on the EU's strengths 
(namely civilian activities), and also importantly, its strengths in an area where it in 
particular had a role to play as an actor. 
1996 
This approach formed the basis of policy into 1996. It is also interesting that 
much of it also echoed the original approach adopted in relation to the initial onset of 
Yugoslavia's disintegration, with the exception that it was the consolidation of peace 
that was being now worked towards, as well as the prevention of further conflict. In 
light of the general process of implementing the Dayton Accords, on the 26 
th 
124 11 th December 95/384 Joint Action on the participation of the Union in the implementing structures 
of the peace plan fro B osma- Herzegovina 
125 15/16"' 95/401 December Conclusions of the Madrid European Council. 
112 
February the General Affairs Council confirmed the Union's commitment to the 
process, and stresses that the provision of reconstruction assistance and longer term 
measures were conditional on the full compliance of all parties with commitments 
made at Dayton and at the subsequent Rome Summit. This included the definition of 
future agreements with the countries of the region 126 . In light of this, and in the 
context of the Dayton Accords, the so-called Royaumont Process or 'Platform for the 
development of the process of stability and good neighbourly relations in South- 
Eastern Europe' was launched. 
The Royaumont Process constituted a regional approach to the former 
Yugoslavia's outstanding problems and was ambitious in its overall purpose and yet 
limited in its focus and intent. It was intended to encourage regional co-operation and 
thus promote greater levels of tolerance and recognition of the value of co-operation 
over conflict. It was stressed from the outset that it was not an attempt to encourage 
the reconstitution of the former Yugoslavia in any form, nor to deal with the more 
taxing questions at the centre of the conflicts pertaining to minorities and disputed 
frontiers. It was more a 'joint and continuing effort to strengthen stability and good- 
neighbourliness in South-East Europe' and an effort would be made to 'contribute to 
reducing the tensions arising from the conflict and preventing a resumptions of 
hostilities, promote a better understanding that it is in the interest of each party to co- 
operate rather than try to systematically to put obstacles in the way of any undertaking 
by a neighbour, contribute to restoring confidence and dialogue, and overcome ethnic 
divisions and hatreds' 127 . The emphasis was on the 
development of civil society and 
of channels of communication at all levels of government and society. 
Despite the very broadly defined objectives, activities carried out under the 
auspices of the process were more limited and largely concerned with assisting 
regional NGO's and, to a more limited extent, inter-parliamentary meetings among 
other things. It was more ambitious in aspiration than in effect, and even the 
aspiration was sufficiently vague and fluid to inhibit any strong sense of purpose or 
comprehensive, effective or more systematic and implementation. It was also rather 
12" 26"' February 96/042 Council conclusions / Statement on former Yugoslavia 
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slow in developing. It was not until November 1997 that Panagiotis Roumeliotis was 
appointed as co-ordinator for the process and not until 1998 that the process' first 
'Action Plan' was produced and arrangements for the financing of subsequent projects 
were agreed 128 . What is most notable is the emphasis on regional cooperation as the 
basis for lasting peace and stability] 29 
In the context of the ongoing process of implementing the Dayton (and 
subsequent Paris) Accords, support was given to the elections held in Bosnia in 
September 1996. On the I oth June a Joint Action was agreed upon to assist, within the 
framework of the OSCE, with the preparation, supervision and monitoring of the 
elections, through and in addition to that already provided by the ECMM 130. This 
mainly entailed the despatch of a team of supervisors funded from the EC budget for 
four weeks. However, before the main Bosnian elections were held,, elections were 
due to be held in the EU administered district of Mostar on the 3 oth June. 
The EU's two-year mandate established by the 1994 Memorandum of 
Understanding was due to expire in July 1996, following the successful election of a 
new unified local authority. Despite some success in reconstruction and promotion of 
inter-ethnic tolerance and co-operation, a level of instability persisted which 
complicated what was unlikely to have ever been a simple transfer of power to the 
127 26 1h February 96/046 Council conclusions Annex III / Platform for the development of the process 
of stability and good-neighbourly relations in South-Eastern Europe for possible submission to the 
participants. 
128 The Action Plan of 26 th January 1998 outlined meetings to be held, the emphases of the process and 
subsequent projects to be carried out in order to achieve overall objectives. See 9/10'hNovember 
Common Position 1998 providing legal base for the financing of certain Royaumont projects from the 
CFSP budgets. 
129 As outlined by the Italian Council President-m- Office (FassMo) in the European Parliament 'we 
have to recognize that reconstruction is not just a technical matter.. -reconstruction means 
reconstructing the reasons for living together ... reconstructing the reasons 
for cooperation and growing 
interdependency. There is no nostalgia for Yugoslavia in emphasising this. Yugoslavia no longer 
exists .... but saying this does not mean thinking peace can 
be stable and durable without reconstructing 
a framework of cooperation and interdependence between the states born out of the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia. So in this respect I emphasise the importance of the reconstruction and the 
European Union's whole strategy for former Yugoslavia ... being characterised 
by a regional approach, 
an approach capable of making available to all the states in the region the financial, political and 
operational instruments necessary to allow reciprocal cooperation to grow. This regional approach alms 
to build stability founded on growth and development for all the states in the region and on the 
affirmation of the principles of law, the principles of democracy, and the values of free societies and 
the market throughout the Balkans' I 9th June 96/176 Statement in the European Parliament on aid to 
the former Yugoslavia. 
130 1 OthJune 96/163 Joint Action/ Council decision on action by the Union to support the electoral 
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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local authorities upon the expiry of the EU mandate to the extent that local groups had 
themselves requested that an extension of the EU mandate be considered. In order to 
encourage the electoral process, the European Council agreed the week before 
elections were held that should successful elections be held and provided that the 
newly elected leaders demonstrated real commitment to the reunification and peaceful 
future of the city and cooperated fully with the EUAM, the EU would consider 
extending the mandate for EUAM for a further limited period before the full 
reintegration of Mostar into the wider implementation structures of the peace 
agreements commenced 131 . The elections were successfully held on the 3 oth June as 
planned and the process of phasing out EUAM began. On the 15 th July a Joint Action 
acknowledged the need for some form of continued EU presence in Mostar for an 
additional and limited transitional period in order to consolidate existing 
achievements and to ensure as smooth a phasing-out process as possible 1 32 . Rather 
than an immediate withdrawal, EUAM was phased out over the rest of the year under 
the direction of a Special EnvoY133 whose primary task was to ensure the rapid 
integration of Mostar into the overall peace implementation structures. However, the 
failure to establish the required unified administration following the elections led to a 
delay in the commencement of the phasing-out arrangements until August. By the end 
of the year EUAM had effectively been phased out and the UN had assumed control. 
Explicit conditionality was introduced for aid for reconstruction and 
development in the region came in the form of the new OBNOVA 134 programme 
which formed the basis for subsequent aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, 
Macedonia, Croatia and the FRY. The emphasis was on the restoration of civil society 
and cooperation within the regions, in other words to support the reconstruction effort, 
to encourage the return of refugees, facilitate reconciliation and regional economic co- 
operation and to help lay the conditions for overall development 135 . 
13 121"/22 nd June 96/192 Conclusions of the Florence European Council / Statement by the European 
Council on the former Yugoslavia 
132 15 Ih July 96/215 Joint Action / Council decision on the nomination of a Special Envoy of the 
European Union in the city of Mostar 133 Martin Garrod 
134 Obnova means 'renewal' 
135 Council Regualtion(EC) No 1628/96 25hJuly 1996 relating to aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
the federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
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The emphasis on the need for a regional approach to secure longer-term peace 
and stability was reiterated at all levels by the end of the year also. In addition, 
explicit reference was made not only to the need for a regional approach in general 
but also that the European Union is Particularly suited to providing a focus and 
making a very particular kind of contribution in this regard. An Irish Presidency 
statement details the EU's commitments and priorities for the former Yugoslavia and 
states that 
'The European Union can make a particular contribution to the process of 
stabilisation and economic renewal through the development of relations with 
all the countries of the region, within aframework which promotes 
democracy, the rule of law, higher standards of human and minority rights, 
transformation towards market economies and greater cooperation between 
those countries 136 
At the end of December the Dublin European Council reiterated its conditional 
intention to consider the establishment of contractual relations with those areas who 
prove co-operative in the process of fully implementing the peace accords and within 
the context of the regional approach 137 which emphasises both an overall approach on 
the part of the Union and also places a certain degree of responsibility on the 
respective groups in the region to co-exist in a peaceful way. 
Towards the end of this period, some sense of perspective of what the EU 
could more proactively do was beginning to be consolidated. What would henceforth 
be referred to as the Union's Regional Approach was further elaborated by the GAC 
in April 1997, firmly establishing economic and political conditionality as the basis 
for the development of relations and the provision of reconstruction and development 
assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the FRY and FYROM. It established 
explicit 'political and economic conditions as the basisfor a coherent and 
transparent policy towards the development of bilateral relations in thefield of trade, 
offinancial assistance and economic cooperation as well as of contractual relations. 
The EU strategy should serve as an incentive, and not as an obstacle to the countries 
136 16 th December 96/3 87 Statement at the 51" session of the UN General Assembly on the situation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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concerned tofuý1'1 these conditions'138 . The conditions included the readiness of the 
beneficiary country to engage in cross-border cooperation and to extend where 
appropriate similar advantages to other countries of the region 139. Regional 
cooperation, closer association and the conditional provision of aid for reconstruction, 
refon-n and development were to be the dominant emphasis of EU policy from this 
point on. 
6.3 Characterising the Second Phase 
(i) The eclipse of Europe or coming full circle? 
Despite the formal developments of the TEU, the EC/EU's reaction in this 
period was centred almost entirely on certain key types of activity. It was increasingly 
sidelined by other actors but towards the end of 1995 and into 1996 begins to develop 
a sense of a clearer perspective, and hence a fledgling strategy of what it could and 
should do in relation to this issue specifically. This understanding of the relevance of 
what could be a particularly EU role contains strong resonances of the initial approach 
adopted in 1991. Overall, EU activity centred on diplomacy, support for and 
implementation of sanctions, the provision of aid for humanitarian purposes, the 
administration of Mostar, and finally post-conflict reconstruction and regional 
stabilisation. 
Firstly, the EU maintained a diplomatic presence throughout the entire period 
under examination. It may not have always been the dominant or most successful but 
it was consistently present, vocal and active even if the volume and intensity of 
activity varied and fluctuated. This can certainly be said of the more 'declaratory' 
form of diplomacy. However, it is also true of the more proactive forms such as 
117 13'h/ 14 Ih December 96/383 Conclusions of the Dublin European Council / Statement by the 
European Council on the former Yugoslavia 138 290' April 97/149 Statement on the 2003 
rd Council meeting -General Affairs 139 
ibid. 
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mediation and negotiation, beginning with the issue of the recognition of Bosnian 
independence, and through to the London conference and the joint EC-UN ICFY and 
its settlement proposals (VOPP and the EU Action Plan). However, no settlement was 
reached. Despite many struggles in getting the warring parties to arrive at any kind of 
agreement and to maintain the support of other states (both American and European), 
the negotiating 'ground-work' did take place within the ICFY and it is arguable 
whether or not the US could have achieved agreement at Dayton without the 
preceding years of negotiation. Of course, NATO air strikes, circumstances on the 
ground in Bosnia and the stronger weight of the United States were all crucial factors 
that brought about the conflict's conclusion. However , it is significant that the 
resulting settlement did build on the discussions and plans of previous years, resulting 
in what has been described as a 'European-style' settlement. 
Secondly, as regards sanctions, the economic sanctions imposed on the whole of 
the foriner Yugoslavia in November 1991 were in effect removed in April 1992 when, 
following the recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the positive 
compensatory measures extended to all other more co-operative former Yugoslav 
republics the previous December 140 were also extended to Serbia. As the situation in 
Bosnia deteriorated rapidly, more comprehensive sanctions were soon re-imposed in 
the context of several UNSCR's over the following few years. Notable at EU-level 
was the lead taken in pursuing the diplomatic isolation of the FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro), measures taken to ensure tighter implementation of the harsh sanctions 
regime both within the Union and through assistance provided to neighbouring 
countries, and the unrelenting commitment to the arms embargo spearheaded by the 
EU from the very beginning of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Diplomatic and economic 
sanctions remained central to all efforts to secure a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict and has so often been noted, entailed the primary means by which the Union 
could strongly encourage the warring parties to co-operate with its efforts in the 
absence of any recourse to military methods. 
Thirdly, as regards the provision of humanitarian aid, this apparently 
straightforward type of activity was itself beset with problems that were not always of 
140 Montenegro was first added to the list of beneficiaries and then removed. 
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the EU's own making. Despite great intentions and high-levels of concern for the 
human suffering within Bosnia, the arrangements for the allocation of finances and 
resources was often slow, technical and cumbersome. Despite reforms, such as the 
creation of the ECHO, the Union still struggled to make a strongly effective 
contribution in a swift and systematic manner. The co-ordinating role of the 
Commission in the context of the G24 and also in relation to UN agencies and other 
humanitarian actors on the ground was significant. However, the allocation of 
resources and its delivery do not always follow in smooth progression in a conflict 
situation. Along with all other agencies, the Union could not always reach those most 
in need due to the hostile terrain and dangerous conditions for aid workers. Also, 
while the Commission sought to act in a more visible manner, less of a 'banker' and 
more of a 'Partner' 141 , it was entirely reliant on the support and protection of 
UNPROFOR in order to carry out its operations. An EU aid effort independent of the 
UN was therefore not feasible or desirable 142 . The emphasis was on the coordination 
of the international aid effort at large in order to maximise resources and avoid 
unnecessary duplication, with the role of coordinating Union efforts falling to the 
Commission (within the limitations of resources accorded under the EC budget - 
directly and beyond that in a consultory and advisory capacity) with overall 
coordination coming from the UN agencies, and also the ICRC. 
Fourthly, regarding the administration of Mostar, though relatively small-scale 
and not intended to become a general principle of EU involvement in external 
conflicts and crises in the future, the EU's administration of Mostar was nonetheless 
significant. For two years from July 1994, Hans Koshnick and his team worked to 
restore the basic infrastructure and political structures necessary for the peaceful 
functioning of an integrated city and district, including everything from basic utilities 
to the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Though not without its problems 
141 Terms used in press release on the launch of the ECHO. 'Commission decided to set up a European 
Office for Humanitarian Aid' DN: P/91/69 Date: 06/11/199 1. One of the primary functions of the 
ECHO was to increase the 'visibility' of what was Community aid rather than have it completely 
subsumed within the activities of recipient agencies. 
142 Nor was this even an issue but it is worth mentioning in the context of the EU's (M)ability to 
function as a strongly autonomous international actor. It was never possible that the EU acting alone 
could deal with this or indeed any issue without close cooperation with other actors. This then begs the 
question of whether the UN etc. could function without the EU. The answer is probably that in many 
ways they could but as will be argued later the EC/EU did have various roles to play that became more 
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and also not intended here to become a general principle of EU involvement in 
external conflicts and crises, after the signing of the Dayton Agreements and after a 
delay, Mostar was integrated into the implementing structure of the wider peace 
agreement under the authority of the High Representative. As with the issue of 
humanitarian aid, budgetary arrangements were sometimes unclear and cumbersome, 
with the initial funding for the establishment of the operation coming from funds 
already agreed on and allocated for humanitarian aid purposes. 
Finally, towards the end of the period under examination activity begins to centre 
on the issue of post-conflict reconstruction and regional stabilisation. This became 
more apparent in the latter stages of the conflict in the run up to the peace agreement 
and especially in its aftermath, but drew quite heavily on similar rhetoric to that drawn 
upon in the initial response to Yugoslavia's impending demise in 1991. What was 
notable at this stage was the extent to which the overall process of reconstruction and 
stabilisation was very much seen as taking place within a framework that involved 
heavy participation of other actors. In fact, here the leadership role fell to the UN 
post-Dayton with some involvement of the EU. An emphasis on post conflict 
reconstruction and development was evident in the Mostar experience. It was also 
implicit in much of the negotiations and peace plans that emerged from the ICFY. It 
was never suggested that the EU was only involved until a peace settlement was 
signed. A longer-term commitment was consistently implied. However, clearer 
articulation of what forrn this would take was only beginning to become apparent in 
this period. It came in the forrn of pre- and post-Dayton expressions of commitment to 
the reconstruction and stabilisation effort. It also came in the loose form of the 
Royaumont Process. Though still stronger on aspiration and in framework than on 
actual action, the emphasis on regional cooperation as the way towards long-term 
peace and stability was significant. This was further added to with the new OBNOVA 
regulation and the elaboration of the 1997 Regional Approach that very much laid the 
basis for subsequent developments. 
(ii) Balance of the reactive and strategic 
significant over time and are not immediately apparent from just looking at the Bosnian example in 
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At some of the most crucial moments during the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, the EU's reaction can only be described as heavily declaratory. In the 
first two years under examination here there was no more a sense of guiding purpose 
or strategy than in the previous two-years. The emphasis was on facilitating the 
negotiation of a settlement. The notable difference this time was that this was pursued 
in conjunction with the United Nations and its peacekeeping force. Sanctions again 
provided a backbone to the diplomatic effort, and again these were imposed mostly 
within the framework of successive UNSCRs with the EU in a leading position in 
matters such as pursuing the diplomatic isolation of the FRY and maintaining the 
arms embargo. Most other activities were at best supplementary. The provision of 
humanitarian aid cannot be described as a proactive policy as such. It was more a 
reaction to a need and had no intended purpose other than to alleviate that need. 
Likewise, even the administration of Mostar was relatively ad hoc, if novel. It was not 
designed to serve any clear purpose other than to restore a semblance of normality and 
law and order to the city within two years before being handing control back to the 
local authorities. At the time, it was clearly stated that this was not intended to set a 
precedent for the kind of activity the EU could be expected to become involved in in 
the future. 
The commitment to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation veers 
towards what might be described as the more strategic. However, this is more 
aspiration and loose framework than any real sense of the obviously strategic, even in 
the heavily qualified understanding of the term. It is the extent to which this is then 
built upon that proves significant. In addition, it is already notable that any sense of a 
guiding framework that becomes more evident towards the end of this period is 
similar to that of the previous period i. e. an emphasis on regional cooperation and a tie 
or relationship (unspecified and vague in 1995/1996, even significantly more so than 
in 1990/1991) to western Europe and the European Union in particular. 
(iii) Goals and capabilities linkage 
isolation. 
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As this period coincided with the coming online of the EU's new Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, expectations were high as regards what it was that the EU acting 
as a collective could achieve and what the extent of its supposedly higher profile 
would be. New instruments and procedures may have implied in theory that a more 
comprehensive collective policy was now possible. However, in practice what can be 
seen is a policy that did not live up to the pre-TEU hype. The CFSP was simply never 
going to equip the EU to fulfil the ambitions it set itself and were ascribed to it in 
1990 and 1991. The gap between the goals expressed during the Bosnian crisis and 
actual capabilities is in actual fact not as wide as might be expected. Much of the 
inflated expectations were a result of a combination of a certain lingering echo of the 
pre-Maastricht hype and the assumption that after 1992 significantly more could be 
achieved than before. In fact, more was achieved but not in any hugely dramatic 
sense. The problems were nonetheless significant, not least when it came to agreeing 
the financing of humanitarian operations and EUAM. The EU's goals were to contain 
and prevent an escalation of the conflict using diplomatic means (including high level 
diplomacy), the ICFY, sanctions (plus monitoring and implementation assistance), to 
provide humanitarian assistance to those who required it and to provide other 
supportive and complementary actions in the field (such as EUAM, ECMM). A peace 
settlement remained elusive, sanctions were an insufficient deterrent to conflict, aid 
was slow in being implemented and other activities such as EUAM and ECMM were 
significant but relatively minor points in the overall international operation in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 
Looked at in the light of this overall context the EU's achievements and efforts 
seem and were relatively minor in comparison. However, this is to miss the point 
somewhat. What the EU did was what the EU was actually capable of, reflective of 
capabilities and importantly, the extent to which the member states agreed 
collectively to utilise these capabilities. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the set 
of goals pursued was relatively ad hoc and without a clear sense of purpose, direction 
or longer-term consequence. A hint of a guiding framework begins to emerge at the 
end of this period in the form of the EU's increasingly expressed desire to participate 
in post-war reconstruction and longer-term regional stabilisation. Though by no 
means what can be described of as a strategy or a coherent or explicit guiding 
framework, it does contain echoes of the original approach adopted in 1991 and 1992 
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and it is also reflective of a better and more conscious linkage between what the EU 
can do and what it sets out to do. This is to an extent an exercise in limiting goals to 
fit limited capabilities or making a virtue out of the EU's incapacity. However, neither 
these capabilities nor even this precise issue remain static. There is the the basis of 
more a coherent and goal-orientated policy linked to actual capabilities and what will 
be significant will be the extent to which this is built upon. 
(iv) Functions performed in context 
The roles or functions perfonned by the EC/EU in this period can be broadly 
characterised under the following headings: 
(a) Joint mediator andfacilitator of negotiations: 
Once the Hague conference was wound down, the dominant EU diplomatic 
efforts were conducted in conjunction with the UN in the framework of the ICFY. As 
before, difficult negotiations proceeded in the ICFY and peace plans produced while 
what effectively brought an end to hostilities was a more direct approach undertaken 
by the United States and NATO. However, this negotiating effort was crucial and in 
effect constituted the ground-work for the eventual settlement even if it did take the 
United States to actually secure it. 
Civilian cease-fire monitor and observers: 
ECMM was again present on the ground in this conflict, monitoring the 
situation and providing information to Union and other actors. It also was involved in 
monitoring elections held in Mostar, again in cooperation with the OSCE. 
(c) Provider of humanitarian aid 
The Union was an important source of finance for the international aid effort, 
facilitated somewhat by the creation of the ECHO in 1992. However, this effort was 
somewhat problematic which detracts from its overall effectiveness and visibility. The 
UNHCR and ICRC were the most dominant actors in this regard, with a definite need 
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for more co-operation and co-ordination of all the international efforts, not just the 
EU's. 
(d) Smaller-scalepost-conflict civil administrator and reconstruction co-ordinator 
The administration of Mostar was one of the more interesting aspects of the EU's 
involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though it was stated that it was not intended to 
set a precedent for future EU action, along with the Union it did show the Union's 
relevance as the kind of multi-lateral framework that could take on tasks of this 
nature. 
(e) Imposition of sanctions1provision of incentives 
As outlined in some detail above, the most significant sanctions imposed in 
this period came in the context of a succession of UNSCRs. However, the Union 
played a part in ensuring their implementation both within and beyond the Union 
itself. The provision of incentives came more towards the end of the conflict in terms 
of conditional aid to the reconstruction and stabilisation process, as is mentioned more 
specifically below 
(0 Promoter of regional cooperation and route to long-term peace and stability 
Linked to the notion of providing incentives to co-operation, the elaboration 
and further consolidation of the EU's Regional Approach was significant and 
particular to the European Union. While a range of actors were involved to be 
involved in the reconstruction effort, most notably the UN, the Union focused on its 
own contribution in this regard. It was linked to the same association dynamic that 
was evident in the 1990/1991 approach and drew explicitly on the Union's magnetism 
as a partner. The emphasis on regional co-operation was an addition, and an important 
one in the long-term context of the region. 
Potential anchor Iframeworkfor longer-term stabilisation and reform. 
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This is linked to the promotion of regional cooperation and the provision of 
financial and technical assistance for the reconstruction and reform effort should this 
principle be adhered to. The Regional Approach and its associated programmes all 
imply the development of closer contractual relations between the Union and the 
individual regions in question. This is by no means explicit but the hint of it is most 
definitely present nonetheless. 
These roles correspond to the activity actually engaged in, even if the 
performance of these roles was not without problems or even entirely effective or 
successful. For example, it is not suggested that the promotion of regional co- 
operation was a high-profile or high-priority activity for the European Union but 
rather that it comprised an aspect of its involvement in Bosnia in this period. The 
performance of these roles generates expectations of what the future involvement of 
the EU might entail. As a reflection of capabilities and the ability and will to use 
them, they also condition future actions and the extent to which the roles will or will 
not be built upon. It can already be seen that the roles perforined in this period are 
similar in nature to those performed in 1990 and 1991 despite the development of 
capabilities and reorientation of goals. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this period, the EC/EU slips from its badly handled position as leader of the 
international response. From mid- 1992, it continued to be active but in conjunction 
with other actors - most notably the United Nations. However, over the remaining 
years its position is eclipsed by the more forceful actions of other actors, including the 
United States and the Contact Group and EU efforts concentrate on the provision of 
aid, continued diplomatic efforts to find a political settlement and supporting the 
actions and initiatives of others. This is despite the CFSP and the associated reforms 
coming online in this period. Towards the end of the period in question, activity is 
mainly oriented towards post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation with the 
emphasis on regional cooperation and the conditional provision of aid and greater 
cooperation. The approach overall is still highly reactive and for a stretch little 
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congruence between what was being attempted and the actual capability to effectively 
pursue such a course of action. However, the emphasis on the particular role the EU 
had to play in the aftermath of a peace agreement is highly significant. lt both builds 
on the earlier approach and will be built on further in subsequent years. Hardly a 
massive leap forward, it does reflect a certain level of understanding of how to 
proactively direct resources in terms of what the Union was best suited to achieving in 
this particular context. 
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7. Kosovo 
7.1 Introduction 
The Kosovo issue came to dominate the international agenda in the spring of 
1999. However, it had been an issue of concern since even before Yugoslavia's 
physical disintegration and it remains unresolved to this day. The EU and also the 
general international, approach prior to the escalation of tension in the region was 
extremely limited. As the situation began to deteriorate markedly in 1998, the EU's 
involvement was mainly of the same kind that it was limited to in Bosnia - but at first 
glance was even more limited in relation to Kosovo. In other words, limited 
diplomacy, support for and implementation of sanctions, the provision of aid for 
humanitarian purposes and support for the action of other actors again constituted the 
main forms of activity. 
However, there were some differences to the Bosnian case, but was not evidence 
of a new or novel direction to the EU approach. Rather, it was more a case of 
increased concentration on what past experience had shown the EU had a greater 
propensity for and what had been the most appropriate tasks it could perform, based 
both on the extent of capabilities and a particular function the EU could perform that 
no other actor could in relation to this particular region and issue. This built on the 
experience of the first two phases to the Yugoslav conflict and drew heavily on the 
magnetic draw of the EU for the fonner Communist block. Building on the regional 
approach fon-nulated in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict, this culminated in the 
EU-led Stability Pact for South East Europe, and most importantly the Stabilisation 
and Association Process that introduced the prospect of EU membership explicitly. 
Reconstruction aid was also linked to this process and it introduced a high and 
systematic degree of conditionality to the process. The EU also further honed its post- 
conflict skills in taking control of part of the UN interim administration established to 
run the province in June 1999. Though in itself limited, imperfect and often badly 
managed, this was representative of an approach specific to the EU and a 
development in terms of a greater sense of strategy according to what the EU was 
capable of and what this particular situation required of it. 
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While the overall approach was not radically different, therefore, in terms of the 
types of activities the EU engaged in, what can be seen is a greater attempt to use and 
introduce further new instruments in order to better perform and expand the scope of 
the functions already performed. This was the case throughout the involvement in 
Kosovo under examination here and despite the more radical discussions occurring 
the background from the December 1998 St Malo Declaration. The effect of these and 
also many of the refonns in the Amsterdam Treaty (which came into effect in 1999), 
were mainly only to be felt in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict - though inspired 
by the experience of both Bosnia and Kosovo. What Kosovo shows, is what could be 
done based on the instruments that could be seized upon and mobilised quickly or 
what could be agreed upon at EU-level. This in turn shows just how little the overall 
type of activity had changed but also how much it had in terms of concentration and 
scope. 
7.2 The EU in Kosovo 
(i) 1990-1997 
Prior to 1998 the European Union's involvement in Kosovo was extremely 
limited, so limited that in some respects it is hardly worth mentioning. Except for the 
limited and restricted participation of ethnic Albanian delegates in the international 
conferences established to work towards a political settlement, Kosovo was ignored. 
However,, this neglect was a significant error on the part of the EU, and all the actors 
involved. This initial phase is significant in terms of the EU in that it highlights the 
side-effects of the policies set in motion in relation to Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia 
and the failure to appreciate these consequences. In addition, the position taken, did 
help shape subsequent events and also the EU's later approach when Kosovo forced 
itself on international attention a little more dramatically. 
Both the ethnic and political issues arising from the Kosovo region pre-date 
Yugoslavia itself and its eventual demise. Kosovo's constitutional status within 
Yugoslavia was one of the main sources of tension within the federation in the late 
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1980's and was also a contributing factor in the treatment the Kosovo issue received 
froni the international community and the European Union In particular. Under the 
1974 Yugoslav constitution, Kosovo was classed as an 'Autonomous Province' within 
Serbia. This was as distinct from the six 'Republics' in little but name only 143 . As an 
autonomous province, Kosovo enjoyed virtually all the rights and autonomy of the 
republics but was not granted the full titular republican status primarily to placate 
Serbian concerns for the Serb minorities in the region and the long-held nationalist 
belief that Kosovo in particular was the 'cradle' of Serbian civilisation. The revival of 
Greater Serbian nationalism 144 in Serbia following the death of Tito in 1981 
eventually resulted in the Serbian re-annexation of Kosovo beginning in 1987, with 
direct rule from Belgrade being re-imposed in 1990. This sequence of events was 
central to the run up to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia. It was this re-annexation of 
Kosovo that more than encouraged both Slovenia and Croatia to consider that 
separation from Yugoslavia was their best way forward. The centrality of the Kosovo 
issue to the outbreak of war did not however render it central to the subsequent 
international response. In effect, the Serbian re-annexation of Kosovo was accepted as 
a fait accompli. Henceforth, until the second half of 1999, Kosovo was treated as a 
problematic part of Serbia and primarily human rights and minority issue. 
This certainly was the primary approach adopted at EU-level in this period. As 
noted in the previous chapters, the initial reaction to the impending outbreak of war in 
Yugoslavia was to stress the necessity of preserving the federation. This was then 
modified to allow not necessarily for the preservation of the federation in its previous 
form,, but in some form of overarching structure. From mid-December 1991 this 
approach was then abandoned in favour of the recognition of the independence of 
certain fori-ner Yugoslav republics subject to adjudication and the fulfilment of the 
specified criteria. However, the primary focus was on Slovenia and Croatia and the 
containment of the conflict. There was no particular emphasis on Kosovo other than 
as an aside to the main event in Bosnia. The complexity of the Kosovo issue, the fear 
"' Yugoslavia consisted of eight federal units, the six republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia and the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina within Serbia. 
... This entailed the conviction that all Serbs scattered across Yugoslavia had the right to co-exist in a 
single Serbian or at least Serb controlled state. 
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of the so-called domino effect and (over-estimated) Greater Albanian ambitions 146 
all suggest that the policy of containment through a certain acceptance of the status 
quo in southern Serbia and the treatment of the Kosovo issue as a minority and human 
rights concern was a matter of convenience rather than conviction. 
The majority Kosovar ethnic Albanian population were not invited to 
participate directly in the EC conference at The Hague that was working towards a 
negotiated settlement of hostilities. They were not excluded but in the context of the 
conference's basic principles of respecting the rights of all, including 'minorities' and 
the need to take account of 'all legitimate concerns and aspirations' 147 . representatives 
of minority groups such as Kosovo's Albanians and the Croatian Serbs were invited 
just to put their point of view to the conference's Chair and deputy chairs, so that due 
account could be taken of their interests 148 . Representations were made 
but there is 
scant evidence of any account being taken of their perspective. The provisional ethnic 
Albanian government applied to be considered as an independent state alongside the 
other republics. However, it was Kosovo's status under the 1974 Yugoslav 
constitution that rendered it far too complex a matter to be considered in the hastily 
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initiated and ill-thought-out adjudication process 
The focus of attention shifted from Croatia to Bosnia from early 1992 and 
despite statements acknowledging that all Yugoslavia's problems were related and 
interlinked, the Kosovo issue was still confined to the far margins as a far less 
pressing and ancillary concern. In addition to being neglected by the Hague 
Conference, an ethnic Albanian delegation was invited to attend the August 1992 
"5Whereby conflict in Kosovo would, in addition to Serbia, draw in both Macedonia and Albania, 
which in turn had the potential to draw in several other countries in the region, including amongst 
others, Greece and Turkey and in time could grow to become a major regional conflict, entailing the 
fall engagement of international force in order to deal with it. 
146 Like Greater Serbian nationalism, refers to the conviction that the ethnic Albanians of Albania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo should have the right to a single Albanian state. 
147 20'hNovember 91/379 Answer to oral question in the European Parliament No H-316/92 by Mr 
Crampton on EC involvement in Yugoslavia. 
148 9th October 91/299 Statement in the European Parliament concerning the situation in Yugoslavia. 
149 Alex Bellamy gives a fascinating account of a letter sent to Lord Carrington by the ethnic Albanian 
leader Ibrahim Rugova outlining Kosovo's request for recognition as an independent state. The letter 
was ignored - neither rejected nor accepted. Great stress was simply put on 
the fact that this was a 
process involving the republics in subsequent communiqu6s (Bellamy 2002; 103). This gives weight to 
the argument that ignoring Kosovo was not a simple matter of not realising the consequences of this 
neglect. It was partly this but it was also a matter of nervous convenience. Any attempt to confront the 
issue head-on would have required a great innovative and comprehensive engagement of multiple 
resources that were simply unavailable. 
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London conference but this was limited to their being permitted to be present at the 
conference venue and have access to other delegates but not to participate in the 
conference's proceedings. They were included in the ICFY but in a very limited way. 
Classified again as a 'minority, they participated in the Working Group on Ethnic and 
National Communities and Minorities and also engaged in talks with the co-chairmen 
and their representatives. In June 1992 it was stressed that the exercise of restraint and 
commitment to political dialogue in Kosovo was one of the conditions for the 
restoration of normal relations between the FRY and the EC. Commitment to the 
principle of border change only being permitted by peaceful means was reiterated and 
the 'inhabitants of Kosovo' were reminded that their 'legitimate request for 
autonomy' should be dealt with in the framework of the EC conference 150 . Therefore, 
while being treated as a part of Serbia, the EC did view as valid the view that at 
minimum Kosovo deserved to have its autonomous status restored but only as a result 
of negotiation and diplomacy. This did not (and still does not) extend to an acceptance 
of the idea of Kosovar independence in its own right. The December 1992 Edinburgh 
European Council conclusions take this further and state that 'the autonomy of 
Kosovo within Serbia must be restored' 151 . 
However, little was done to either pursue 
or even promote this view. What is also discernible in this period is a level of 
appreciation for the need to engage in some level of practical conflict prevention 
measures. In the first instance, this entailed vocal support for the deployment of 
monitors to Kosovo under the auspices of the CSCE 152 and condemnation of the 
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expulsion of the monitors by the Serbian authorities in June 19931 . 
However, along with the majority of actors, the focus and explicit priority in 
this period was Bosnia. Other issues were dealt with but Kosovo remained a side- 
event right up until 1998. In addition to the emphasis on the need for productive 
dialogue based on the assumption of Kosovo's right to some form of limited 
autonomy within a wider framework, it was also stressed that the Kosovo issue, 
among others, could and would be dealt with within a wider settlement to the conflict. 
However, no attempt at a comprehensive solution was made. A settlement for the 
Bosnian conflict alone was proving frustratingly elusive. While the EU remained 
150 15 th June 92/226 Statement on the situation in Yugoslavia 
151 11 th/12"' December 92/450 Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council 
15) Deployed in September 1993 to monitor tensions, especially in border regions. 
153 10 July 93/3 07 Statement in the European Parliament 
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6 concerned' at the events and human rights abuses in Kosovo, eventual attempts at 
actually proactively seeking to resolve or even ameliorate the situation was deferred 
until the elusive and hypothetical settlement for Bosnia would appear more vividly on 
the horizon 154 . It was stressed that a wider comprehensive solution addressing the 
wider range of issues would be required before Serbia's international rehabilitation 
and reintegration could commence and that restoration of Kosovo's autonomous 
55 status must be an integral component of such a settlement' . In fact, in June 1995, the 
European Council went as far as to acknowledge that 'overall peace will not be 
156 restored unless the rights of each community are safeguarded everywhere' 
However, when that settlement finally came in December 1995 no mention 
was made of Kosovo and slow rehabilitation of Serbia began. The generally held new 
view of Milosevic and his cohort as the new allies of the West was largely adhered to. 
That said, Kosovo did remain on the agenda. An improvement in the situation there 
and restoration of its autonomous status were one of a list of conditions for the 
recognition of the FRY157 and this was repeated several times throughout 1996. It was 
acknowledged that this was a little more than a simple internal Serbian concern but 
was a problem with international dimensions and implications for wider regional 
efforts to promote lasting stabilItYI58. At the end of April 1997 after stating only that 
substantial progress on Kosovo was expected, autonomous trade preferences were 
extended to the FRY for 1997. This was justified by the need to promote an economic 
revival in the FRY and to reinforce the increasing trend towards democratisation'59. 
Following the election of Slobodan Milosevic as Federal President, a statement was 
released calling on the FRY to choose the path of democratisation, economic refonn 
and reintegration into the international community. The centrality of human rights and 
154 For example in January (94/059) 'beginning with what is the most urgent, if peace in Bosnia is 
achieved then in parallel with that it is clear that the other problems created in the former 
Yugoslavia.. will have to be discussed and efforts made to find solutions that accord with international 
law and systems for the protection of human rights' 
155 16 th November 94/292 Answer to oral question in the European Parliament No H-586/94 by Mr 
Posselt on the situation of the Albanians in Kosovo. 
156 26th/27d' June 95/191 Conclusions of the European Council/ Statement by the European Council on 
the former Yugoslavia 
157 See 9th April 96/103 Statement on recognition by EU member States of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
158 1" October 96/282 Statement on the 1950'h Council meeting - GeneralAffairs 159 3 oth April 97/064 Statement on the occasion of the granting of autonomous trade preferences to the 
FRY 
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respect for the rights of minorities was emphasised and it called on the authorities to 
avoid the use of violence and recourse to force in Kosovo' 60 . 
As with Bosnia, the recognition process set in motion by the EC had an 
impact in Kosovo. During the first half of the 1990s a remarkable process was 
underway in Kosovo. Having not been deemed eligible to apply for recognition and 
determined not to be left to endure a litany of human rights abuses committed by the 
Serbian authorities against the ethnic Albanian population 161 led to the development 
of a parallel 'Republic of Kosovo'. This entailed the holding of parallel elections, 
creation of a constitution and establishment of parallel health care and education 
systems - in effect the creation of a de facto shadow state to cater for the needs of the 
ethnic Albanian population. It existed alongside the official administration and 
constituted a concerted, deliberate and impressive exercise in passive resistance. In 
this case, however, the remarkable and deliberately passive methods used by those 
involved in the parallel Republic of Kosovo ironically ensured that Kosovo could be 
ignored while the violence in Bosnia was addressed. The expectation that the Kosovo 
issue would be eventually addressed in the context of a settlement to the wider 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia underlay the commitment to passive methods of 
resistance in Kosovo. 
The net effect of the neglect of the Kosovo issue in favour of Bosnia was the 
shift in support within Kosovo for the passive methods of resistance promoted by the 
moderate LDK under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, in favour of the more 
6 proactive' direct and in short, violent methods of the paramilitary Kosovo liberation 
Army (UCK). The initial swing commenced after the Dayton agreement and the 
exclusion of Kosovo from the negotiations and the eventual agreement. While Dayton 
was but just one factor among many, it certainly marked a turning point and the 
increased activity of the UCK from 1996 is probably the main reason why Kosovo 
remained on the agenda even before the upsurge in violence in 1998. When instability 
160 31" July 97/105 Statement in the European Parliament on the programme of the Luxembourg 
Presidency 
16 1 These include police brutality, dismissals of ethnic Albanian state employees and 
health care 
workers, closure of ethnic Albanian schools and educational establishments, control of the media and 
closure of Albanian language media and harassment of those involved in the parallel administration, 
human rights organisations or NGOs. See (Vickers 1998) and (Malcoh-n 1998) 
for more on the penod 
of the parallel Republic of Kosovo. 
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became near anarchy in Albania in 1997 162 , concern for the spread of the crisis to 
Kosovo and Macedonia was pronounced. However, this at no stage translated into an 
attempt to actually deal with the issue head-on. Unlike the earlier conflicts, whose 
occurrence and forin could arguably not have been predicted, what happened in 
Kosovo over the next two years occurred precisely because of this neglect. 
(ii) 1998 
After years of simmering tension and low-intensity conflict 1998 was the year 
in which Kosovo became an issue of central focus on an international level. With the 
full glare of international preoccupation now elsewhere, various factors that had been 
building up over the previous years now converged to cause a serious escalation of 
tensions and outright violence. Feeling somewhat more insecure within his sphere of 
influence with economic problems within Serbia and an erosion of his control over 
both Republika Srpska and Montenegro 1 63 , Milosevic's response to the growing 
control of the UCK over the Kosovar countryside was fierce. In the first half of the 
1990's, the more passive methods of the LDK never afforded Milosevic the 
opportunity to engage in larger scale ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The change in the 
form of Kosovar resistance now afforded him a timely opportunity to reunite Serb 
opinion behind and to play the 'Kosovo' card, just as he had done in the late 1980s. 
162 The crisis in Albania was triggered by the simultaneous collapse of several ill-advised pyramid 
investment schemes in January 1997. There followed a great influx of Albanian refugees to 
neighbouring countries, especially to Italy and Greece. Fears for the spread of the instability to Kosovo 
and Macedonia, involving their substantial ethnic Albanian populations were pronounced. Another 
consequence of the disorder tin Albania was the flood of small arnis that came into Kosovo and into the 
hands of the to date poorly armed UCK. Intervention in Albania eventually came in the form of the 
novel Operation ALBA, an ad hoc coalition of willing European states under Italian leadership and 
given the mandate to guarantee the security of international operations in Albania under UNSCR 110 1. 
The military intervention force was comprised of troops from Italy, Greece, France, Austria, Spain, 
Denmark, Turkey and Romania also, with the notable exception of the UK and Germany whose 
opposition prohibited the operation occurring under the auspices of the WEU. Though UN-mandated 
Operation Alba is interesting because it involved an entirely European force. Consequently it can 
be 
viewed as an example of the difficulty of organising a specifically European force legitirmsed 
by 
purely European structures such as the EU or WEU. A European intervention was possible but only 
when organised outside European structures and legitirnised by the United Nations. On the other 
hand, 
the very fact that it was an entirely European force could be viewed as evidence of what was possible 
despite the failure to secure EU or WEU consensus. The EU was itself involved in Albania, as was the 
OSCE. Operation ALBA entailed the creation of more secure conditions for EU and OSCE 
humanitarian and stabilisation efforts. See (Greco 1998) 
163 Throughout 1997 and 1998 Milosevic's position in Serbia was by no means as strong or as secure as 
it had been in previous years. Though they amounted to little, the January 1997 
demonstrations in 
Belgrade organised by the Zajedno opposition did indicate a certain crumbling of unquestioning 
loyalty, despite firm state control of the media. Also, the pro-western Montenegrin President Milo 
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By the end of February 1998, the low-intensity conflict that had persisted for 
almost ten years became a full-scale and violent offensive under the guise of anti- 
terrorist (UCK) manoeuvres in the Drenica region. The new offensive was 
immediately characterised by a scope and level of brutality that greatly exceeded 
anything that the vastly superior Serbian forces could possibly have been forced to 
undertake in order to crush UCK strongholds. Villages with alleged UCK connections 
were singled out for attack, but not exclusively. Serbian forces met with little 
effective resistance. The first attacks began on the 28thFebruary in the Drenica region. 
and the effort was stepped up on the 5 th March. Mass demonstrations occurred 
throughout Kosovo from early March through the Spring of 1998 in protest at the 
massacres in Drenica. The initial demonstrations at the beginning of March were 
suppressed brutally by the Serbian police but subsequent protests were tolerated due, 
in part, to the increased presence of the world's media in Prishtina. The UCK and its 
rapidly expanding support base were no longer prepared to rely on the international 
community being eventually compelled to intervene. Disgust at the Drenica massacre 
led to a direct surge in UCK membership. By early May the UCK had succeeded in 
establishing a supply corridor from northwestern Drenica to the Albanian border. The 
northern Albanian village of Tropja became a base from which new recruits could be 
armed , instructed and deployed into the 
battle zones over the border - Within a matter 
of weeks the UCK had control of approximately one third of the province. The 
Serbian response to the UCK's advances took the form of two major offensives in the 
summer of 1998, focusing on the Drenica and Decan regions, which resulted in high 
casualties, displacement of people and destruction of towns and villages. 
Following on from the experience in Bosnia, no intention was signalled and no 
attempt was made by the EU to lead the international response in any way 
whatsoever. From the outset, it maintained a supportive position on the sidelines - 
present and not entirely insignificant, but by no means dominant . In relation to 
Djukanovic and the (relatively) more independent minded BiIjana Plavsic in Republika Srpska were 
not as subservient as previous leaders. 
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Kosovo, the immediate diplomatic initiative and impetus lay with the Contact Group 
- not the EU or the UN. The response at the EU-level was to condemn the attacks 
and to express support for the demands and efforts of the Contact Group. It was 
reiterated that independence for Kosovo was not on the agenda and that both parties 
(Serb and ethnic Albanian) should desist from engaging in further hostilities and 
engage in constructive negotiations 164 . In line with the Contact Group statements and 
UNSCR 1160, sanctions were confirmed and introduced - including an arrns 
embargo, a refusal to supply any equipment that could be used in a repressive way, a 
moratorium on financial credits and non-admittance to any member state of persons as 
having clear security responsibilities 165 .A further common position added that these 
measures would be reconsidered should the FRY comply and would be added to if 
they didn't - including the freezing of funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian 
governinents 1 66 . This threat was carried out in early May. 
Support for the Contact Group's efforts and action in line with the UNSC's 
statements and resolutions were cast repeatedly in terms of the crucial need to 
maintain unity of purpose among the main players in the international community and 
repeated mention of not wanting to allow the divisions and confusion that 
characterised the reaction to Bosnia to be repeated this time around. However, in 
practice all the EU could and did do to reduce this confusion and division in effect, 
was to itself say and do little. That said, action by the Contact Group had what can be 
described as a strong European flavour, though US dominated. The fact that the UK 
held the EU Presidency at the same time as it played a prominent role within the 
Contact Group is significant. However, though linked and overlapping, in the strict 
sense, the EU itself simply endorsed the efforts of others, while acting much more on 
the sidelines. Felipe Gonzalez was appointed EU Special Representative to the 
FRY 167 in order to provide some focus and effectiveness to the Union's contribution 
to the diplomatic effort, though to little effect, as Milosevic refused to concede that 
the Kosovo issue was anything more than an internal concern and would not co- 
operate. 
164 2 nd March 98/027 Statement on the upsurge of violence in Kosovo and I VhMarch 98/421 Statement 
in the European Parliament on the situation in Kosovo 165 19'hApril 98/097 Common Position 
166 
19thApril 98/045 Common Position 
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This escalation and the re-emergence of the issue of ethnic cleansing in the 
former Yugoslavia was greeted with strenuous condemnation. On the 15 th June, the 
European Council demanded that an end be put to hostilities and called for 
engagement of all parties in a vigorous political process in order to resolve their 
differences. Concern was expressed for the worsening refugee situation and a 
determination to support the efforts of the UNHCR and the ICRC was expressed. 
Willingness to participate in a monitoring mission that would oversee the safe return 
of displaced persons to their homes was also expressed 168 . Additional sanctions were 
also introduced -including a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the FRY 
and the member states 169 . 
Over the rest of the summer diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis centred on 
members of the Contact Group, backed up with the threat of NATO action. On the 
16 th June, NATO engaged in a display of force in the form of the over flights as part 
170 
of Operation Determined Falcon over Albania . 
Opposed to the use of military 
force, especially by NATO, the Russian President Bons Yeltsin intervened and the 
same day got Milosevic to agree to some of the demands set out by the Contact Group 
in March 17 1 and UNSCR 1160. In July and August the US envoy, Christopher Hill, 
continued his negotiations with Milosevic. However, little of lasting effect was 
achieved and the situation in Kosovo deteriorated further despite continued diplomatic 
efforts. Towards the end of September evidence of a fresh Serbian offensive began to 
emerge from Drenica and southern Kosovo. The level of the atrocities committed in 
this instance captured the attention of the western media more so than previous 
massacres. The imminent approach of winter created an additional sense of urgency. 
On the 23 rd September LTNCSR 1199 demanded the cessation of attacks on the 
civilian population and, amongst other things, stated that should these demands not be 
met, further unspecified action would be taken to restore peace and stability to the 
region. Then, on the 24'hSeptember a further offensive was launched by Serbian 
forces in Kosovo 172 .A 
NATO Activation Order was secured on the 12 th October and 
167 He was also simultaneously the OSCE Special Envoy 
168 15'hJune 98/104 Statement by the European Council on Kosovo 
169 Confirmed by 29hJune 98/121 Common Position 
170 Also at Albanian request, NATO troops also were positioned on the Kosovo-Albanian border. 
17 ' 25hMarch Contact Group Statement on Kosovo and also UNSCR 1160 
172 In line with UNSCR 1199, the UCK declared a ceasefire on the 9'hOctober. 
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air-strikes averted in this instance by an agreement secured by US envoy Richard 
Holbrooke with Milosevic. This agreement compelled compliance with the terms of 
UNSCR 1199 and also to allow a deployment of monitors under the auspices of the 
OSCE to be deployed in order to verify compliance (Kosovo Verification Mission or 
KVM) . After an 
initial appearance of compliance by the end of the year fresh 
offensives had been launched. 
Other than expressions of support or condemnation the EU, was not a 
significant presence on the diplomatic front during these during these months. In 
October, Wolfgang Petritisch was appointed as EU Special Envoy to Kosovo to 
reinforce Felipe Gonzalez and did play a significant part in later negotiations, most 
notably at Rambouillet, which will be discussed below. Otherwise, the deployment of 
KVM was strongly supported and the expertise and assistance of ECMM was made 
available in the lead-up to its deployment. Aid to refugees and to the countries 
supporting them was another significant aspect of the EU's activity yet again. 
Involving the ECHO, representatives of the Presidency and Petritisch and conducted 
in conjunction with other agencies, such as the UNHCR and the ICRC, the guiding 
principle in the provision of aid was the preference to deal with refugees in the region 
in order to alleviate the burden on the member states. The aid total for 1998 came to 
EUR 7.5m 173 with much of the emphasis on assisting reftigee return and supporting 
Montenegro in the interests of trying to prevent the spill-over of instability resulting 
from the influx of refugees and the resulting chaotic circumstances. However, the 
extreme instability of the situation on the ground made this a very problematic policy. 
Towards the end of October a so-called 'comprehensive approach to Kosovo' 
was set out. It was comprehensive in that it did address all aspects of the conflict and 
sets out the EU's view on them and any potential contribution it might play in their 
regard in the future. It is notable in that it clearly portrays all action occurring in 
conjunction with a wide range of other actors and although the EU itself as a unit 
might not have played the dominant or most significant part in overall efforts, it sets 
out relatively clearly where the EU fits into an overall effort that itself lacked 
coherence. The comprehensive approach consisted of- 
173 European Commission DG External Relations: 
h! ip: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/see/fry/kosovo/index. htm viewed 26.05.03 
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Emphasis on the effective implementation of sanctions; 
Full support for all UNSCRs and diplomatic efforts; 
9 Full support for the activities of the OSCE and KVM, cooperation 
between KVM and ECMM and for the deployment of a NATO extraction 
force in order to ensure the safety of the monitors; 
* Citing the EU as a major factor in the stability of the Balkans, stressed the 
need to start real negotiations on the future status of Kosovo and pledging 
to remain actively involved in this process through Petritisch; 
Commitment to the provision of aid; 
Consider further confidence-building measures to further building of civil 
-society in Kosovo; 
174 
The comprehensive approach was more a bringing together of the scattered 
components of the existing approach rather than anything entirely new or anything 
resembling a coherent plan. It focuses on what the EU had been doing and what it 
could continue to do - namely, assist the diplomatic process (through negotiations, 
sanctions, civilian monitoring assistance), offer full support to the actions of other 
actors capable of doing what the EU could not and provide aid. The citing of the EU 
as a major factor for stability in the Balkans within the approach is notable and is in 
line with how both the initial response in 1990/91 and the response to the 
reconstruction of Bosnia were cast. This would be further built on in a highly 
significant way in 1999. 
(iii) 1999 
Following the hostilities of Christmas 1998 and the controversy surrounding 
the Racak massacre of early January, the international reaction and approach to 
Kosovo took on a more determined tone. The credibility of NATO and international 
resolve in general was at stake. The previous years had shown Milosevic and the 
Serbian authorities that despite the volume and tone of threats (and the previously 
mentioned NATO Activation Order), it was very likely that the threats would never be 
followed through. The escalation of tensions in the province into 1999 contained a 
174 27 th October 98/272 Statement on a comprehensive approach to Kosovo 
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greater potential for spill-over into neighbouring regions than the previous conflicts in 
Croatia and Bosnia. The humanitarian situation was of such a visible and rapidly 
deteriorating nature that the pressure to act and not be seen to repeat the failures to 
prevent suffering in Bosnia was immense. This attitude was prevalent at EU-Ievel 
also. The rise and increased activity of the UCK also increased the sense of urgency at 
international level. However, the main players in the international reaction to this 
phase of the conflict were again the Contact Group and NATO. The EU's own 
activity was not insignificant but it was more part of the supporting chorus than the 
lead performer for the first half of the year. After the end of Operation Allied Force in 
June, a clearer impression of what the EU could do and was doing begins to emerge. 
Following the Racak massacre in January, a stronger sense of purpose was 
injected into diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. The massacre was condemned 
directly by the EU in the forin of a direct letter from the President of the Council to 
President Milosevic. However, the lead in the international response came from the 
Contact Group, which on the 22 nd January demanded the urgent convening of 
negotiations, backed up with the threat of NATO action should the warring parties not 
comply. These negotiations came in the form of the Rambouillet Conference on 
Kosovo, which commenced on the 6 th of February. Though conducted under the 
auspices of the Contact Group, the Rambouillet conference had a definite European 
emphasis, though it is arguable as to whether it can be considered clearly 'EU'. The 
conference was co-chaired by the British and French foreign ministers - Robin Cook 
and Hubert Vedrine. The Presidency and the Commission were also represented. In 
addition the EU's Special Envoy, Wolfgang Petrisch was one of the three central 
negotiators facilitating the proximity talks between the delegations, along with 
Christopher Hill (US) and Boris Mayorski (Russia). However, this can at best be 
described as a definite EU input into the process but it was by no means definitive. 
The relevance and significance of the EU's role is confirmed by its presence in 
several guises, but it was the relevant member states and the US and Russia who 
provided the greater weight, supported of course by the threat of NATO action. 
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The conference failed to produce a settlement 175 by the time of its conclusion 
on 23 d February. The parties reconvened in Paris in March and this time the Kosovar 
Albanians agreed to sip a settlement. The Serbian delegation, however, did not. In 
fact throughout this second round of negotiations, Serb forces in Kosovo had engaged 
in fresh attacks against civilian targets and adding greatly to the numbers of the 
displaced within Kosovo and also spilling over its borders. Milosevic, it became 
apparent, was prepared to risk challenging the extent of international resolve to 
engage in the threatened military action. However, following this latest escalation and 
the refusal to sign the Rambouillet accords, preparations for military action began. On 
the 20'hMarch KVM began to withdraw from Kosovo and on the 26 th March the 
controversial Operation Allied Force was launched. 
Throughout this period, the reaction at EU level was for the most part in a 
supportive capacity and concentrated on the introduction of further sanctions at EU- 
level and efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation (as in the latter stages of 
Bosnia). In the midst of the floundering Rambouillet negotiations a phased and 
coordinated withdrawal of staff from EU diplomatic missions throughout the FRY 
was commenced. At this stage, the commitment to playing a key role in the 
implementation of a peace settlement was reiterated, specifically in the civil 
implementation structures, economic reconstruction and community building. 
However , in line with the approach and new arrangements put in place in 
the 
aftermath of the Bosnian conflict, any assistance to be granted was always to be 
conditional. In considering what would come to Kosovo from the OBNOVA budget 
for 1999, it was stressed that conditionality should be applied to all projects governing 
the implementation of an eventual peace agreement 176 . This was 
based on the 1997 
Regional Approach , introduced 
in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict which 
emphasised the principle of conditionality in EU support for the reconstruction effort. 
The response to the break-down of the diplomatic process and the launch of 
NATO air-strikes on March 26 th , was one of resolute support. 
Meeting on 24 th /25th 
March the European Council set out very clearly where it stood on the failure of 
efforts to end the conflict. It explicitly blames the Yugoslav leadership for the 
175 See (Weller; 1999) for an account of the conference from someone who was actually present in 
Rambouillet. 
fa 176 21" February 99/026 Statement on the 2161" Council Meeting -General Af 1rs 
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worsening situation and the failure to secure a settlement. The activities of Serb 
security forces in Kosovo was declared to be direct contravention of UNSCR 11999 
the resolution being used justify military intervention in the absence of a direct 
mandate for Operation Allied Force. Put in quite strong terms the European Council's 
statement goes on the stress that 
' We, the countries of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to 
ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence ... are not 
repeated .... Aggression must not be rewarded. An aggressor must know that he 
will have to pay a high price. That is the lesson to be learntfrom the 20'h 
century ... In thefinal analysis, we are responsiblefor securingpeace and co- 
operation in the region. This is the way to guarantee ourfundamental 
European values, i. e. respectfor human rights and the rights of minorities, 
international law, democratic institutions and the inviolability of borders' 177 
While the NATO intervention was not mentioned explicitly, the air strikes by 
implication are the 'high price' that the 'aggressor' (clearly identified as the FRY 
leadership) would have to pay for frustrating peace efforts and continuing to engage 
in attacks on Kosovo's civilian ethnic Albanian population. This is further confirmed 
by the GAC, meeting on the 8th of April. The situation demanded 'the use o severest !f 
measures, including military action'which NATO was conducting 'in order to put an 
end to the humanitarian catastrophe' 178 . 
Several key demands are then made of 
Milosevic, which mirror those made by NATO for a cessation of air strikes 179. Of 
course this consensus does obscure disagreements under the surface but nevertheless, 
the official Union stance was one of support for the NATO intervention, despite the 
absence of the clear legitimation of the UN Security Council. However, it was 
stressed that the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General had a pivotal role 
to play in the context of any political settlement' 80 . 
177 26hMarch 99/046 Conclusions of the Berlin European Council 178 9th April 99/048 Special Council Meeting - General Affairs. 179 ibid. The demands made of Milosevic as listed are: ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and 
the immediate ending of the killing, ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and 
paramilitary forces; agree to the stationing of an international military peacekeeping presence; agree to 
the unconditional return of all deportees and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid 
organisations; provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rarnbouillet 
agreement in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations. These are identical to the demands set out by 
the North Atlantic Council the same month. See htti): //www. nato-int/kosovo/historv. htm viewed 
26-05.2003 
180 8hApril 99/067 Statement on the 2173 d Council Meeting - General Affairs 
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Another key aspect of the Union's response to the situation came in the form 
of assistance to the rapidly rising numbers of displaced ethnic Albanians forced out of 
Kosovo after the air strikes commenced 181 . At this stage, this mainly took the form of 
aid to the refugees in Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. While full support was 
given to the UNHCR policy of trying to assist the needs of the displaced on-site in 
order to better facilitate their more speedy repatriation, allowance was also made for 
the voluntary accommodation of refugees in the member states. The concern for the 
massive numbers of refugees was one of the primary concerns for the EU - not 
simply for humanitarian reasons but also because of the implications for regional 
security and the consequences for those member states absorbing most of the burden 
of accommodating them outside of the region, Germany being the prime example in 
this regard. The funds mobilised in early April amounted to a total of C250m , with 
E 15 Om specifically for the needs of the Kosovar refugees and EI 00m for refugee- 
related support for the host countries and other relief agencies 182 . This amount was in 
addition to bilateral member state aid. Efforts were made to co-ordinate the 
international aid effort' 83 , with the Commission taking on a prominent role in this 
regard. Full gratitude and support was expressed for the three countries bearing the 
massive burden of accommodating the refugees (Albania, FYROM and Montenegro) 
and increased co-operation with and support for these countries in the future was 
184 
mentioned 
181 It is a moot point as to whether the air strikes caused this massive humanitarian crisis and therefore 
effectively worsened the situation they were supposedly intended to alleviate. The absence of an 
intervention by land did mean that little could be done to prevent this kind of mass exodus/expulsion 
other than targeting the machinery of war from the air. Whether or not it was planned regardless of the 
NATO intervention is not the central point. It seems likely that the NATO airstrikes did create the 
conditions that perri-fitted the Serbian leadership to engage a level of ethnic cleansing that may not have 
been possible with any level of an international presence on the ground - even KVM, which was 
supported by the NATO force deployed in Macedonia to facilitate its extraction should it be put 111 
danger. That is not to go so far as to argue that KVM could have prevented ethnic cleansing on this 
scale. It already failed to prevent it on a smaller scale. However, the NATO intervention provided a 
certain level of opportunity and were a part of (not necessarily a sole cause of )a rapid and intense 
escalation of the conflict and as history, not just in the FRY, has shown that the conditions of rapidly 
escalated war can permit the occurrence of events of such an extremity that might not otherwise be 
possible. 182 
8 1h April 99/048 Special Council Meeting - General Affairs 183 For example the German Presidency held a meeting on the 1" of April in order to discuss a 
concerted approach to the international aid effort. It was attended by a large number of actors involved, 
including the EU foreign ministers, the Commission, ECHO, foreign ministers of countries in the 
region, the UNHCR, the OSCE, NATO, the IMF, the EBRD, the Council of Europe and the WEU. 184 8 th April 99/067 Statement on the 2173 
rd Council Meeting - General Affairs 
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Table 5: EU Assistance to Kosovo 1998-2001 (EUR millions) 
As before, sanctions were the means brought to bear in order to attempt to 
compel cooperation. The EU took the lead in imposing an oil embargo on the FRY 
and existing sanctions were topped up and extended with further measures including a 
travel ban on Milosevic, his family and significant figures of authority in Serbia, an 
extension of the scope of the freeze of funds held abroad and a comprehensive flight 
ban between the territory of the EU and that of the FRY 186 . However, there was a 
problem in reconciling the promise to assist Montenegro and efforts to effectively 
implement sanctions. It was difficult, for example, to ensure the full enforcement of 
the oil embargo without cutting off Montenegro. 
As in previous conflicts, the EU did have a presence in the diplomatic process 
being conducted alongside the military campaign, attempting to bring about some 
kind of a political solution to the crisis. On the basis of the key principles agreed to by 
the G8 foreign ministers on the 6 th May, the Finnish President, Martti Athisaari 
represented the EU in negotiations with Belgrade. This was in conjunction with 
Russia, represented by former Prime Minister Vicktor Chernomyrdin, and in 
consultation with the US representative Strobe Talbot. The Athisaari-Chernomyrdin 
process yielded an agreement with the FRY on the 3 rd June that was to pave the way 
for the final cessation of the campaign on the I oth June. Based on the G8 principles, 
the demands included the following: 
o Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 
185 See http: //www. euroi)a. eu. int/comm/extemal re lations/see/ Lry/ko sovo/ index - htm. 
186Listed in 8th April 99/067 Statement on the 2173 
d Council meeting - General Affairs. Basis later in 
23 rd April 99/064 Common Position (Oil embargo), 10'hMay 99/079 Common Position (Travel 
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i nis was tne overan amount provi(le(I tor supporting the region affected by the Kosovo crisis (Albania. FYROM, Montenegro). Out of this amount EURI 11.7 was spent directly in Kosovo 
Source European Commission, DG External Relations 185 
" Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 
" Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presenceý 
endorsed by the LTN; 
" Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the 
UNSC; 
" Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded 
access for humanitarian aid organisations; 
"A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 
framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for 
187. Kosovo , 
On 9th June, a military-technical agreement was reached between NATO and the 
FRY and on 1 oth June the air strikes ceased. 
In the absence of a political settlement to the dispute over what Kosovo's actual 
status should now be, on the 1 oth June under UNSCR 1244, it was decided that the 
UN would assume overall responsibility for the interim administration of the 
province. The interim administration (UNMIK), while under the overall auspices of 
the UN was to involve several other international actors. The security presence put in 
place as Serb forces withdrew was NATO-led but also included Russia. Comprised of 
four pillars, the responsibilities of the civilian administration were split between the 
UN, the EU and the OSCE. The UN maintained responsibility for the two pillars 
dealing with overall civilian administration and police and justice. The OSCE took 
responsibility for democratisation and institution building and finally, the European 
Union took responsibility for Reconstruction and Economic Development. The EU's 
task was to assist in the development of a modem market economy in Kosovo. This 
entailed in the first instance basic reconstruction and infrastructural repair followed by 
programmes guiding both administrative and legal reforms in order to bring Kosovo's 
standards in both regards closer to the EU's own 
188 
. 
Having been involved but not predominant up to this point, the scope of EU 
activity increased as the conflict approached its end and as the reconstruction effort 
restrictions and extension of freeze of funds), 10'hMay 99/080 Council Decision (list of people 
included in travel restrictions), 
187 Source: http: //kosovo. mod. uk/account/principles viewed 5.06.2003 
188 See UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and UNMIK http: //www. unmikonline. org/intro. htm 
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began. The full effect of these measures may not have been immediately felt, but 
already it was indicative of the particular approach of the EU based on what had 
already been done and what could be developed to greatest effect. Subsequent activity 
is also inter-related and indeed unnecessarily overlapping at times and therefore was 
hardly a thorough coherent strategy of any kind. It all arose directly from the Union's 
experience in the former Yugoslavia to date and the development and consolidation of 
its own particular approach. Starting from the run up to the Kosovo conflict's 
conclusion, this new wave of activity dealt specifically with the EU's role in the 
future stabilisation. of the region. 
In the midst of the conflict the European Union proposed the idea of a Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe in order to better work towards and secure the long- 
term stabilisation of the region as a whole 189 . The role of the EU within the pact was 
highly significant. Eventually launched on the 1 oth June, the same day as the NATO 
campaign stopped and UNSCR 1244 was agreed beginning the process of establishing 
the UN interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Stability Pact constituted a 
framework for the coordination of the actions of the broad range of actors involved in 
South East Europe. The stated purpose of the Pact was to coordinate efforts in order to 
bring peace, stability and economic development to the region' 90. The relevant parties 
to the Pact came together under three working tables'91 to work towards bringing their 
strategies into line and coordinate activities, and thus try to minimise unhelpful 
duplication of activities. In addition, there was a strong emphasis on regional 
cooperation and on encouraging and strengthening cooperation between the countries 
of South East Europe. UNSCR 1244 cites the Stability Pact as part of a 
comprehensive international response to the economic development and stabilisation 
of the region as a whole and stresses the importance of further promoting democracy, 
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 
189 See (Friis&Murphy: 1999) for more detail on the background. The Stability Pact in this Incarnation 
was a German initiative, promoted mainly to placate tensions within the German coalition government 
over the support for the NATO intervention in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate. 
'90 Sarajevo Sumrmit Declaration, Sarajevo 30ffi July 1999 accessed at http: Hwww. stab ilitypa ". or 
viewed 26.05.2003 
191 Dealing with issues of concerning democratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction, 
cooperation and development and also security issues. The six core targets for development and reform 
centred on media, local democracy and cross-border cooperation, interregional trade and investment; 
regional infrastructure and energy; organised crime, rnigration and asylum/refugee issues. UNMIK 
http: //www. unmikonline. org/intro. htm 
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Most importantly in terms of the EU was the very particular part it had to play in 
relation to the Stability Pact. One of the overall intentions of the pact was to provide a 
European 'anchorage' to the region and eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures. The role of the EU was to 'draw the region closer to the perspective of full 
integration of these countries into its structures' and 'in the case of countries which 
have not yet concluded association agreements with the EU, this will be done through 
a new kind of contractual relationship" 92. As a result, the future framework for EU 
relations with the region came in the forin of a Commission initiative - the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and a new type of Association Agreement - the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, as distinct from the Accession process 
underway with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe more generally. However, 
out of the inability of the EU to do much more than work alongside the Contact Group 
and NATO once the situation deteriorated, came the first concerted attempt to codify 
and make more coherent what had been underlying so much of the Union's dealings 
with the region to date. 
It also had consequences for the way aid to the region would henceforth be 
structured. Drawing a distinction between more immediate humanitarian aid and aid 
for reconstruction and development, the conditionality introduced in earlier processes 
and programmes (e. g. OBNOVA) was streamlined and linked to the SAA process 
eventually. The ECHO retained responsibility for the allocation and coordination of 
humanitarian and emergency, more short-term aid. However, the aid for 
reconstruction was to be managed by the new European Agency for Reconstruction 
(EAR), also under the direction of the Commission. In advance of actual 
commencement of the EAR work, a Commission task force was despatched to the 
region in July 1999 to coordinate the aid effort locally until the EAR took over in 
February 2000. As distinct from the ECHO, the EAR was responsible for more long- 
term reconstruction and development efforts and would remain active after the 
assistance of the ECHO was no longer required. No conditionality was attached to aid 
for emergency or humanitarian purposes. However, the assistance of the EAR was 
dependent on cooperation and willingness to work in the interests of reform overall. 
This point in time was a transitional one characterised by a proliferation of new 
192 Sarajevo Sumnut Declaration, Sarajevo 30'h July 1999 accessed at http: //www. stab ilftyp ag ". Or 
viewed 26.05.2003 
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initiatives and reforms. The overall programme of reconstruction assistance to the 
region was further and more explicitly linked to the SAA process eventually with the 
establishment of CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction and 
Development). 
These developments were to combine to provide an increasingly coherent context 
and framework for the Union's subsequent involvement in the region. This is the case 
for the ongoing reconstruction and reform efforts throughout the region, but for our 
purposes they were to provide a significant backdrop and more coherent framework 
within which attempts were made to deal with the next phase of conflict in 
Macedonia. Interestingly, the Vienna European Council, meeting at the end of the 
year, declared the intention to fon-nulate a common strategy on the Balkans in line 
with its new competence to do so under the Amsterdam treaty. The common strategy 
on the Balkans has never materialised. The proliferation of new initiatives that were 
launched, or being planned in this period did lack coherence and were not part of what 
could be described as an entirely integrated approach. However, they were part of 
what had been a developing EU strategy towards the region, be it a very heavily 
qualified notion of strategy. 
7.3 Characterising the Third Phase 
(iv) Approaching a particular and more coherent EU approach? 
At a superficial glance, it would appear that this period was the quietist so far 
in ten-ns of EU activity. Although the reaction was somewhat more subdued than the 
initial reaction to the previous conflicts, this is not entirely accurate. In fact, this 
period is significant in that there was a greater sense of realism in terms of what the 
EU could do based on previous experience. The reflection on past experience was not 
just negative, however. It was clear that the EU did have a part to play in certain types 
of activity and in fact that its participation was desirable due to the particular and 
unique role that the Union could play in this situation specifically. What is interesting 
is that the range of activity engaged in is not substantially different to that of Bosnia 
in terms of overall type. What is different, however, is the manner and scope in which 
it was conducted and where the relative emphases lay. 
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in terrns of diplomacy the EU's involvement was significantly more low key 
than in the previous conflicts. The opportunity to engage with the Kosovo issue was 
not taken in the years previous to 1998 and despite statements stressing the necessity 
of addressing the range of outstanding questions within the former Yugoslavia, little 
attempt was made to take on this task as had been the case in relation to Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia. Kosovo was not ignored but resolution of the more visible 
conflict in Bosnia was the focus. When the situation began to rapidly deteriorate into 
1998, the Contact Group and its representatives, with the full support of the Union, 
took the immediate diplomatic lead. Two Special Representatives were appointed to 
the FRY (Gonzalez) and to Kosovo (Petritsch). Petritsch played an active part in 
negotiations in Kosovo in late 1998 and early 1999 and played a significant part in the 
Rambouillet proximity talks. In the ran up to the end of the conflict, Martti Athisaari 
played a key role on behalf of the Union (in conjunction with Chernomyrdin) in 
paving the way towards the 9th June Military-technical agreement between NATO and 
the FRY that ended the air campaign. Otherwise, EU diplomacy was heavily 
declaratory and also supportive of the actions of other actors on the surface at least - 
including support for the NATO air campaign. This is not to say that the dominant 
international effort did not have a strong European flavour, in particular in relation to 
the European members of the Contact Group. However, though conducted in Europe 
and involved EU representatives, Rambouillet was a state-led endeavour, unlike the 
Hague Conference or the ICFY which were led by the EC and the EU and the UN. 
Also in a similar manner to Bosnia, a strong emphasis was once again put on the 
imposition and implementation of sanctions at EU-Ievel, as the only means by which 
to strongly encourage cooperation with diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. 
Likewise, until the spring of 1999 the provision of aid for humanitarian purposes 
constituted the other main form of activity, though this time with more of an eye to 
extending this to reconstruction aid from the outset. In Kosovo, the aid effort 
concentrated both on providing direct relief to refugees and also supporting the 
countries hosting them. 
What is notable overall is a clear appreciation of the range of actors involved 
in dealing with the crisis and the need to coordinate these many different types of 
response rather than jumping to trying to cover all possible functions. Acting in a 
149 
supporting capacity in terms of diplomacy, supporting and also taking a lead in ten-ns 
of the imposition of sanctions and participating in the aid effort with a strong 
emphasis on the need to coordinate and cooperate with other aid agencies was explicit 
from the outset in relation to Kosovo. This approach formed the basis of the 1998 
Comprehensive Approach in which the Union set out its position in relation to actions 
and policies of other actors and the contribution it had and could continue to make. 
It also fon-ned part of the basis of the Stability Pact for SouthEast Europe that 
was launched in direct relation to the Kosovo crisis. The Stability Pact was intended 
to provide a framework for the coordination of the activities of all the actors involved 
in the region with the longer terrn objective of facilitating the development and 
stabilisation of the region. While adopting a leadership role in the Stability Pact, the 
Union's own role within the pact was to provide an 'anchorage' for the countries of 
the region to greater encourage the levels of necessary reform and compliance. In 
light of this the Stabilisation and Association Process was launched, though its impact 
was not immediately felt in Kosovo specifically. This introduced the explicit 
perspective of EU membership to the countries of the region as the end result of a 
process of reconstruction and reform. At the same time moves to restructure the 
Union's aid for reconstruction and development were put in place, making explicit 
distinction between humanitarian aid and reconstruction aid, and confirming the 
notion of conditionality for the continued provision of the latter. Significant also was 
first the Union's willingness to play a leading part in post-conflict Kosovo and second 
its assumption of responsibility for a significant pillar of UNMIK. This was 
substantially more ambitious than the administration of Mostar and entailed 
commitment to assist the development of a functioning market economy in Kosovo. 
Though the range of these measures arose out of the experience of the 
previous conflicts, their immediate impact was not felt in this period. However, what 
can be seen is movement towards a distinct and definitely EU approach to the region 
with an increased sense of what should be made more coherent and how. The 
emphasis remained on the part the EU could play in relation to the region, drawing 
heavily on its own integrative dynamics and their strong draw on the foriner 
Communist east as a whole. Overall, despite being less visible as an actor in the 
throes of the conflict than before this was not necessarily a bad thing. Before, when 
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highly visible it was usually when attempting to achieve what it simply could not 
achieve. This time, and especially in the run up to and in the afterinath of the Kosovo 
conflict, the European Union was putting in place reforms and new initiatives that 
combined with other developments and also more formal competences coming online 
in this period, would mean that the reaction to the next phase in the Yugoslav conflict 
would directly build on but be different in terms of coherence, strategy and also 
content and form than before. 
(V) Balance of the reactive and strategic 
Despite all these developments it would be a mistake to say that what was 
emerging was an entirely 'strategic' EU approach to the crisis and the region. It was 
still relatively ad hoc and the most that was being done was building on and 
consolidating past practice rather than launching a new integrated and coherent EU 
policy towards the region. What was being built upon had been in evidence in the 
previous conflicts, namely the approach to post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilisation of the region drawing on the EU'S own enlargement dynamic. However, 
the effort to bring more of a sense of coordination to the international effort and the 
development of the Union's own particular strength in relation to the region to the 
point of introducing the explicit membership perspective, did indicate a significantly 
higher degree of the deliberate and the proactive. It does represent an attempt to 
manage the situation and to prevent conflict there in the future. As stated above, the 
extent to which this is followed through or realised is more apparent in the years 
following the Kosovo conflict and will be discussed in more specific relation to 
Macedonia. At most all these developments combined to create the greater potential 
of an overall framework that was characterised by cooperation with other relevant 
actors and concentration on the tasks which the EU-1evel was equipped to perforin. 
Goals and capabilities linkage 
This period also was marked by certain development in this regard. Unlike the 
previous two phases of conflict in Yugoslavia, no attempt was made by the EU to take 
responsibility for or manage the response to the conflict. The new arrangements and 
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reforms of existing mechanisms were channelled into the fulfilment of what might in 
one sense be considered more limited goals e. g. provision of aid and reconstruction 
assistance. However, on the other hand, engaging in a process that had as its primary 
objective the encouragement of the stabilisation of one of the historically most 
troubled and turbulent parts of Europe can hardly be dismissed as a limited goal. This 
was within the EU's capabilities to an extent and it began to conscious focus its 
efforts on this. Even if it was a case of just concentrating on what it could set in 
motion more quickly than any other more radical or new course of action, it was still 
highly significant and more realisable precisely because of its clearer linkage to the 
actual capability to bring it about. This is not suggest that other developments 
occurring at the same time would not have an impact, but in terms of what was done 
in relation to Kosovo,, this was the more relevant issue. In the background 
developments of the EU's competence to act in international affairs were progressing 
- both in terms of the Amsterdam reforms to the CFSP and the development of an 
autonomous EU military capacity. These also were to an extent a direct result of the 
Union's experience in Yugoslavia. Combined with the developments outlined here 
and launched in this period, the next phase of activity shows how far the EU's policy 
in the fortner Yugoslavia has come from the initial stage. Real progression had been 
made in this period, in that the increasing sense of a guiding operational framework 
was inforining the actions of the EU-level more broadly, with clearer 
acknowledgement of the fact that other tasks were best left to those actors better 
equipped to deal with them. 
(vii) Functions performed 
Considered in context, the roles or functions perfon-ned by the EC and its agents and 
representatives in this period can be characterised under the following main headings: 
(a) Limited diplomatic involvement: 
The Union's involvement in the diplomatic effort in this period was not 
dominant, but it was specific, especially that of the Special Representative and 
Athisaari and the effort overall contained what can be described as a strong European 
'flavour'. There was little emphasis in the negotiation effort overall this time in 
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securing any kind of long-term settlement, and there was a sense of distance between 
diplomatic efforts and the other activities being engaged in that have been outlined. 
The United States and the Contact Group predominated in this period, though the 
participation of Russia was also significant. 
(b) Civilian monitoring and assistance: 
ECMM/EUMM was by now a fixture and it was active again in this period, 
most notably in assisting with the KVM deployment under the auspices of the OSCE. 
(c) Provider of humanitarian assistance: 
Once again the Union was a significant provider of aid for humanitarian 
purposes. The primary target of this aid was the relief of the refugee situation that 
worsened so dramatically following the commencement of NATO's air campaign in 
late March. As in Bosnia, this was for the most part dominated by the LJNHCR and 
the better coordination of the overall international aid effort became a matter of EU- 
level policy in this period. 
(d) Imposition ofsanctions 1provision of incentives: 
The imposition of sanctions, including those imposed in the context of 
UNSCRs. was again important. The provision of incentives to cooperation came more 
ion process and aid precisely in the context of the evolving Stabilisation and Associat, 
for reconstruction and development. 
(e) Leadership and coordination of long-term international stabilisation effort: 
This is linked to the better appreciation of the need to co-ordinate the 
international effort with the relevant actors dealing with what was in their most 
immediate competence. It can be seen first in the 1998 'Comprehensive Approach' 
but more precisely in the initiation and leadership of the Stability Pact for South East 
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Europe which had as one of its underlying purposes the better coordination of many 
and some overlapping efforts on the part of different types of actors. The 
appropriateness of the EU's performing this function is highlighted by the particular 
role of the Union within the Stability Pact. 
(fi Explicit anchorfor long-term stabilisation and re rm. - Ifo 
As mentioned above, the particular part played by the EU In the Stability Pact 
was to provi ete prospect to the participating countries of future integration into EU 
structures at the end of a Stabilisation and Association process. Having been implicit 
in so much of the Union's dealings with the former Yugoslavia since 1990 the 
perspective of EU membership was now explicit and henceforth was to provide a 
strong context for all dealings, across all activity types and rendered the Union one of 
the primary actors positioned to take responsibility for and deal with future crises, in 
much the same manner as it was expected and failed to be in 1991. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Overall, this period is one of the most significant in terms of the development of the 
EU's policy towards the former Yugoslavia. This is despite the first impression that it 
was one of the quietist. Much in fact was done or set in motion in during this period 
that was to have a very clear effect on subsequent policy. Playing more of a 
supporting role in the international diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict, the 
Union's representatives nevertheless played a significant part in all stages of 
negotiations prior to and during the NATO campaign. However, the more interesting 
aspects of Union activity built directly on the approach that had begun to emerge in 
the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict culminating in a Stabilisation and Association 
process that incorporated the emphases of the Regional Approach and introduced the 
perspective of Union membership as the ultimate incentive for the first time. The 
overall policy was still badly integrated but the difference was that the Union was 
now beginning to a least operate within the context of some kind of more coherent 
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guiding framework , regardless of whether or not it actually worked as it should have 
or was entirely effective or appropriate. 
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8. FYR of Macedonia 
8.1 Introduction 
The latest and perhaps last of the conflicts' 93 to follow in the wake of the 
demise of the Yugoslav federation took place in what had ironically been the only 
former Yugoslav republic to make the transition to independence both peacefully 
and relatively successfully 194 . During the years of the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia 
and Kosovo, Macedonia shakily proceeded in establishing a functioning political 
system and slowly developing economy hindered greatly in this task by general 
regional instability and its own internal ethnic tensions and inequities. 
International concern for Macedonia during the 1990s centred mostly on efforts to 
prevent the spread of conflict to it and containing the tensions within it. However, 
as with Kosovo in the pre-war years, there was little that could be described as 
systematic or intensive about these efforts in general. The main concern was to 
prevent the igniting of Macedonia's own 'Albanian question', leading to a 
potentially greater spiral of regional instability than that even threatened by the 
conflict in Kosovo. The European Union's involvement in such conflict 
prevention was hindered by the Greek blockage of Macedonian independence but 
picked up again after 1995. This time the EU's activity was consistently 
conducted in the context of the potential drawing of Macedonia closer to 
European Union. 
From 1999 new approaches were becoming more consolidated or beginning to 
have more effect and found clearer expression in Macedonia. In addition, 
background developments on the ESDP had a clear effect, with the explicit 
consolidation of previously utilised civilian crisis management activities being 
further refined and eventually enhanced with the military component. This time 
193 This is assuming all the previous conflicts are contained, including Macedonia and that no conflict 
occurs in Montenegro or Serbia proper. 
194 Slovenia has made the most successful transition, but it did experience conflict briefly in 1991 
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the European Union was acting within a much clearer fTamework building on the 
1997 Regional Approach through to the signing of the first Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with Macedonia in 2001. The Macedonian conflict was 
not as complex or protracted as Bosnia, there was better cooperation between the 
EU and other relevant international actors dealing with the conflict. That the EU 
once again assumed a leadership role in relation to Macedonia was this time 
appropriate and was backed up with clear precedent, closer relations with the 
region and an integration of the important role of other actors into the approach. 
Though still limited and fairly ad hoc at times, this period of EU activity shows 
that the EU had progressed somewhat in terms of more successfully pursuing a 
remarkably similar approach to that in 1990 and 1991. 
8.2 The EU and the FYR of Macedonia 
(i) 1990-2000 
For most of the duration of the four previous conflicts in the foriner 
Yugoslavia, Macedonia was relatively peaceful. As mentioned above, it was in many 
ways the success story of Yugoslav disintegration, having left the federation and 
established a relatively prosperous independent state peacefully. However, the 
underlying problems and tensions that were to result in the outbreak of conflict in 
2001 had been simmering under the surface for the entire lifetime of the independent 
Macedonian state. The referendum held on independence and the constitution of the 
new state in 1991 was boycotted by Macedonia's significant ethnic Albanian 
minority. Ethnic Albanian concerns centred on their rights, or rather the perceived 
lack of them under the new constitution. Rather than being accorded their desired 
4 constituent nation' status under the constitution, the ethnic Albanian population were 
classed as a 'nationality'. In addition, Macedonian was established as the only official 
language, which had implications for the provision of Albanian-language education 
and media by the state. There were also issues of representation in all levels of 
government, the police and armed forces and restrictions of the free use of national 
symbols (i. e. Albanian not Macedonian). Deep suspicion between the ethnic Albanian 
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and ethnic Macedonian populations were also exacerbated by economic instability 
and the fact that society was in effect highly segregated and polarised, with the 
majority of ethnic Albanians in the west and north of the country. In addition to ethnic 
Albanian frustrations with their lack of status and rights In the new state, the ethnic 
Macedonian population viewed the very claims to such rights as a fundamental threat 
to the integrity and survival of Macedonia as it presently exists. 
This ethnic tension was the core of Macedonia's problems in the 1990s but it 
was contained for the most part, with some assistance from the international 
community. However, the tension was of such a level that there was always the 
potential that what might otherwise have been a minor or local dispute could escalate 
very quickly. In a similar manner to Kosovo, some attention was paid to these 
underlying issues, with the primary concern being to prevent the spread of conflict 
through the former Yugoslavia's more southern region, and by consequence even 
ftirther. These efforts were relatively successful in that outright conflict was prevented 
for ten years. However, it was merely contained and while its own internal problems 
persisted and never satisfactorily resolved, Macedonia also had to endure the 
consequences and side-effects of the other conflicts, the international response to 
them and also other geo-political sensitivities, most notably concerning Greece. 
As in Bosnia and Kosovo, the recognition process launched by the EC back in 
1991 was to have a very crucial impact on Macedonia, crucial this time because 
despite having been judged by the Badinter Commission to have satisfied all the 
criteria for recognition as an independent state (unlike either Bosnia or Croatia), the 
Macedonian application for recognition of the independence declared in September 
1991 was ultimately not granted due to the resistance of Greece. The reasons for 
Greek opposition to Macedonian independence centre on certain fundamental 
concerns such as the legitimacy of a separate Macedonian state or distinct national or 
ethnic identity, but more specifically centre on specific regional geopolitical concerns 
and the implications that Macedonian independence would have for Greece. The 
dispute came to centre on the name that new state would be recognised under, 
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amongst other things' 
9. The failure to recognise Macedonia had a strong effect and 
ultimately sent a strong message about the flawed nature of the recognition process 
itself In effect, the only former Yugoslav republic to leave the federation and 
establish a viable and independent state peacefully was the only one not granted 
recognition. There were definite problems associated with the foundation of the state, 
especially regarding the position and rights of the republic's significant ethnic 
Albanian minority, but that was not the reason why recognition was withheld. The 
process did not work even according to its own criteria, let alone what was most 
appropriate for the region or specific context. The recognition process was a hastily 
devised and ill-thought out mechanism introduced in response to the war in Croatia, 
after. It took on a life of its own and reverberated, as has been shown herel through 
Bosnia, Kosovo and also Macedonia. 
After Greece blocked recognition, the EC/EU had then to attempt to negotiate 
a solution acceptable to all over the following few years. In accordance with Greek 
concerns, the recognition of Macedonia was made conditional on the requirement that 
it would commit itself prior to recognition to adopt constitutional and political 
guarantees ensuring that it had no territorial claims against a neighbouring 
Community state and that it would not conduct hostile propaganda activities versus a 
neighbouring Community state, including the use of a denomination which implies 
territorial claims 196 . However, it was declared in principle that the EC was willing to 
recognise it 'as a sovereign and independent state, within its existing borders, and 
under a name that can be accepted by all parties concerned 197 . The Portuguese 
Presidency led efforts to arrive at some form of agreement that could form the basis 
for how to proceed. However, while recognition was held back Macedonia was 
195 Tension over this issue predates 199 1. In short, there is certain resistance in Greece to the 
acknowledgement of a separate 'Macedonian' ethnicity and in addition Greece also claims exclusive 
right to the name 'Macedonia' for the region by the same name within its own territory and refuses to 
acknowledge the existence of an entity using that name and suggests its usage implies claims on Greek 
territory. This was also an issue in bilateral relations during the lifetime of the former Yugoslavia but 
escalated with the prospect of international recognised statehood for the former republic under the 
name 'Macedonia'. The title 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' or FYROM used as interim 
arrangement is the name that has stuck. 
196 See initial statement inviting the former Yugoslav republics to apply for recognition. Macedonia 
was not mentioned explicitly and it assumed that these criteria apply to all states but were in fact 
directly targeted at Macedonia. 16thDecember 91/465 Statement by an extraordinary EPC Ministerial 
Meeting concerning Yugoslavia 
197 4 th May 92/164 Statement on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by an informal meeting 
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Guimaraes I st/2 nd May 
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excluded from some much needed sources of aid for reform and economic 
development and the development of closer links with the EC/EU were also held up. 
The lack of sufficient aid and assistance at a crucial moment was exacerbated by the 
knock-on effects of the sanctions imposed throughout the other conflicts In the former 
Yugoslavia. These effectively cut Macedonia off from its important trading partners 
in Serbia and Bosnia. The imposition of the Greek trade embargo from 1993-1995, 
which resulted from the ongoing dispute between the two countries that was re-ignited 
by the independence and recognition dispute, on top of this, also deprived Macedonia 
of its main trade route to the south. This in combination with other factors outlined 
below would contribute to the steady destabilisation of Macedonia. 
In other ways Macedonia did benefit from measures introduced by the 
international community out of a concern not to allow the spill-over of conflict into 
Macedonia and risk igniting the regional geo-political tensions of which the Greek 
opposition to recognition was part. However, here the EC/EU did not play the 
significant part but rather expressed its support for the deployment of an OSCE 'Spill- 
over Mission' to monitor the situation within Macedonia and the deployment of a UN 
Preventative Deployment (UNPREDEP) to patrol the border and prevent the 
escalation of any minor incidents. Negotiations within the context of the Hague 
Conference and the ICFY did also have a positive effect. Deliberations within the 
Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities, in combination 
with the OSCE mission and the presence of UNPREDEP did make a valuable 
contribution to ensuring that tensions were for the most part kept in check (Ackerman 
2000; 102). 
When finally an interim agreement was secured between Greece and 
Macedonia in late 1995, closer and more beneficial relations between the EU and 
Macedonia could proceed and the Union could become more directly involved in 
accordance with the means available to it. Macedonia was finally declared eligible to 
receive more aid under the PHARE programme in its own right and the Madrid 
European Council declared that the conditions for establishing contractual cooperation 
now existed and the process of negotiating a Cooperation and Trade Agreement was 
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commenced 198 . Relations were subsequently conducted in the context of the Union's 
Regional Approach, with the provision of aid based on the principle of conditionality 
and the encouragement of good neighbourly relations between the countries of the 
region (including OBNOVA). The Co-operation Agreement, which saw Macedonia 
receive asymmetric trade preferences with the EU and an Agreement on transport 
were agreed in January 1998. 
It was at this point however that the instability that had existed, but had been 
kept more or less in check, began to worsen with isolated incidents increasing in 
scope and intensity from 1997. The collapse of the Berisha regime in Albania in 1997 
and the ensuing chaos there had consequences for Macedonia as well as Kosovo. In 
addition to stirring the already restive ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia and 
supplying the more radical elements with cheap arms, it also caused concern and a 
hardening of feeling amongst the ethnic Macedonian community who saw the general 
widening restiveness of the ethnic Albanian populations across the region as a greater 
and greater threat to the Macedonian state. Rather than sustained conflict, what 
prevailed was a tense atmosphere and ongoing smaller scale incidents punctured by 
more dramatic events such as the July 1997 clashes in Gostivar that led to the 
imprisonment of the city's ethnic Albanian mayor for flying the Albanian flag over 
the city hall. These incidents and the ethnic tension more generally, combined with 
economic uncertainty, the increased prevalence of organised crime and the instability 
in both Albania and Kosovo, posed an extremely grave threat to the very precarious 
equilibrium in Macedonia that had to date held it back from descending into outright 
conflict. 
The Kosovo crisis of 1999 was to have a further and deep impact in this 
regard, in that it added greatly to all these pre-existing points of tension. The 
Macedonian population was split along ethnic lines in terms of the extent of its 
willingness to bear the burden of hosting the refugees who fled Kosovo for 
Macedonian during the conflict's duration in line with the international community's 
policy of aiming to keep as many refugees as possible in the region in order to 
198 15 th/ 16'hDecember 95/401 Conclusions of the Madrid European Council 
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facilitate easier repatriation in the conflict's aftermath "'. This extended to increasing 
tension within the government itself, between the main ethnic Macedonian parties and 
their ethnic Albanian partner in the coalition government'00. The ethnic Albanian 
minority and their leaders were strongly in favour of offering maximum support to the 
refugees, with many refugees being housed with ethnic Albanian host families as well 
as in camps. This and the presence of over 200 '00020 
1 extra ethnic Albanians added to 
ethnic Macedonian fears and suspicions of the consequences for the Macedonian state 
of Albanian ambitions in general. There were also tensions between the refugees and 
their Macedonian guards and concerns for the spread of UCK activities over the 
border and the usage of Macedonia, and even refugee camps, as bases for activities 202 
Added to this was tension between the range of international organisations working 
on the ground in Macedonia in response to the crisis and the Macedonian authorities 
who felt the international organisations and agencies did not adequately appreciate the 
nature of the difficult and potentially extremely destabilising burden that was being 
imposed on the state. There was also a sense that measures applied were designed 
mainly for the immediate relief of the refugee situation with less of a regard for the 
longer-term consequences for Macedonia in terms of its retarded economic 
development and greatly worsened inter-ethnic tensions (International Crisis Group 
1999; 11) 
The European Union, acting in the context of the contractual relations already 
established between the Union and Macedonia, adopted an approach based on 
continued expressions of support and gratitude for the part played by Macedonia in 
hosting the huge numbers of refugees from Kosovo. There were repeated expressions 
of support along these lines, accompanied also by a reiteration of the importance of 
not doing anything that might further j eopardise the extremely precarious regional 
199 This was the guiding LJNHCR policy, and was supported and adopted by the EU also. 
'00 Comprised of the more moderate parties on both sides of the ethnic divide and led by (ethnic 
Macedonia) Kiro Gligorov. It included the two main ethnic Macedonian parties (SDSM or Social 
Democratic Alliance of Macedonia; SPM or Socialist Party of Macedonia; and the PDP or Albanian 
Party of Democratic Prosperity) (Clement 1997). Such cooperation worked because it unofficially it 
meant that the ethnic Albanian party took responsibility for the ethnic Albanian majority regions and 
vice versa, thus ensuring entrenched polarisation and segregation. 
201 LJNHCR estimated that as of early May 1999 there were are 241,299 Kosovar refugees *in 
Macedonia . Over 
half of them (114,273) were living with host Macedonian families, while the other 
91,400 are living in camps and transit centres. Source UN at httv: //www. rellefweb. int/w/rwb. nsf 
viewed 20.12.2003 
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security balance 203 . 
This support came more directly in the fonn of aid to assist with 
the refugee issue and importantly, repeated promises that contractual relations and 
cooperation between the EU and Macedonia would be enhanced, more or less out of 
gratitude for the cooperation of Macedonia with the international relief effort. As 
mentioned above, the relationship between the aid agencies, including the EU's own, 
and the Macedonian authorities was not always an easy one. The promise of enhanced 
cooperation provided a broader and more attractive framework to encourage 
cooperation, moderation in its response to increasing tensions and a sense of direction 
204 overall . The extra aid allocated during this period was specifically in response to 
the refugee problem and hence had more to do with Kosovo than Macedonia 
specifically. The couching of expressions of gratitude and requests for continued co- 
operation and support couched in terms of Macedonia's eventual reward with closer 
ties with the EU was one of the few measures adopted to this point that was 
specifically addressed at Macedonia, even if its primary concern was the prevention of 
the spread of conflict or more serious instability. 
In response to the Kosovo crisis and in order to approach it as wider regional 
issue with a view to encouraging the stabilisation of the regional as a whole, an EU- 
205 led Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched . In this context the EU 
launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) which offered the 
participating countries, including Macedonia, the perspective of full integration into 
the EU with the negotiation of a new type of contractual relationship in the form of a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement as the first step in this process. The possible 
202 See Institute for War and Peace Reporting 'Refugee Heat Rising' 19 th May 1999 
http: //www. iwpr. net/archive/bcr/bcr 19990519 2 eng. txt 203 rd For example WhApril 99/067 Statement on the 2173 Council Meeting - General Affairs 'fully 
recognised the dramatically increased burdens which had been placed on these neighbouring 
states..... The Council commended the policy of moderation which the governments have been pursuing 
and expressed its profound appreciation of the sacrifices which they have made..... the policies being 
pursued ... continued to constitute an essential contribution to the security and stability of the region as a 
whole'. Also 3 rd /4 th June 99/099 Conclusions of the Cologne European Council 'welcomes the 
extraordinary efforts of the countries in the region, particularly Albania and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, to grant temporary protection and shelter to the displaced persons in spite of 
the severe economic and social burden'. 
204 For example 3 1" May 99/093 Statement on the 2186thCouncil Meeting- General Affairs 'reiterated 
its support for the efforts of the FYROM to alleviate the plight of refugees and encouraged it to 
continue along this road, which included fall cooperation with and access by international organisations 
and NGO's..... exarrune urgently the upgrading of the contractual relations between the European 
Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia towards a new kind of agreement' 
205 See http:., /ý'Nvww. stab iI itypact. org 
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upgrading of relations with Macedonia was often mentioned alongside the expressions 
of gratitude for the part played by Macedonia in the refugee crisis. As the SAP was 
launched in 2000, Macedonia was at the forefront of the potential candidates for a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Negotiations began In March 2000, 
culminating eventually with the signing of the first SAA with Macedonia the 
following year. In June the Feira European Council made explicit that the key 
objective of the process overall was the fullest possible integration of the countries of 
the Western Balkans into the political and economic mainstream of Europe 206 . The 
process was formally launched at the Zagreb Summit in November 2000, attended by 
all the participants and Union representativeS207. This built further on the Regional 
Approach that emerged in response to the Bosnian conflict 208 . The principle of 
regional cooperation was the basic premise of the SAP, and the process of developing 
closer ties and securing assistance from the EU would go hand in hand with efforts to 
develop stronger regional cooperation 209 . The emphasis was on fostering greater 
regional cooperation and thereby bettering the prospects for longer-terrn regional 
stability, much along the same lines as the EU model itself The context and incentive 
for the furthering of regional ties was the prospect of inclusion and integration into 
European, and specifically, EU structures. 
The EU's programmes for providing assistance for the reconstruction and 
reform efforts were also in the process of being streamlined for the SAP countries. 
This included the creation of the CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Democratisation and Stabilisation) programme. To date, aid for these purposes in 
Macedonia had primarily come from the PHARE and OBNOVA programmes 210 . 
CARDS was designed to make the provision of aid in this context for reconstruction, 
development and reform (effectively combining what was done under previous 
separate programmes in the region) more efficient and streamlined with specific 
206 19th/20'h 00/37 June Feira European Council Conclusions 
207 Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYR of Macedonia, Albania and the (still then) Federal Republic 
of Macedonia - plus Slovenia. The conference was co-hosted 
by the French Presidency and Croatia and 
was also attended by the President of the Commission Romano Prodi, the External Affairs 
Commissioner Chris Patten, and the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana. 
208 The April 1997 Regional Approach established political and economic conditionality for the 
development of bilateral relations. Conditions include respect for democratic principles, human rights, 
the rule of law, protection of minorities, return of refugees, implementation of the Dayton Accords, 
market economy reforms and regional cooperation. 
209 Zagreb Summit 24thNovember 2000 Final Declaration 
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conditions and objectives and a strong emphasis on the principle of regional 
cooperation, and linked to the SAP(General Report 2000; Point 895) 
However, while all this proceeded Macedonia was slipping into conflict 
highlighting once again that these kinds of measures on their own could not prevent 
conflict of the type that flares up quickly due to long festering resentments and 
tensions, be they economic, political or ethnic and which involves smaller more 
radical militias to whom the prospect of closer association with a little-understood 
European Union meant nothing. On the other hand, as will be seen, all these 
developments provided a definite context for the Union's response to the violence that 
proceeded into 2001. It was a clearer context, and one customised to the perceived 
needs of the region with the heavy emphasis on regional cooperation. 
(ii) 2001 
By early 2001 the tensions that had existed within Macedonia for many years 
began to seriously intensify. This was due to a culmination of the factors outlined 
above and especially due to still unresolved ethnic tensions that were greatly 
exacerbated first by the Kosovo conflict itself, and second by the fact that the question 
of its long-term status and the Albanian question in general remained largely un- 
addressed 21 1. By January 2001 the emergence of an ethnic Albanian paramilitary 
organisation in Macedonia - the National Liberation Association - (NLA) was 
beginning to give a new edge to tensions and suspicions of close association between 
this group and the UCK in Kosovo made the Macedonian authorities and ethnic 
Macedonian population highly uncomfortable. At the same time the still unresolved 
issues regarding the status and rights of the ethnic Albanian minority, led to an 
increase in frustration with the official ethnic Albanian parties in the ethnic Albanian 
community with a consequent increase in support for those favouring a more direct 
210 Excluding humanitarian aid and aid directly for the assistance with the Kosovar refugee crisis. 
211 As long as Kosovo's long-term status remains undetermined it will be a cause for concern for 
Macedonia and a permanent reminder of the fears over Greater Albanian aspirations. An independent 
Kosovo would almost be of more concern because it has the potential to act as a magnet to the ethnic 
Albanian population in Macedonia. The extent of support for any 'Greater Albanian' project, however, 
is highly over-estimated with more divisions between the various groups than might be expected, 
especially between the Albanians in Albania proper and the 'Yugoslav' Albanians. 
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and violent approach 212 - Kosovo's unresolved status, the failure of KFOR to manage 
the border with Macedonia in order to effectively prevent cooperation and collusion 
between militant elements in Kosovo and Macedonia, long-standing tensions and 
instability, and the entry of the NLA all combined to make 2001 the most violent year 
in the new state's lifetime. 
Isolated incidents involving the NLA in January spread into (International Crisis 
Group April 2001; 11). In addition, the Macedonian government also refused to 
negotiate with the NLA activists or to consider, within the context of a response to the 
unrest, the outstanding issues regarding the status and rights of the ethnic Albanian 
population. This policy had the effect of further exacerbating this situation and 
weakened the position of the 'official' ethnic Albanian political parties further and 
allowed the range of legitimate ethnic Albanians concerns to be appropriated by more 
radical elements with more radical consequences. 
The general tone of the international response was one of support for the 
Macedonian government while urging restraint on all sides at the same time. The EU 
condemned various incidents along these lines, expressing concerns for the regional 
implications for the further destabilisation of Macedonia and urging the authorities not 
213 
to take excessive action in response to the activities of the NLA . 
Concern for better 
control of the border region translated into support for increased efforts on the part of 
KFOR to control the border and to better cooperate with the Macedonian authorities 
in order to achieve this, and underlined the contribution of EUMM and the OSCE to 
this effort214. Plans for the signing of the first SAA between the European Union and 
Macedonia in April proceeded regardless of the increasing problems and instability in 
the country. In fact , it provided a 
finn context within which to condemn the activities 
of the more radical ethnic Albanian elements, urge restraint on the part of the 
Macedonian government and reiterate support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and inviolable borders of the state. Support for the Macedonian government was clear 
212 This is similar to Kosovo and the growth of the UCK from 1996 but was not to the same extent. 
213 For example - 6thMarch 0 1/049 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the violent 
attacks near the village of Tanusevici 
214 9hMarch 011055 Declaration by the Presidency on the security situation at the FYROM's border 
with the FRY 
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and unambiguous 
215 
. The concerns of the ethnic Albanian minority were addressed in 
calls for refon-n precisely within the context of the overall reform effort being fostered 
by the Union. In this sense, EU policy directly echoes the same policy adopted in 
1990 and early 1991 with insistence on the preservation of the status quo, within a 
context of support and cooperation with the Union. 
More significantly, diplomatic efforts to deal with the worsening crisis in the field 
were led by the High Representative for the CFSp216 - Javier Solana, closely 
supported and often accompanied by the External Affairs Commissioner Chris 
Patten 217 . In addition, he also cooperated quite closely with the NATO Secretary 
General George Robertson. The shuttle diplomacy of Solana did provide a level of 
consistency and visibility that had not been achieved before. However, this can be 
over-stated because despite the serious nature of the Macedonian crisis it was not at 
this stage as serious or as complex as, for example, Bosnia became. This is due to a 
large part to the conflict prevention measures already outlined. Also, the very fact that 
there was a confirmed link between Macedonia and the EU made it entirely 
appropriate that Solana should lead the effort, in conjunction with the Commission 
which was most intensely involved in the development and consolidation of this link. 
Also, a sense of momentum and intense engagement was created by the shuttle 
diplomacy and, in cooperation with NATO and later the United States, placed the EU 
at the forefront of the international response in its own right once again. The result of 
diplomatic efforts was the formation of the 'National Unity Government' of 
Macedonia, comprised of the range of political parties and led by two each of the 
main ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian parties. Persistent fighting and 
disagreements between the parties to make up the new government meant, however, 
that it was not actually fonned until the 13'h of May. Nevertheless the SAA was 
signed on the 9th of April, and on the occasion of its signing the General Affairs 
Council urged the new government to use it as an opportunity to develop and 
215 See 24 th March Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council - Declaration on the FYROM, 
which was addressed to President Trjkovski and his government beginning 'we aff= our solidarity 
with you in the current crisis and urge you to continue to respond with restraint' 216 Solana was appointed in October 1999 
217 Also bolstered by other high level visits such as that of the Ministerial troika in March - see 19 Ih 
March 0 1/ 198 Statement on the 23 38 th Council Meeting - General Affairs - and again in May - see 
15 th May 01/200 Statement on the 2346hCouncil meeting - General Affairs. 
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consolidate a true multi-ethnic society in Macedonia with the full support (practical 
and financial) of the EU218. 
Alongside the diplomatic efforts a new Community mechanism for the provision 
of aid was set in motion. First used in May 2001, a sum of EUR 12.8 million 219 was 
allocated to Macedonia in this period through the Commission's new Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM). The RRM was introduced at the request of the Helsinki European 
Council of December 1999220 , as part of the non-military crisis management 
component of the developing ESDP. This was to add yet another mechanism to the 
Union's aid repertoire, but was to serve a specific purpose and was designed to plug 
into the evolving network of Community aid agencies, programmes and mechanisms. 
It was also a reflection of the direction in which the overall EU policy had been 
moving. The RRM is distinct from the ECHO, which specialises in the provision of 
aid for immediate humanitarian purposes. The RRM, on the other hand has a political 
base and plugs into the thinking behind the conditionality introduced to the provision 
of aid in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict and the SAP. It is an emerRency 
response instrument designed to ensure the rapid mobilisation of funds for short-term 
stabilisation efforts to fill the gap between the expressed intention to act and the time 
taken to agree and mobilise the funds and programme for more intensive long-tenn 
reconstruction and stabilisation efforts. In effect, it allows a more rapid response than 
was previously possible in terms of the short-term deployment of existing resources 
and can lay the groundwork for the longer-term programmes. This was evident to an 
extent in Macedonia in 2001 when the RRM was used to address the need for a quick 
response in order to assist in the stabilisation of conditions, first, to facilitate the 
negotiation of a settlement, and then in its implementation. Then, from January 2002, 
programmes initiated through the RRM were taken over and henceforth managed by 
the EAR with additional funds coming from the CARDS programme 
221 (European 
Commission 2003). 
218 91h April 01/199 Statement on the 2342 
nd Council Meeting - General Affairs 
2 '9 http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relation/see/fUgom/index. htm. viewed 27.10.03 
22' helsinki conclusions 
22 ' Ref the website 
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Table 6: EC Assistance to the FYR of Macedonia 1992-2002 (FITR millinn. p. ) 
1992 1 1993 1 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Phare + Obnova 
60.00 25.00 25.00 33.00 25.00 47.00 25.00 
CARDS 
1 56.20 41.50 
ECHO 
36.52 9.15 0.40 43.00 3.35 5.40 
Media 
0.05 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.20 
Democracy and Human Rights 
- TI I 1 0.50 1 0.20 1 1.02 1 
Balance of Pa ments Support 
I II 1 40.00 30.00 22-- 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
12.80 
Total 
_96.52 
0.05 34.43 25.00 73.71 25.88 90.00 58.55 75.42 63.50 
Source: European Commision, DG External RelationS222 
After a brief abatement in the conflict in April the pace picked up once again and 
by 9'hJune the NLA had advanced as far as the suburbs of Skopje and the numbers of 
displaced persons (both ethnic Albanian and Macedonia) had increased leading to a 
considerable worsening of the humanitarian situation 223 .A cease-fire 
in order to allow 
the delivery of aid to those in need was agreed on the I Ith June, but nothing even 
close to a settlement was achieved despite a tentative peace plan. The shuttle 
diplomacy of Solana continued, sometimes together with Patten and other times with 
Robertson, the NATO Secretary Genera, 224. On 22 nd of June a major offensive was 
launched to recapture Aracinovo, just outside Skopje that proved considerably more 
difficult than expected. At this point NATO was engaged to help resolve the situation 
to the extent that negotiations on a possible settlement could proceed through the 
evacuation of the NLA from the conflict zone and thereby facilitating a pause in this 
222 Also accessible at http: //www. europa. eu. int/comni/extemal relation/see/fyioni/index. htm viewed 
20.12.2003 
223 According to the Macedonian Red Cross from February to August, it had registered 70,728 
internally displaced persons - 66,871 in host families and 3,857 in collective centres Source LJNHCR 
Briefing Notes: FYR of Macedonia, Angolan refugees/DRC, Pakistan, Colombia, Ingushetia 28 th 
August 2001 http: //wwww. reliefweb. int 
224 The meetings of the High Representative since the beginning of 2001 can be tracked on his website 
at http: //ue. eu. int/solana/archAgenda. asp 
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particular locus of fighting. However, the removal of the NLA did not resolve the 
situation. Tensions throughout Macedonia by this stage were at their peak. On 25 th 
June, ethnic Macedonians infuriated and frustrated with the descent into conflict, the 
inability of the government to resolve it and the necessity of NATO intervention, 
stonned the Parliament building in Skopje and the country was on the brink of a full- 
scale and serious civil war. 
The international response was quick and centred on close cooperation between 
the EU, the US and NATO. The previously established relationships, the overall 
operational context and the relatively comfortable and effective cooperation between 
these actors was in significant contrast to what often went before. In order to add 
further to the strong EU presence in the form of Solana's regular visits, Francois 
Leotard was appointed EU Special Representative to Macedonia under the High 
Representative, in order to establish a more permanent presence during such a crucial 
time 225. Within days of this the US appointed its own special envoy - James Padrew, 
and NATO agreed to dispatch a mission for a limited period of 30 days to disarm the 
NLA in the event of a cease-fire being secured. In early July Leotard and Padrew 
engaged in negotiations with the warring parties and this process yielded a ceasefire 
by 5 th July. With the assistance of Robert Badinter 226 , negotiations within the context 
of the Leotard-Padrew process were conducted on the basis of a framework settlement 
that was presented to the Macedonian government on 7 th July. This settlement 
preserved the integrity of the Macedonian state and the current system of government 
overall, but provided significantly enhanced status and rights for the ethnic Albanian 
minority and increased local government. Supplementary to this process and on the 
recommendation of Solana, a common position was adopted prohibiting the issue of 
visas to extremists on either side of the political divide 
227 
. 
On 26 th of July a new 
cease-fire was agreed 228 and both Solana and Robertson travelled to Skopje 
229 to 
provide the necessary momentum for the commencement of substantive negotiations 
225 25hJune 01/202 Statement on the 2362 nd Council Meeting - General Affairs and 29h June 0 l/ 185 
Joint Action. Leotard was replaced by Alain le Roy in October 2001. 
226 Robert Badinter was the head of the Arbitration commission established in 1991 to judge the 
applications for recognition. 
227 16'h July 0 1/ 18 8 Common Position concerning a visa ban against extremists in FYROM 
228 Involved EUMM monitoring see l6th July 01/203 Statement on the 2367hCouncil meeting - 
General Affairs 
229 They were also accompanied by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE - 
See 26 th June 01/133 
Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the situation in FYROM 
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on the framework settlement. After much deliberation, especially as regards the status 
of Albanian as an official language, agreement had been reached by the 8 th of August. 
However, quite farcically, signature was delayed for a few days while the government 
launched a new offensive against the NLA. 
The Ohrid agreement was finally signed on 13 th of August by the four main parties 
in the National Unity government, with Solana in attendance representing the EU and 
Robertson representing NATO. Upon the signing of the agreement, it was reiterated 
by the Presidency that the EU was determined 'to stand by the Former Yugoslav 
Republic ofMacedonia as it draws closer to Europe, along the route mapped out at 
230 the Zagreb summit by the Stabilisation and Association Process' . 
Subsequently 
great emphasis was placed on the agreement and its full and effective implementation 
in order to secure Macedonia's future increasingly close association to the Union. The 
agreement itself entailed relatively significant constitutional amendments and political 
reforms that would simultaneously improve the position and status of the ethnic 
Albanian minority while maintaining the unity of the Macedonian state (International 
Crisis Group 2001; 4). It provided for increased rights and representation and more 
local government, but did not accord the ethnic Albanian population their much- 
craved 'constituent nation' status. Iniportantly also, Albanian was granted official 
language status and third level education through Albanian would also henceforth be 
231 state-funded 
The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement was assisted and supervised through 
a combined effort of NATO, the OSCE, the UNHCR, the US, and the Commission 
under the overall coordination of Leotard. Each actor took responsibility for tasks 
within its immediate sphere of competence. The UNHCR took responsibility for 
overseeing the return of reftigees and the displaced to their homes and the OSCE for 
policing and monitoring of the situation. Assistance with legislative reform was 
230 13 Ih August 01/ 163 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the signing of 
the framework agreement in Skopje 
231 Albanian per se was not strictly accorded this status. Rather the agreement provided for recognition 
and provision of education in any language spoken by more than 20% of the population. See 
Framework Agreement 13.08.01 hqp: //www. coe. int/T/E/Legal affairs/Leizal co- 
212eration/Police and internal securfty/Police cooperation/OHRID`/`2OAjzreementý/`2013auizust2OOl. 
aM viewed 7.12.03 
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provided by the OSCE, also in conjunction with the Council of Europe. in line with so 
much of what had gone before, the Commission took responsibility for the 
reconstruction effort. Overall, this was in addition to the support and aid already being 
provided by the Union in the context of the SAP, and also overall in terms of the 
Stability Pact. In addition, at this point the Commission proposed to extend the scope 
of the EAR to include Macedonia. From the beginning of 2002 it began operating in 
Macedonia (dealing with emergency assistance), in addition to Kosovo and also 
eventually took over the management of funds allocated through other programmes, 
most notably some of that coming from the RRM in the first instance and also 
eventually CARDS. NATO assumed responsibility for the security component of 
implementing the agreement, namely a deployment of 3,500 troops to collect NLA 
weapons for an initial period of 30 days (Operation Essential Harvest) which 
commenced on 27 th August. Though a state of relative peace and a functioning 
political system were re-established in Macedonia in the aftermath of the Ohrid 
Agreement, an international security presence was required for two years. NATO 
remained in place therefore beyond the duration of its initial mandate until the end of 
March 2003. It is interesting to remark in this context that it was the first autonomous 
deployment of an EU force under the ESDP that took over from NATO at this point to 
complete the task. It highlights the extent to which the Union has developed the 
competence to act in the variety of areas necessary in dealing with a situation such as 
the Macedonian conflict - drawing on an increasingly inter-linked range of 
instruments be they security, military, political or purely civilian related. This will be 
mentioned again in the concluding chapter, but it is possible to acknowledge the 
existence of a developing and more fully-competent European Foreign Policy in this 
specific regard without seeing it in the context of a developing state-type foreign 
policy. There is still something very specifically 'EU' about not just this approach, but 
so much of the overall approach culminating to an extent in Macedonia. 
8.3 Characterising the Reaction 
(i) A point of culmination? 
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The European Union's reaction and experience in Macedonia represents a point of 
culmination in many ways, occurring as it did after a decade of practical experience 
and formal development of competences. At this point, the two do start to come 
together more though within the overall context of a policy that was not entirely 
different to that attempted in 1991 in response to the Slovenian and Croatian conflicts. 
Here we can start to see the effects of initiatives set in motion throughout the decade, 
in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict, during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo 
conflict, the TEU and Treaty of Amsterdam and background developments of the 
ESDP. That is not to suggest that there was anything resembling perfect linkage 
between all these but there was a definite increase in terms of a sense of direction to 
the particular policy, with the majority of initiatives and actions fitting in with that 
policy and drawing much of their legitimacy from this particular context. Of course, 
the 'success' of the EU in Macedonia can be overstated, precisely because it did have 
over ten years of experience behind it when it came to dealing with the worst year of 
conflict (2001), both in its relations with Macedonia itself and the other conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia. 
It was also not an exclusive EU 'success' 232 . The participation of, in particular, 
the US and NATO was not just a welcome addition but a necessary component of the 
approach in order to provide the crucial security component and reinforced diplomatic 
weight. It was more a case of the EU doing better than it had done before. The reason 
why it 'did better' was that it had more successfully built both on what it was able to 
do most appropriately in this particular context and the already established ties 
between Macedonia and the Union. It also had at least something to do with the fact 
that the Macedonian conflict, while serious and quite dangerous in terms of its 
potential spill-over effect on regional security, was not as entrenched and protracted 
as the Bosnian or Kosovo conflicts. The basic structure of a functioning political 
system and economy were in place, even if they were stunted, divided, and unequal. A 
reforined constitution, assistance with reconstruction and reform and a relatively small 
security presence were required for peace - not a prolonged diplomatic effort, 
successive failed peace plans, sanctions, military intervention, or installation of an 
232 The term 'success' is used reluctantly in that the international response to this situation can only be 
deemed a success in relative comparison to the previous conflicts. The conflict here was contained to a 
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international administration. In other words, the Macedonian conflict involved less of 
a total break-down of society and that which required attention could be addressed 
within the range of the Union's capabilities to a great extent. However, there was still 
no return to the idea of the Union attempting to deal with the conflict alone, despite 
the development of both the relationship to the region and the development in terms 
of the Union's external competences. Co-operation with others was both necessary 
and desirable and now an integral part of the Union's approach from the outset. 
Within that however, the Union was to the fore. 
In contrast to earlier conflicts, the association dynamic had already been 
heavily drawn on prior to outbreak of the more serious conflict in 2001. The reaction 
prior to 1999 was relatively minor and focused on containing the conflict and 
minimising the negative impact of the other conflicts in Macedonia. This effort was 
dominated by the OSCE and the UN overall, with EC/EU expressing support and 
offering some assistance to the conflict prevention effort with some negotiation on 
contentious minority rights with the ICFY and, after 1995, inclusion of Macedonia 
within the Union's Regional Approach and the signing of a Cooperation Agreement in 
1998. However, the gap in Union assistance caused by the Union not recognising 
Macedonian independence and the side-effects of sanctions imposed in relation to the 
other conflicts did little to help the shaky new state establish itself more securely. 
The more systematic establishment of links and provision of aid to assist the 
reform and relief effort after 1995 was, however, crucial and gave the EU particular 
leverage in relation to the Macedonian authorities during the Kosovo crisis. The threat 
to regional stability caused by the massive exodus of refugees from Kosovo into 
Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro in particular, was profound. This was especially 
the case in relation to Macedonia and its tense geopolitical positioning and relations. 
The presence of thousands of Kosovar refugees in Macedonia in 1999 threatened to 
destabilise the state greatly, a fact which caused considerable tension between the 
authorities and the range of international organisations and relief agencies involved in 
tending to the emergency humanitarian needs of the refugees. One of the primary 
complaints was that the aid effort was targeted just at the refugee crisis, with not 
varying degree prior to 2001 and did not escalate as seriously as other conflicts, so in that sense was a 
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enough attention paid to the effects on the Macedonian state itself The context of the 
EU's prior approach is particularly relevant. Promises of aid and enhanced 
cooperation were effectively offered as a reward to Macedonia for cooperation with 
the international aid effort - and ultimately for the signing of the first SAA in the 
midst of conflict. 
It was in response to the 2001 conflict that the Union did begin to come into its 
own. In response to the emergence of the NLA and the descent into violence, the 
Union was clear in its support for the Macedonian authorities, calling on them also to 
exercise restraint and to engage in reform to address the grievances of the ethnic 
Albanian minority. In comparison to previous efforts, the diplomatic response was 
quite focused and more streamlined in terms of cooperation with the other actors 
involved. This was most manifest in the person and activity of the High 
Representative who gave the EU a more visible and consistent diplomatic presence. 
This was bolstered by the close cooperation between the High Representative and the 
External Affairs Commissioner who had a very crucial part to play in that the 
Commission was most significant in implementing and consolidating the close ties 
between the Union and Macedonia that provided a back-drop to all actions in this 
period and provided the context for the high-profile Union response. In addition, the 
close consultation and cooperation between Solana and Robertson, NATO Secretary 
General, was crucial in tern-is of providing the then missing military component and 
weight to the overall response. The cooperation of the EU's Special Representative 
and the US Special Envoy in terins of doing the groundwork for the Ohrid Agreement 
was also highly significant. In terms of the diplomatic response this was an EU-led 
effort with Solana as the focus representing the CFSP, in close collusion with the 
Commission due to its absolutely crucial involvement in the context of the aid, 
reconstruction, association and stabilisation processes. It provided a sense of 
momentum and a constant reminder of what was now a much clearer operational 
context within which to encourage cooperation. The collective weight of the EU 
(CFSP and the Commission), the US and NATO, added to the explicit incentive of 
closer association (this time actual potential membership in the form of the signed 
SAA) with the EU rendered this a significantly more effective approach than 
qualified success. 
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previously. In addition, the aid effort was linked to this process, with the exception of 
ECHO aid for immediate humanitarian purposes. Aid under the PHARE and 
OBNOVA programmes, and also eventually as allocated through the RRM, was 
linked into a response based on the Union as a focus for reconstruction and long-term 
reform and stabilisation through cooperation and association with the Union, 
accompanied by a heavy emphasis on regional cooperation as a basis and precondition 
for the provision of aid and closer ties. 
(ii) Balance between the reactive and strategic 
It would be going too far to suggest that what is in evidence in Macedonia is what 
could be described as a planned or strategic policy. It is more strategic than before, 
but still highly reactive. It is more the case that the previously devised approaches that 
attempted to provide more of a sense of direction or purpose to the EU-Ievel approach 
reach a point of culmination in Macedonia and informed the overall policy to a 
significantly greater extent than before. The Regional Approach, through to the 
Stability Pact and Stabilisation and Association process, the various aid and 
reconstruction programmes etc., provided a much clearer framework for the Union's 
involvement. The 2001 conflict was approached with a much clearer sense of a long- 
term perspective and the EU's role in this regard, not merely in rhetorical terms but in 
terms of the actually established links and programmes. This was further added to by 
the greater (though still far from complete) inter-linkage of the various strands to the 
Union's reaction giving a greater sense of coherence and purpose to the effort rather 
than the more random and disparate actions of the earlier reactions. 
(iii) Goals-capabilities linkage 
The linkage between goals and capabilities was also at its best to date in this 
period. This was aided by the accumulation of reforms and initiatives set in motion in 
previous years finally coming online and getting into their stride in relation to 
Macedonia. The most notable in this regard is the role of the High Representative in 
giving a more consistent and engaged focus to Union diplomatic activity, bolstered by 
close cooperation with the Commission and other actors, especially NATO. In 
addition the Regional Approach introduced in relation to the aftermath of the Bosnian 
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conflict and the various procedures, agencies and programmes introduced as the 
Stabilisation and Association process evolved had an immediate and tangible effect 
here. In addition, the ongoing development of the ESDP in the background began to 
feed in to the approach to Macedonia, in the form of the RRM and eventually in the 
233 form of Operation Concordia 
The combined contexts of the increasingly institutionalised ESDP and 
Regional/SAP provided a guiding framework and rather than entirely ad hoc 
responses to disparate events as they arose, the goals pursued in this period were 
better linked into their operational context in terms of capabilities, appropriateness 
and opportunity. The goals were to assist Macedonia in maintaining its stability prior 
to 2001, including during the Kosovo conflict. The Regional Approach and SAP 
provided a framework within which to encourage this, leading ultimately to the 
reward of the first SAA in 2001. After 2001 the goal was to secure peace and maintain 
the integrity of the Macedonian state and addressing the concerns of the ethnic 
Albanian minority through constitutional reform. Once again the Union was quite 
well positioned to take on the task of leading the international response this time. 
However, in contrast to the 1990/1991 reaction to the conflicts in Slovenia and 
Croatia, there was no sense of the Union going it alone. Rather there was a more 
comfortable cooperation with especially the two other most important actors in the 
fon-n of the United States and NATO. Within this, however, the Union adopted the 
guiding position with everything occurring within the longer-ten-n context of Union 
involvement in stabilisation and reform through the enticement of the perspective of 
Union membership and associated assistance and aid for reform and development. 
The presence of the United States added an extra degree of required weight to the 
diplomatic effort and NATO filled in the missing Union military competence until 
eventually the Union was in a position to perform the remaining elements of this task 
233 Operation Concordia was launched on the 31" March 2003, based on UNSCR 1371 and taking over 
from the NATO force deployed in the aftermath of the Ohrid Agreement. The operation makes use of 
NATO assets and capabilities and is comprised of just 350 military personnel, including 14 (then) non- 
EU countries and 13 member states. The aim of the operation to contribute to the consolidation of 
stability to allow the full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and in itself is stated to be 'part of 
the larger commitment of the EU to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its 
rapprochement with the EU within the Stabilisation and Association Process' 
http: //www. ue. eu. int/pesc/default. asp? lang=en 
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itself It is partly the result of this confluence of circumstances that make this policy 
the most integrated to date. 
Functions performed in context 
The roles or functions perfonned by the EC/EU in this period can be broadly 
characterised under the following headings: 
(a) Anchorframeworkfor Stabilisation and Reform 
This was explicit in this period. Macedonia had signed a Cooperation Agreement with 
the Union in 1998 but far more importantly it was negotiating a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement in the run up to the outbreak of the more serious period of 
conflict and signed it in its midst. As noted above, this did not prevent conflict, nor 
could it. However, it gave additional weight to the Union's position when it came to 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the 2001 crisis and confirmed the relevance of the 
Union's high-profile involvement. It also provided a context within which to 
encourage stabilisation and reform based on a longer-term commitment that no other 
actor was in a position to provide. For example UNMIK or the UN's High 
Representative in Bosnia were overseeing a transitional period whereas the SAP 
implied not just a long term commitment but potential integration of the partner 
country into Union structures. 
(b) Civilian monitorslobservers 
Again active in this period, EUMM was especially significant in tenns of monitoring 
events on the troublesome border between Kosovo and Macedonia, once again in 
close cooperation with the OSCE. 
(c) Sanctionslincentives 
The emphasis was on incentives in this period, with the imposition of just one 
sanction . 
The incentives were offered in the context of the SAA in terms of aid for 
reconstruction and development and with the exception of aid for short-term or 
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humanitarian purposes were based on the prmciple of conclitionality developed from 
the aftenuath of the Bosnian conflict. 
(d) MediatorlFacilitator of negotiations 
The Union played a significant part in this regard once again, though in close 
cooperation with the United States and NATO. There was also the more high-profile 
close cooperation between Solana and Patten, representing the Council and the 
Commission respectively. The context of close relations informed the diplomatic 
effort and provided a clear context for the Union's overall involvement. 
(e) Provision of aidfor humanitarian purposes 
Significant contributions were once again made to assist the humanitarian needs of 
civilians displaced or generally affected by the conflict. 
(f) Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation 
The provision of aid and assistance for stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction 
was notable in this period. The RRM gave the Union greater potential to act and 
deploy resources in order to facilitate short-term stabilisation efforts in the midst of a 
crisis. In Macedonia it was used to assist in the run-up to the signing of the Ohrid 
Agreement and in its aftermath, pending the formulation of a more long-term strategy 
which was subsequently managed by the EAR with funds coming from the CARDS 
programme. Therefore the provision of aid for these purposes in the short-term (as 
distinct from aid for humanitarian purposes) was better plugged into the overall 
stabilisation approach 
In marked contrast to the two previous phases the Union was a high-profile 
participant in many respects in this period. The participation of the United States was 
still necessary in order to provide additional weight. NATO provided the essential, if 
small scale, military component. Though the EU itself eventually took over the 
stabilisation tasks performed by NATO until the end of March 2003, this was on a 
very small scale and dependent on NATO resources in order to perfon-n the task. 
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Overall therefore, the primary overall function served by the EU was to provide some 
sense of context for the response that included some perspective of how to manage it 
in the longer-term beyond the more immediate need to stop the fighting. 
8.4 Conclusions 
After an unsteady start, the experience of ten years of experience in the former 
Yugoslavia, the series of developments and reforms and consolidated instruments and 
an increased sense of an appropriate operational framework combined to make this 
phase of Union activity one of the more notable. However, in judging the policy in 
terms of success or failure , it is crucial to be certain that like is being compared with 
like. In short, Macedonia was not Bosnia. Bosnia might be charactensed as the nadir 
of the reactions to the successive conflicts. Bosnia was also the most entrenched and 
complex of the conflicts and it occurred at a time when NO actor was in a position to 
devise an entirely adequate and fully appropriate response. Likewise, Macedonia 
occurred after a decade of experience, was not as out-of-control, and this time an 
approach couched in the promises of association and assistance could have more of an 
effect. Indeed, the power of this dynamic to halt conflict must not be over-estimated. 
On its own it simply cannot do that, rather in this instance it provided a framework 
within which to pursue the other means to end conflict, such as diplomacy. What it 
did provide was a longer-term perspective that had the potential to encourage 
stabilisation and hence, provide a much needed and more strategic dimension to the 
approach to the situation. In terms of responding and pursuing ends that it possessed 
the means to at least attempt to achieve, the reaction to Macedonia was at the very 
least approaching coherence. 
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9. Conclusion 
9.1 The EU, the Former Yugoslavia and European Foreign Policy 
Rationale 
The starting point of this thesis was that there is a valuable 'story' to be told 
n t.. about the nature of the European Union's own specific involvement in the former 
Yugoslavia overall through the course of the successive conflicts in the region. This 
constitutes an attempt to address the fact that what is missing in existing treatments to 
date is a sense of overall perspective that relates specifically to what the EU itself has 
done in relation to this particular issue and how it has (or has not) changed over time. 
This has involved a certain re-focusing and synthesising of what are several over- 
lapping narratives on the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the overall international 
response and the process of EU political integration. The emphasis here has been on 
the substance of what the European Union in particular did in relation to the former 
Yugoslavia through four conflicts between 1990 and 2002. The purpose of this is to 
establish what it was that the EU did or was done in its name (as distinct from other 
actors, including its own member states); the extent to and ways in which it has 
changed over time; and how the identified patterns of activity can be characterised. 
However, despite this restricted focus on the actions of the European Union, it has 
been argued that it is still crucial to see them in context in relation to the situation 
itself and the actions and roles performed by the other actors involved. 
(ii) Analyticalframework 
As part of the first step in accomplishing this, both the notion of European 
Foreign Policy and the context of the wars in the former Yugoslavia were addressed. 
In terms of European Foreign Policy, it was argued that concentration on formal 
developments and procedures separated from practice does not do justice to the range 
and dynamic of the EU's external actions, relations, roles and their development and 
consolidation over time. In the same way, concentration on the development of the 
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Union's external competence in terms of the CFSP pillar and the formal link of the 
EC institutions to it also does not pay due accord to the variety of the EU's external 
policies and the range of actors involved in its various activities. However, just as it is 
not sufficient to focus on the formal CFSP, it is also difficult to simultaneously 
account for, describe and analyse every aspect of the often over-lapping array that 
combines to make the whole suggested by Hill's definition of EFP as 'the sum of what 
the EU and its member states do in international relations' (Hill 1998,18). In order to 
deal with this problem, it was specified that it was strictly the development of the 
policy at the EU-Ievel that was under examination; in other words, the emphasis was 
on the common policy itself in order to isolate when it was that the EU-level 
specifically was acting as distinct from individual or sub-groupings of member-states. 
What has been set out here is an analytical framework that attempts to 
accomplish the tasks set out above, by accommodating both the formal development 
of EPC/CFSP and the need to consider a broader range of activity other than that 
emanating from the CFSP pillar, the need to see this activity in context in order to 
establish its relevance or appropriateness, and finally that allows the extent and nature 
of any change or development in the nature of the policy pursued to be characterised. 
This involves isolating the actions of the EU-Ievel, considering the full range of 
activity engaged in and locating it in its broader operational context but with the focus 
on how the EU-Ievel developed, and not that of the other mentioned actors. 
However, in order to measure the extent of any change the notion of foreign 
policy was assessed in terms of its applicability to the EU-1evel. It was concluded that 
while the notion of an EU foreign policy is not synonymous with state-type foreign 
policy, there are certain characteristics of foreign policy that are relevant to an 
analysis of the EU-level policy. These are: the fact that the policy must be externally 
directed; that it be implemented externally; and that it entail a degree of the purposive 
or strategic. It was argued that the EU is a non-unitary international actor and the 
extent of its potential impact or relevance vanes according to the issue in question and 
its capability to respond. In line with what is stated above regarding the need to 
consider the range of EU activity in the former Yugoslavia, the concept of foreign 
policy in the contemporary international arena is broader and more diffuse than is 
normally traditionally conceived, which reiterates the fact that in the case of the EU it 
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is not sufficient to focus just on the second pillar CFSP-related activities. An analysis 
of the substance of the EU's external activity permits a degree of liberation from 
state-centric inhibitions and allows an acknowledgement of the fact that the EU 
actually engages in extensive (if not comprehensive) levels of international action 
without prejudicing it with criticisms of failing to live up to both internal and external 
expectations. 
In terms of the treatment of EU activity in the former Yugoslavia specifically 
and attempting to redress an imbalance in existing treatments, the focus on the 
substance of policy, rather than procedure or policy-making, allows us to isolate what 
it was that the EU actually did (as distinct from other actors, focus on institutional 
procedure etc) and to better pennit a characterisation of the resulting policy and 
progress over time in terms of what it actually was and has and could do. In order to 
characterise the substance of policy and its development, it was considered in light of 
three key questions. 
First, the extent to which it could be described as reactive or strategic was 
considered. It was argued that external relations contains elements of both the reactive 
and the strategic but that foreign policy must at the very least display some level of a 
deliberate attempt to manage circumstances with which the Union is confronted. 
Rather than looking to identify an over-arching and coherent single strategy, it is more 
a case of looking for the extent to which some attempt to design, direct or proactively 
manage was inherent in the Union's external relations. Second, examining the policy 
actually pursued gives a clearer picture of what instruments can and have been used 
and to what effect. The extent to which a sense of purpose can be pursued will depend 
on the existence of and ability to mobilise the relevant and appropriate instruments in 
order to bring about the desired results. This reveals what the Union actually was 
capable of doing as a collective and the way in which the available instruments have 
been used as distinct from, but still in the context of, the formal evolution and design 
of the CFSP. 
Finally, consideration was also given to the extent to which the context within 
which the EU operated influences the ability to follow a particular course of action. 
The EU's actions need to be situated in context in order to consider it in tenns of its 
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appropriateness, not only as regards the EU's intentions and capabilities, but also in 
ten-ns of the nature of the particular issue being addressed. The EU has common 
policies, as opposed to a single common policy that vary in their extent and nature 
depending on the issue in questions. In this regard a sense of context and the relevant 
roles and actions of other actors is important. The EU policy must be seen in its 
operational context in order to arrive at conclusions as to the relative importance of 
the Union's action in this particular instance, and also the roles and functions that the 
patters of EU activity show it to be performing. 
9.2 The EU and the Former Yugoslavia 
(i) Activity 1990-2002 
As the course of Yugoslavia's disintegration progressed over the decade leaving a 
succession of conflict in its wake, the European Union was undergoing extensive 
development of its own, with at least some of it in terms of external relations directly 
related to the experience of the foriner Yugoslavia. What has been the central task 
here has been to look at the substance of the EU's own policy in relation to these 
successive crises and to ascertain the extent to and ways in which the policy itself 
changed over time. In terms of the substance of policy, a wide range of types of 
activity were engaged in, some more predictable and traditional forms of international 
action or intervention and some highly novel. What is also interesting to note is the 
ways in which the overall types of policy and approach engaged in from one end of 
the period under examination here to the other have not changed but the manner of 
their execution has significantly. 
From the outset constant recourse to the Union's own integrative and association 
dynamic was made, even though the likely consequences of such rhetoric were not 
thought through. First invoked in response to the initial impending crisis involving 
Slovenia and Croatia, it was to remain in place until it was given more tangible forin, 
with the signing of the first Stabilisation and Association Process with the FYR of 
Macedonia in 2001. This was to provide some sense of an evolving framework to the 
European Union's actions over the course of the decade. Within this however, other 
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significant developments also occurred, mostly in terms of a honing in on a particular 
approach which the restrictions and requirements of circumstances and achievable 
consensus permitted. 
As was argued from the outset, the accounts of what was done in the fori-ner 
Yugoslavia reveal how a broad focus in terms of types and sources of activity was 
required in order to capture the full picture. Even in the first phase discussed, in 
relation to Slovenia and Croatia, the limits of the then system of EPC did not restrict 
EC activity to just diplomatic measures, though they did predominate. The initial 
reaction and subsequent diplomatic efforts was in line with that adopted towards the 
rest of the former Communist East, building on an already well-establi shed 
cooperative relationship between the Yugoslav federation and the European Union. 
The sanctions imposed in this period to a significant extent relied on this dynamic 
also. 
Sight of this approach was lost somewhat in the initial response to the Bosnian 
conflict and the EC/EU moved away from even claims of adopting an overall 
leadership approach to the international response. This was because of the failure of 
the initial response to end the conflict in Croatia, and also because the Bosnian issue 
was more complex, violent and intractable and required resources which the EC/EU 
, could not supply. Coinciding with the coming 'on-line' of the new CFSP, this did 
not mark the commencement of a new phase of high-profile activity. It was rather less 
ambitious and visible, especially as the conflict became more protracted and complex. 
The EU was increasingly sidelined by other actors but towards the end of 1995 and 
into 1996 begins to develop a sense of a clearer perspective, and hence a fledgling 
strategy of what it could and should do in relation to this issue specifically. This 
understanding of the relevance of what could a particular role for the EU contains 
strong resonances of the initial approach adopted in 1991. Overall, EU activity 
centred on diplomacy, support for and implementation of sanctions, the provision of 
aid for humanitarian purposes, the administration of Mostar, and finally post-conflict 
reconstruction and regional stabilisation. In terms of diplomacy the EC/EU effort may 
not have made an earth-shattering difference but it was intense and constant at the 
same time. Despite reforms, such as the creation of the ECHO, the Union still 
struggled to make a strongly effective contribution to the international aid effort in a 
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swift and systematic manner. The administration of Mostar was significant, and 
despite it not being the intention at the time, was to provide a basis for the 
consolidation of the future EU's approach to international affairs. 
However it is towards the end of this period that the Union begins to revert back 
to the underlying logic of the initial approach, when activity begins to centre on the 
issue of post-conflict reconstruction and regional stabilisation, within a framework 
that involved heavy participation of other actors. An emphasis on post conflict 
reconstruction and development was evident throughout the Union's dealings ranging 
from the ICFY to Mostar. A longer-ten-n commitment was consistently implied. 
However, clearer articulation of what form this would take was only beginning to 
become apparent in this period. It came in the form of pre- and post-Dayton 
expressions of commitment to the reconstruction and stabilisation effort and in the 
form of the Royaumont Process and the Regional Approach. Though still stronger on 
aspiration or framework than on actual action, the emphasis on regional cooperation 
as the way towards long-term peace and stability was significant. 
This further fed into the approach taken towards the Kosovo crisis. Though on 
a first glance this period is marked by an apparent low level of activity on the part of 
the EU, it is arguably the most notable to this point in that there was a greater sense of 
realism in terms of what the EU could do based on previous experience, and not just 
in a negative sense. What is interesting is that the range of activity engaged in is not 
substantially different to that of Bosnia in terms of overall type. What is different, 
however, is the manner and scope in which it was conducted and where the relative 
emphases lay. What is notable overall is a clear appreciation of the range of actors 
involved in dealing with the crisis and the need to coordinate these many different 
types of response rather than jumping to try to cover too many ftinctions itself Acting 
in a supporting capacity in terms of diplomacy, supporting and also taking a lead in 
terms of the imposition of sanctions and participating in the aid effort with a strong 
emphasis on the need to coordinate and cooperate with other aid agencies was explicit 
from the outset in relation to Kosovo. This approach formed the basis of the 1998 
Comprehensive Approach in which the Union set out its position in relation to actions 
and policies of other actors and the contribution it had and could continue to make. 
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It also formed part of the basis of the Stability Pact for South East Europe that 
was launched in direct relation to the Kosovo crisis. The Stability Pact was intended 
to provide a framework for the coordination of the activities of all the actors involved 
in the region with the longer term objective of facilitating the development and 
stabilisation of the region. While adopting a leadership role in the Stability Pact, the 
Union's own particular role within the Pact was to provide an 'anchorage' to the 
countries of the region to greater encourage the levels of necessary reform and 
compliance. In light of this the Stabilisation and Association Process was launched, 
though its impact was not immediately felt in Kosovo specifically. This introduced 
the explicit perspective of EU membership to the countries of the region as the end 
result of a process or reconstruction and reform. At the same time moves to 
restructure the Union's aid for reconstruction and development were put in place, 
making explicit distinction between humanitarian aid and reconstruction aid, and 
confinning the notion of conditionality for the continued provision of the latter. 
Significant also was first the Union's willingness to play a leading part in post- 
conflict Kosovo and second its assumption of responsibility for a significant pillar of 
UNMIK. What can be seen is movement towards a distinct and definitely EU 
approach to the region with an increased sense of what should be made more coherent 
and how. The emphasis remained on the particular part the EU could play in relation 
to the region, drawing heavily on its own integrative dynamics and their strong draw 
on the former Communist east as a whole. Overall, despite being less visible as an 
actor in the throes of the conflict than before this was not necessarily a bad thing. 
Before, when highly visible it was usually when attempting to achieve what it simply 
could not achieve. 
The European Union's reaction and experience in Macedonia represents a point of 
culmination in many ways, occurring as it did after a decade of practical experience 
and forinal development of competences. At this point, to an extent, the two do start 
to come together though more within the overall context of a policy that was not 
entirely different to that attempted in 1991 in response to the Slovenian and Croatian 
conflicts. Here we can start to see the effects of initiatives set in motion throughout 
the decade, in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict, during and in the aftermath of the 
Kosovo conflict, the TEU and Treaty of Amsterdam and background developments of 
the ESDP. That is not to suggest that there was anything resembling perfect linkage 
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between all these but there was a definite increase in terms of a sense of direction to 
the particular policy, with the majority of initiatives and actions fitting in with that 
policy and drawing much of their legitimacy from this particular context. Co- 
operation with others was both necessary and desirable and now an integral part of the 
Union's approach from the outset. 
In contrast to earlier conflicts, the association dynamic had already been 
heavily drawn on prior to the outbreak of the more serious conflict in 2001. The more 
systematic establishment of links and provision of aid to assist the reform and relief 
effort after 1995 was, however, crucial and gave the EU particular leverage in relation 
to the Macedonian authorities during the Kosovo crisis. Promises of aid and enhanced 
cooperation were effectively offered as a reward to Macedonia for cooperation with 
the international aid effort - an ultimately for the signing of the first SAA in the midst 
of conflict. 
It was in response to the 2001 conflict that the Union did begin to come into its 
own. In comparison to previous efforts, the diplomatic response was quite focused 
and more stream-lined in terins of cooperation with the other actors involved. This 
was most manifest in the person and activity of the High Representative who gave the 
EU a more visible and consistent diplomatic presence. This was bolstered by the close 
cooperation between the High Representative and the External Affairs Commissioner 
who had a very crucial part to play in that the Commission was most significant in 
implementing and consolidating the close ties btween the Union and Macedonia that 
provided a back-drop to all actions in this period and provided the context for the 
high-profile Union response. It provided a sense of momentum and a constant 
reminder of what was now a much clearer operational context within which to 
encourage cooperation. 
(ii) Overall balance between the reactive and the strategic 
From the outset, it must be acknowledged that the overall approach was 
largely ad hoc and reactive. The initial framework out of which the EC responded and 
subsequently acted was, as noted above, the wider association and cooperation 
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process with former- Communist Europe in general. The emphasis was on 
encouraging democratisation and market reforin, using the prospect of building on the 
existing relationship and the developing closer ties to encourage the stabilisation of 
the political situation. This provided a back drop to overall activity, including the 
diplomatic process. However, it was very loose, vague and undefined and there was 
little coherence or congruence between the various activities that were engaged in. 
The commitment to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation that becomes 
more pronounced towards the end of the Bosnian conflict and the Royaumont Process 
and Regional Approach veers a little more towards what might be described as the 
more strategic. However, here there is more aspiration and loose framework than any 
real sense of the obviously strategic, even in the heavily qualified understanding of 
the term. It is the extent to which this is then built upon that proves significant. 
This was further elaborated and consolidated in relation to Kosovo but it 
would be a mistake to say that what was emerging was an entirely 'strategic' EU 
approach to the crisis and the region. It was still relatively ad hoc and the most that 
was being done was building on and consolidating past practice rather than launching 
a new integrated and coherent EU policy towards the region. What was being built on 
was the hint of the strategic in the previous conflicts, namely the approach to post- 
conflict reconstruction and stabilisation of the region drawing on the EU's own 
enlargement dynamic in the forin of the Stability Pact, the Stabilisation ad 
Association Process, and the creation of the European Reconstruction Agency. 
However, the effort to bring more of a sense of coordination to the international effort 
and the development of the Union's own particular strength in relation to the region to 
the point of introducing the explicit membership perspective, did indicate a 
significantly higher degree of the deliberate and the proactive. It does represent a 
conscious attempt to manage the situation and to prevent conflict there in the future. 
It would be going too far to suggest that what is in evidence in Macedonia is 
what could be described as a planned or strategic policy. It is more strategic than 
before, but still highly reactive. It is more the case that the previously devised 
approaches that attempted to provide a better a sense of direction or purpose to the 
EU-1evel approach reach a point of culmination in Macedonia and informed the 
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overall policy to a significantly greater extent than before. The Regional Approach, 
through to the Stability Pact and Stabilisation and Association process, the various aid 
and reconstruction programmes provided a much clearer framework for the Union's 
involvement. The 2001 conflict was approached with a much clearer sense of a long- 
term perspective and the EU's role in this regard, not merely in rhetorical terms but in 
concrete terins in terms of the actually established links and programmes. This was 
further added to by the greater (though still far from complete) inter-connection of the 
various strands to the Union's reaction giving a greater sense of coherence and 
purpose to the effort rather than the more random and disparate actions of the earlier 
reactions. 
(iii) Overall goals-capabilities linkage 
The gradual development of more of a guiding framework which increasingly 
informed the overall response was aided by a better degree of linkage between goals 
and capabilities over time. The degree of clear linkage between goals and capabilities 
in the first period was inadequate and was the main reason why the EC's reaction and 
approach has been perceived as such a dismal failure. This was set up as an issue the 
EC could deal with -a European issue that 'Europe' was most suited to dealing with. 
That view was not entirely mistaken. The mistake was in the over-inflated nature of 
the goals and therefore expectations set and the inability of the EC to achieve them. 
This particular issue required a more comprehensive approach than the EC was 
capable of at this point in time and this had a great deal to do with the complexity of 
the Yugoslav question itself. It was not a case of being the wrong actor to deal with 
situation. It was more a case of it being the wrong actor to attempt to deal with it 
alone. 
As already noted, the Bosnian conflict coincided with the inauguration of the 
EU's new Common Foreign and Security Policy and expectations were high as 
regards what it was that the EU acting as a collective could achieve and what the 
extent of its supposedly higher profile would be. New instruments and procedures 
may have implied in theory that a more comprehensive collective policy was now 
possible. However, in practice what can be seen is a policy that did not live up to the 
pre-TEU hype. However, on the other hand, the gap between the goals expressed 
190 
during the Bosnian crisis and actual capabilities is in actual fact not as wide as might 
be expected. What the EU actually did was what the EU was actually capable of 
reflective of capabilities and importantly, the extent to which the member states 
agreed collectively to utilise these capabilities. Part of the problem lies in the fact that 
the set of goals pursued was relatively ad hoc and without a clear sense of purpose, 
direction or longer-term consequence. A hint of a guiding framework begins to 
emerge at the end of this period in the form of the EU's increasingly expressed desire 
to participate in post-war reconstruction and longer-term regional stabilisation and the 
hint of the basis of more a coherent and goal-orientated policy linked to actual 
capabilities. 
Kosovo was also marked by certain development in this regard. Unlike the 
previous two phases of conflict in Yugoslavia, no attempt was made by the EU to take 
responsibility for or manage the response to the conflict. The new arrangements and 
reforms of existing mechanisms were channelled into the fulfilment of what might in 
one sense be considered more limited goals e. g. provision of aid and reconstruction 
assistance. However, on the other hand, engaging in a process that had as its primary 
objective the encouragement of the stabilisation of one of the historically most 
troubled and turbulent parts of Europe can hardly be dismissed as a limited goal. Yet, 
the Union began to focus its efforts on this. 
In relation to Macedonia, the linkage between goals and capabilities was also at its 
best to date in this period. This was aided by the accumulation of reforms and 
initiatives set in motion in previous years finally coming online and getting into their 
stride in relation to Macedonia. The most notable in this regard is the role of the High 
Representative in giving a more consistent and engaged focus to Union diplomatic 
activity, bolstered by close cooperation with the Commission and other actors, 
especially NATO. In addition the Regional Approach introduced in relation to the 
aftermath of the Bosnian conflict and the various procedures, agencies and 
programmes introduced as the Stabilisation and Association process evolved had an 
immediate and tangible effect here. In addition, the ongoing development of the 
ESDP in the background began to feed-in to the approach to Macedonia, notably first 
with in the form of the RRM and eventually in the forin of Operation Concordia. 
191 
The combined contexts of the increasingly institutionalised ESDP, Regional 
Approach and SAP provided a guiding framework and rather than entirely ad hoc 
responses to disparate events as they arose, the goals pursued in this period were 
better linked into their operational context in ten'ns of capabilities, appropriateness 
and opportunity. Within an overall approach that involved other significant actors, the 
Union adopted a prominent guiding position with everything occurring within the 
longer-term context of Union involvement in stabilisation and reform through the 
enticement of the perspective of Union membership and associated assistance and aid 
for refon-n and development. 
(iV) Functions performed 1990-2002 
As previously argued, looking at the functions perforined by the European Union in 
particular provide a useful means through which to characterise the nature of patterns 
in the activity and policy actually pursued. It also makes clearer the distinction 
between the EU and other actors, and also where functions over-lap or coalesce, what 
was the particular EU-function or role. As outlined in Chapter 2, the notion of a role is 
not assumed to be synonymous with anything fixed or universally understood and 
defined. However, the patterns of activity, characterised in terms of function and then 
linked back to the previously outlined notions of the strategic and goals-cap abilities 
linkage and looking at how the actual policy evolved over time under the following 
main headings brings us further towards an overall characterisation of the policy and 
how it had evolved. The main functions performed by the EC/EU in relation to the 
four conflicts covered in this thesis between 1990 and 2002 can be characterised as 
follows: 
(a) MediatorTacilitator of Negotiations 
Beginning with the intensive effort of 1991 it became quickly apparent that 
this was a task which the EU could not overall deal with alone or just relying even on 
what was a developing framework which might have rendered the Union the most 
appropriate actor to deal with this task in relation to this issue. The Union has proved 
to be useful in difficult negotiations that require persistence and a willingness to 
address the long-term. Where it improved in this regard was firstly in consolidating 
the basis on which the Union itself could contribute to longer term stabilisation and 
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reform, secondly in better cooperating with other relevant actors and thirdly in 
actually using the increasingly coherent operational framework to inform the 
diplomatic process in addition to the tasks coming more directly under the more 
practical remit of the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. This is evident in the 
contrast between 1991 and 2001 where a remarkably similar policy was in operation 
with the significant difference being in the manner of its execution. The association 
logic was not sufficient alone, despite its greater coherence and elaboration by 2001. 
The participation of the US and NATO was crucial in order to round out the response 
and provide added weight. The region and issue specific nature of the EU's potential 
influence is highly significant in this regard. The Union's diplomatic presence and 
relevance was improved by its better linkage to an overall Union approach. However, 
this applied very specifically to Macedonia and the pre-existing relationship and the 
Particular circumstances there. It would not have been so significant elsewhere. 
(b) Post-conflict civil administrationlreconstruction 
With its first experience of post-conflict civil administration in Mostar and its 
important involvement in UNMIK, the Union has established itself as one of the range 
of relevant actors suited to serving this particular functions in this regard in Europe. 
There has been some development in this regard, but mostly in terms of a greater 
concentration and channelling of efforts into this particular type of activity given the 
fact that the Union is relatively well equipped to perform it. This is specifically in 
terms of the dominant task undertaken within UNMIK in relation to economic 
development and also the emphasis on reconstruction as part of the overall EU 
supervised implementation of the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia. This function is 
perfon-ned alongside and in cooperation with a range of other relevant actors, most 
notably NATO, the OSCE and of course the UN but the EU has become a crucial 
participant due mainly to its connection to the region and the suitability of its 
capabilities in this regard. 
Promoter of regional cooperation with a view to stabilisation 
This became a primary basis of the Unions overall approach after the Bosnian conflict 
and was significant in that it did recognise the fact that stability in the region would be 
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more or less impossible without the fostering of better relations between the former 
yugoslav republics. To a limited extent this had been implicit throughout in that the 
Union always placed an emphasis on the need for some kind of over-arching structure 
within which to improve relations and thereby minimise the potential for conflict. 
This was explicit in the negotiations at the Hague Conference until the recognition 
process and the conflict ran out of control and overtook the possibility of negotiating 
such a settlement. After 1995 the Regional Approach as it developed was linked to the 
association process, thus in effect offered the prospect of closer association with and 
potential integration into Union structures as the very over-arching structure within 
which to encourage regional stability and minimise the potential for further conflict. 
This was not a function that any other actor was in a position to perforrn - even the 
United Nations who at most could offer interim assistance, no matter how long that 
interim period eventually would come to last (as in the case of Kosovo). 
(d) Anchor/Framework and coordinatorfor stabilisation, reconstruction 
and reform 
This aspect of Union involvement underwent significant development, as mentioned 
above moving from offering closer relations between the EC and the Yugoslav 
federation prior to war to the launching of the Stablisation and Association Process 
whereby the membership perspective was offered in a process more customised to the 
particular circumstances of the region. This comprised the dominant EU function and 
it increased in scope and coherence over the decade, with the emphasis on post-war 
reconstruction, regional cooperation and stabilisation being made more explicit in 
overall rhetoric, the basis of aid mechanisms and finally feeding into diplomatic 
efforts also. The Union's provision of 'anchorage' was its particular role in the overall 
international effort, as highlighted by the main Union role in the Stability Pact. 
Imposition ofsanctions, provi . sion of incentives and aidfor 
humanitarian purposes. 
The Union also served a function as the vehicle for the imposition of sanctions and for 
assisting in the implementation of sanctions imposed with the contexts of UNSCRs 
both within and beyond the Union. The promise and provision of incentives drew on 
the association dynamic outlined above and developed in its impact and centrality as 
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the decade progressed with the ever increasingly emphasis on conditionality 
in the 
provision of aid for anything other than humanitarian purposes. 
6D Civilian monitoring 
In close cooperation with the OSCE, the ECMM created in 1991 became a constant 
fixture and a constant EU presence on the ground in the conflict zones. It thus became 
a central component of Union activity 
9.3 The Development of European Foreign Policy? 
The intention as outlined has been to consider the activity of the EU-level 
overall, as distinct form the member states in order to establish the extent to and ways 
in which it has changed over time. The ways in which the actual activity itself has 
changed over the course of the conflicts in Slovenia/Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Macedonia has been outlined above. The remaining question is therefore, 
how the nature of this change can be characterised in tenns of the development of 
European Foreign Policy as was defined in Chapter Two. 
On the whole, it can be concluded that the European Union engaged in a 
range of activity in the former Yugoslavia and was active, to varying degrees through 
out the entire period under examination. Focusing on the activity of the EU-level and 
perspective of looking at over ten years of activity has revealed that while the Union's 
overall policy developed quite significantly, this was not in a manner that might be 
expected. For this reason, it would be possible to suggest that little 'development' had 
actually occurred as the approach throughout was in fact remarkably similar. 
However, the main development did not come in terms of the dramatic widening of 
the types of activity engaged in by the Union or attempts to better act in a more state- 
like manner but rather in a better channelling of both existing competences and new 
instruments into the better execution of what became the central fundamental aspects 
of Union policy towards the region. 
The sense of perspective emphasised in this thesis has also shown how the 
account of activity in the former Yugoslavia and the formal development of the 
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Union's external competences does not always sit comfortably with each other. To 
just focus on the Immediate effects of the TEU on the policy in Bosnia, for example, 
would be to almost miss the highly significant emphasis on post-conflict 
reconstruction and the regional approach that emerges towards the end of the conflict. 
Despite three major Treaties coming into effect in this period, and the development of 
the ESDP the overall policy performed did not change significantly in terms of overall 
type, as can be seen in the very close resemblance between the functions performed in 
relation to Slovena/Croatia and Macedonia, over ten years apart. There is also the 
issue of a certain amount of 'time-lag' in terms of enhanced competence being 
actually felt in practice. It was more the case of new instruments and competences 
being channelled into the better fulfilment of what was a slowly evolving overall 
Union approach to the region, rather than branching it off into any significantly new 
directions. 
The analysis of the EU-level's activity overall beyond a simple focus on the 
CFSP has shown just how broad the EU's activity in relation to the conflicts outlined 
here has been. To focus on the CFSP would have been to focus on a problematic 
diplomatic effort and miss capturing what has shown to be quite a broad and 
increasingly appropriate policy for the region. The heavy reliance on the association 
dynamic, post-war reconstruction and stabilisation, the provision of aid and the 
implementation of sanctions. were the central components of the overall approach, not 
mere side activities and relied on the heavy involvement of the EC pillar, most 
notably the Commission. In addition, it was not simply just a case of using EC 
instruments and polices to reinforce CFSP policy. First pillar activities themselves 
became highly political, forming in fact the basis of what was to grow into the 
Union's overall policy towards the countries of South East Europe. 
Rather than limiting the analysis to the extent to which the Union's policy has 
developed in terms of coming to resemble what might strictly be described as state 
foreign policy, the Union's activity was analysed and characterised throughout in 
tenns of the extent to which it displayed some sense of the strategic in its overall 
approach, the degree of linkage between goals pursed and the capability to pursue 
them and the functions performed in context. This was in acknowledgement of the 
fact that there are certain key factors which cannot be ignored when it comes to 
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drawing a distinction between what can be labelled external relations or foreign 
policy. However, beyond this it has been argued that there is little to prevent the EU's 
external activity being characterised as a sui generis foreign policy. 
What were we are looking for is what Winn & Lord have defined as 
ýurposive and sustained efforts to influence the international environment' (Winn & 
Lord 2001; 17) and the extent to which an attempt has been made to manage or design 
an approach within the context of some kind of plan or guiding framework. As shown 
through the accounts of Union activity, the overall approach towards the region was 
increasingly conducted with the context of a particular Union role in relation to post- 
conflict reconstruction and longer terin stabilisation, drawing on the Union's own 
increasingly articulated association dynamic. In addition, overall goals were 
increasingly linked to this process and couched in its rhetoric and existing and new 
instruments increasingly channelled into it. The main types of functions performed 
did not change significantly in terms of type, rather they changed more in terms of the 
extent to which they became the main components of the developing foreign policy. 
The main development has been in the increased extent to which the Union injected a 
greater sense of purpose and strategy into what the essence of the pre-existing 
activity, accompanied by greater - though still insufficient - channelling of resources 
and instrument into the fulfilment of these purposes. 
What is in evidence is not one single overarching policy per se, but rather sets 
of common policies that are representative of when interests do converge over a 
specific issue combined with the competence and will to act in order to achieve them. 
The EU had several policies in the fori-ner Yugoslavia as shown in the range of 
activity engaged in. This recalls the distinction made by Ginsberg between foreign 
policy activity: the process of 'integrating the policies and actions of the member 
states towards the outside world' and foreign policy: a composition of mutually 
related joint actions that set forth a unified position intended to serve predetermined 
objectives' (Ginsberg 1989; 4) Judgedaccordingly the Union very definitely engaged 
in a high-level of foreign policy activity but the extent to which it can be said to have 
progressed towards possessing a foreign policy in these ternis is less clear-cut. As was 
shown, towards and into 2001 the operational framework of Union activity based on 
the Stabilisation and Association process did begin to inforin the wider range of 
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activity, including the provision of aid and even diplomatic efforts. However, this was 
quite loose and by no means consistently coherent but it was a considerably more 
integrated and coherent than it was in 1991. 
Therefore it can be argued that by 2001 the EU had developed an increasingly 
purposive, coherent and integrated policy towards the former Yugoslavia. The vast 
majority of activity was conducted within an overall framework. This can be taken so 
far as to argue that the various components of even the EDSP did not really mark a 
dramatic leap forward in tenns of EU-level policy in the region. The civilian crisis- 
management and conflict prevention components were essentially a consolidation of 
much that had already been done in the former Yugoslavia, combined with new 
procedures and instruments that rounded out the existing policy rather than branching 
it off into any significantly new directions. This even includes Operation Concordia 
that was very much conducted within the context of the stabilisation process. Though 
adding a military facet to the Unions's existing competences, the basis of the overall 
policy was still based on economic, political and diplomatic processes. 
However, this brings us back to the fact that just as there is no definitive 
overarching EFP towards the former Yugoslavia, there is no overarching EFP overall. 
EU policies are time, issue and region specific and much concerning the policy in the 
former Yugoslavia is as such precisely because of the geographical , connections and 
relations between the Union , its member states and 
the region both historically and 
more recently. The activity of the EU in relation to the former Yugoslavia between 
1990-2002 has developed quite remarkably in the direction of what might be 
described as a limited and context specific foreign policy in its own right, as distinct 
from those of its member states. 
9.4 Conclusion 
Over the course of its involvement in the former Yugoslavia, the EU has 
become capable in formal terms of using a full range of instruments usually 
associated with the notion of foreign policy. At the same time, it 
fulfilled a broad 
range of functions and has been shown to be pursuing an increasingly proactive and 
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integrated policy towards the region which has here been characterised as a European 
Foreign Policy. However, this has not meant that the EU has been moving towards 
functioning as a state-like actor. Rather, there is something quite specifically 'EU' 
about the European Foreign Policy that has developed in this context. The real 
development has occurred in the way the Union has increasingly used the 'pull' of its 
own association dynamic in order to provide a framework to the range of actions 
engaged in. By the end 2003, the EU has acted across the range of foreign policy 
competences but the overall nature of the policy pursued has not changed dramatically 
between 1990 and 2003. New and old instruments were increasingly channelled into 
the fulfilment of this core EU policy towards the fon-ner Yugoslavia. What is also 
interesting is the extent of first pillar involvement in this policy, not just in 
implementing CFSP policy but in acting as one of the key players in the pursuit of the 
overall policy. On the whole, the EU has been shown to have fulfilled some important 
functions within the broader international response and in doing so it has found its 
purpose in relation to the region, based on what it is in a position to most successfully 
do. Not an overarching or comprehensive foreign policy, in this instance the EU has 
been shown to have developed a distinct and significant foreign policy towards the 
former Yugoslavia, as distinct from other actors involved, including its own member 
states. 
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II th December 99/253 Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council 
6 th March 01 /049 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the violent 
attacks near the village of Tanusevici 
gth March 011055 Declaration by the Presidency on the security situation at the 
FYROM's border with the FRY 
24 th March Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council - Declaration on the 
FYROM, 
15 th May 01/2000 Statement on the 2346 th Council meeting - General Affairs. 
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9th April 0 1/199 Statement on the 2342 d Council Meeting - General Affairs 
3 rd /4'hJune 99/099 Conclusions of the Cologne European Council 
25'ý June 01/202 Statement on the 2362 nd Council Meeting - General Affairs 
29th June 0 1/ 18 5 Joint Action. 
16 th July 0 1/ 18 8 Common Position concerning a visa ban against extremists in 
FYROM 
6th July 01/203 Statement on the 2367 th Council meeting - General Affairs 
26 th June 01/ 13 3 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on 
the situation in FYROM 
13 th August 0 1/ 163 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on 
the signing of the framework agreement in Skopje 
EC. - 
Council Regulation (EQ No 2666/2000 of 5 th December 2000 on assistance for 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CARDS Regulation) 
Council Regulation (EQ No 1628/96 of 25 th jUly 1996 on assistance for Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Fonner 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Obnova Regulation) 
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